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Direct quotes from research participants are written in italics, but without quotation 
marks. Where a quote is in italics with double quotation marks, it indicates that an 
English term was used in Bengali by the research partipant. Quotes from secondary 
sources are written with single quotation marks when in the body of the text, while 
larger quotes are separated and indented without quotation marks. Important Bengali 
terms are transliterated into English, italicised, and their meanings defined when first 
used. Where a particular Bengali expression has been used that is deemed important, 
the transliterated Bengali is also provided in italics. Both quotes from research 
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Bangladesh is often perceived as disordered, characterised by the absence of law 
abiding systems of governance, and with the poor left to rely on corrupt and 
dysfunctional relationships. This thesis tells a different story. Examining the lives of 
people living in the open and most basic slums ethnographically in Dhaka city reveals 
that people have complex dependencies on ‘intermediaries’ or ‘brokers’ to access 
resources. Rather than see these relationships as dysfunctional, the core argument 
developed is that they are inherently part of how social order is maintained in 
Bangladeshi society. If order is understood as contingent on actors throughout society 
establishing a dominant capability for violence and accruing resources on this basis, 
then intermediation can be seen as a prominent means by which both of these ends are 
achieved. These relationships are thus intertwined with how violence is organised and 
controlled. A young man who grew up at a bazar described how people need to live in 
the shade of others, and this metaphor is used to portray this phenomenon. This thesis 
argues that intermediation in Dhaka has changed significantly over the past decade, 
with the mastan gangs once identified as powerful in radical decline, replaced by 
wings of the ruling political party. At the lowest levels of urban society, a complex 
web of intermediaries exists, including labour leaders, political leaders, their followers 
and informers. Some people attempt to rise in this order by mobilising as factions and 
demonstrating their capability for violence, but more generally people employ tactics 
and strategies for avoiding, negotiating and even exiting these relationships. 
Negotiating these relationships and one’s place in this order is conceptualised here as 











At the age of around ten, a young boy called Golap came alone to Dhaka from a village 
in Bhola district, at the very south of Bangladesh, where he had lived with his father, 
stepmother and two younger siblings. His father had worked away from the village as 
a night coach driver, only coming back one or two days a month, and did not seem to 
care for him (he didn’t listen to my news, as Golap put it). Meanwhile his stepmother 
had abused him and prevented him from going to school. And so he decided to run 
away, taking a launch to Dhaka and coming to Karwan Bazar – a large wholesale 
market at the centre of the city - where he knew he had a cousin working in the fish 
market. Golap stayed with his cousin and for the first couple of years they slept when 
they could on the large planks of timber in a shop to the south of the bazar, and he 
survived by stealing vegetables at night, then buying rice and cooking for himself. As 
goods pour in to the bazar from the country’s districts by truck, they are moved onto 
smaller rickshaw vans to find their way to the appropriate wholesaler. For years Golap 
and a couple of other young boys at the cusp of their teenage years would work their 
way around the bazar every night, sometimes cutting small holes in the sacks on the 
backs of the rickshaws as they moved or picking off vegetables from shops, and 
making off with as much as they could.  
In the early hours of the morning they then used to crouch down at the side of the paths 
at the bazar and sell the vegetables in small ten taka1 piles, before giving a share of 
their profit to a boro bhai (big brother) who used to protect them if a shop owner or 
the police caught them. Their boro bhai was a drug dealer operating from a nearby 
bosti (slum) along the railway line. If they made 500 taka in a night, they would give 
him 200 taka. Despite his support the work was still risky, and Golap was beaten up 
on a number of occasions. After a couple of years he got the opportunity to fill in for 
someone as a street newspaper seller, and around this time he was also taken in by a 
local NGO for boys, and allowed to shower at their centre as well as sleep there during 
the day. After a short stint selling newspapers he got work on a bus through a friend. 
At first he was a “helper”, responsible for rounding up customers, alerting people by 
banging the side of the bus; then he became a “conductor”, responsible for taking 
people’s fares and managing passengers; and for the past six months now aged around 
eighteen, a “driver”, though he earns less because he is yet to have a driving license.  
Golap works the Uttara – Gulistan route, from the North to the South of the city, three 
days a week and in 23 hour shifts, starting at 4am and finishing at 3am the following 
day. He described to me his relationship with a political leader who was a member of 
                                                 
1 100 taka is around 1 British pound, and worth much more in real terms.  
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the Sramik League2, using the notion of being under someone, as in dependent upon 
them: 
I stay under him, I drive a bus under him, I eat under him, everything is under 
him… If the police or administration catches me then he will set me free… You 
need the shade of a guardian [guardianer chaya lage] 
This thesis examines how people live in the shade of others, a metaphor for the 
dependencies that people need to maintain on more powerful actors to pursue their 
livelihoods and interests. In contexts of poverty and inequality such relationships are 
a relatively familiar object of study within the social sciences, and can be seen in a 
rich history of work from at least the early 20th century within anthropology, sociology 
and more recently development studies. The precise subjects of interest and concepts 
through which these relationships have been examined have differed in line with both 
the dominant forms of social organisation in any given context, and the fashions and 
concerns of the period. To name only a few concepts this includes: kinship, class, 
clientelism, power, gender, caste, brokerage and patronage. The focus of this thesis is 
therefore a familiar one, but approached with new theoretical tools, and in a context 
to date largely unexamined.  
It is common to see much in the account of Golap’s life in Dhaka as portraying a 
broken, disorderly society, riven by corruption and crime. Stealing vegetables, being 
protected by a drug dealer, being an unlicensed bus driver, requiring the protection of 
a political leader; all of these descriptions seem to indicate a profound dysfunction. 
Indeed, analyses of how and why such hierarchical relationships and livelihoods exist 
are often based on, or lead to, similar characterisations. But in so doing they betray an 
assumption about what such societies should be like, and that explanations can be built 
by analysing societies against this model. In other words, they frame the dynamics 
observed not in terms of their logics and the wider purposes they serve, but instead 
normatively, in terms of their distance from an abstract notion of how a state should 
be. A number of authors have argued that this normative model is Liberal and 
Weberian in form, characterised by impersonal rights based on the rule of law with 
the central state holding a monopoly on the use of violence (North et al 2009; Khan 
2013; Wood et al 2017). Explaining Golap’s life against this model results in 
explanations that emphasise a deficiency or an aberration; characterisations of being 
‘dysfunctional’, ‘disordered’ or ‘corrupt’, by contrast with that which is functional, 
ordered, or law abiding.  
That these models should be held in such high regard can be questioned normatively, 
and the analytical risk this assumption brings is that it draws attention in the wrong 
direction; with social structures and dynamics understood in ways that obscure the 
logics and meanings they have in the contexts in which they take place. Arguably 
much development practice is premised on this mistake (North et al. 2015). Recent 
                                                 




decades of development policy as embodied in the Washington consensus has been to 
‘embed institutions… [such as] property rights, entry into markets, elections, or 
institutions of good governance’ in societies across the world (Ibid: 3). Arguably the 
assumption underlying such policy is that these societies are ‘flawed’ or ‘incomplete’ 
versions of Weberian states, and dynamics that do not adhere to this model represent 
a deficiency (North et al. 2015; Khan 2010a, 2013). One example which exemplifies 
this is analysis of corruption, which is often described as a disease - a cancer or plague 
- that undermines development efforts (Harrison 2006). The presence of corruption is 
often explained through notions of a ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ state, assuming that the 
phenomenon observed can be accounted for by a lack of ‘good governance’ (North et 
al 2009; Khan 2010b). The solution advocated is to introduce the institutions and 
practices currently lacking. Like a disease, corruption can be beaten – so the logic goes 
– through introducing its opposite, accountability and transparency, public sector 
efficiency and the rule of law (Grindle 2010: 2), characteristics associated with the 
societies in which such policies are formed3.  
Recent work on political settlements helps illuminate more precisely why this 
assumption is so misguided (North et al 2009; Khan 2010b, 2013). For North et al 
(2009) societies are organised according to fundamentally different principles, rooted 
in the way in which violence is controlled. These authors argue that social order in the 
vast majority of the world’s countries today and throughout history rests on a dispersed 
set of actors, organised as factions, coming together in a coalition to dominate rivals 
on the basis of their superior capability for violence (Ibid). This is termed the ‘ruling’ 
or ‘dominant’ coalition and stands in contrast to the classic Weberian model, where a 
centralised state holds a monopoly on violence and managed it bureaucratically 
according to the rule of law. This coalition extracts resources (or ‘rents’) from society, 
which incentivises them not to be violent, thereby enabling a degree of social stability 
and peace. These societies are termed ‘Limited Access Orders’ (LAOs). This 
framework suggests is that what can be seen as constituting ‘disorder’ or ‘corruption’ 
in one context, may in fact represent something quite different in another. Indeed, 
certain forms of violence and extortion can be seen as a means of enabling social 
stability (Ibid). Similarly, institutions that function one way in one society may do so 
differently elsewhere, highlighting the problem of introducing certain institutions in 
the expectation that they will behave in similar ways. Recognising the weakness of 
premising analysis on ideal models, re-focuses attention away from the need to explain 
disorder and dysfunction, and towards a focus on order and how it is constituted 
(Wood et al 2017).  
The Northian framework of social order outlined above is built on in this thesis to 
understand the hierarchical relationships alluded to in the life of Golap. To date, this 
understanding of social order has been developed and applied empirically at a societal 
level, concerned with the broad formation of a ruling coalition, and macro analyses of 
                                                 
3 The extent to which the model of society that is used to judge others in fact exists in context such as 
Europe is of course an important question. Needless to say, it is assumed to exist.   
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societal change (North et al 2009; North et al 2012). The way North et al conceptualise 
a ruling coalition has focused on elites, however Khan (2010b) argues that a ruling 
coalition is always formed at different levels of society, with the relative power of 
actors over others, and organisational forms they take, differing significantly. This 
opens up the possibility – and highlights a need – for building on this framework to 
examine the lives of people much more broadly within society. This resonates with 
calls to examine these concepts through the experiences of ‘active agents’, their 
problems and strategies (Bates 2010: 755). In so doing, this thesis builds on this 
understanding of social order by theorising how it is experienced and viewed bottom 
up.  
The context in which this framework is developed and applied is Bangladesh, a 
country recently described as a ‘vulnerable semi-mature LAO’ (Khan 2013). 
Bangladesh is poorly understood by the wider world (Lewis 2011). Despite the 
country’s many distinctions – for example its population size, its relatively consistent 
economic growth over recent decades, and its interesting place as a predominantly 
Muslim nation with a state identity teetering at the fringes of secularism – it has an 
underwhelming position in bookshelves, libraries and newspapers. Indeed, over a 
hundred years ago an Indian Civil Servant described East Bengal, observing that ‘the 
makers of books have left it for the most part severely alone’ (Bradley-Birt 1906: 3). 
The situation in Bangladesh today is not so bleak, and indeed there are reasons for 
optimism. International media coverage for one has become more dynamic even in the 
relatively small period that I have paid serious attention. When Bangladesh does make 
headlines it is unfortunately most often due to an association with corruption, mal-
governance and dysfunctionality. Indeed, in the early 2000s Transparency 
International rated it the world’s most corrupt nation, a title it maintained for a number 
of years. Despite Van Schendel (2014: 2) describing academic work from Bangladesh 
as ‘infinitely richer’ today than it was forty years ago, significant neglect remains. One 
example is the tradition of village ethnographies that gave us insight into rural life 
over the past two generations but today has been ‘more or less lost’ (Hossain 2011a: 
2).  
Historically, most scholarly attention has been given to rural Bangladesh, and the 
tradition of ethnographies – with a few exceptions - never had an urban counterpart. 
This is understandable given that both the country’s economy and the majority of its 
people have been reliant on agriculture. However rapid urbanisation and the role of 
urban and peri-urban industry as a significant driver of growth increasingly challenge 
this focus. Dhaka is one of the fastest growing cities in the world although with the 
lowest GDP per capita of all megacities (UNHabitat 2013). The extent of urban 
poverty is debated; according to Government statistics 20% of the nation’s urban 
population live in poverty, while around 7% live in extreme poverty (BBS 2011: xxi), 
though the validity of these statistics is strongly contested (Rahman 2011; Banks 
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2012).4 Despite the magnitude of challenges, less than 1% of Bangladesh’s social 
protection expenditure is targeted on urban areas (Rahman and Choudhury 2012: 24), 
indicating serious state neglect. The increasing significance of urban settlements 
within Bangladesh, and the need to grapple with the issues they present, is juxtaposed 
against the traditional vision of Bangladesh as a nation, with the romanticised paddy 
fields, rivers and banyan trees of amar sonar Bangla5 replaced with flyovers, traffic, 
slums and high-rises.  
This thesis examines the lives of people living in similar circumstances to Golap in 
Dhaka city. These people often call themselves kangali, meaning destitute, and are 
described in international discourse through terms such as squatters, the homeless or 
street dwellers. This particular sub-group of the urban poor are neglected within 
academic research from Bangladesh, which has tended to focus on large and partially 
serviced slums. The kangali are conceptualised in public and government discourse as 
‘floating’, ‘rootless’ and generally disconnected from the primary social, economic 
and political structures in Bangladesh. Many such people work in sectors where labour 
is organised, and hence findings here pertain to the urban poor more generally through 
the lens of organised labour. Research was conducted primarily in a large wholesale 
market at the centre of Dhaka called Karwan Bazar. A number of secondary locations 
included Osmani Uddyan park adjacent to Dhaka South City Corporation 
headquarters, the pavement outside the Supreme Court, and the pavement adjacent to 
Pantho Kunjo park near the five star Sonargaon hotel. Placing the theoretical focus 
together with the empirical context, the overarching question within this thesis is this: 
how do the kangali relate to the social order in urban Bangladesh?6  
The core theoretical argument developed in this thesis is that the framework of social 
order outlined above intersects with the hierarchical relationships described in the life 
of Golap, through the organisation of violence. As such, the organisation of violence 
structures how the kangali relate to the social order. The logic of this argument is as 
follows: when social order rests on a dispersed set of actors maintaining a superior 
capability for violence than rivals, these actors utilise their status to extract resources 
from society. These resources are essential to maintaining the viability of factions, and 
hence are also essential to maintaining social order. A common way in which these 
actors extract resources from society is by controlling the access that others have to 
resources. What these resources are differ, and can mean access to space for living, to 
work, to personal security and much more. Viewed bottom-up, this represents a 
relationship of intermediation or brokerage, where personal relationships are essential 
to pursuing one’s livelihood and interest. This posits that there is a close relationship 
between experiences of intermediation and violence, or put another way, that violent 
                                                 
4 Rahman (2011: 34-35) argues that the cost-of-basic-needs-approach used fails to consider the heavier 
reliance of urban households on cash income to survive, being unable to live from homestead or 
agricultural land. Furthermore, it may fail to consider price differentials between urban and rural areas 
for food and basic non-food items (Banks 2012). 
5 My Golden Bengal, Bangladesh’s national anthem. 
6 Further sub-questions are offered in the methodology chapter. 
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intermediation is a function of how social order is maintained. How this intermediation 
is structured and negotiated is conceptualised as the ‘politics of intermediation’. This 
argument recasts a long history of studies concerned with hierarchical relationships, 
brokerage and intermediation, around the organisation of violence. Although the urban 
political economy has received a wave of attention in recent decades (Wood and 
Salway 2000; Khan 2000; Banks 2008; Shafi 2010; Hackenbroch 2011; Hossain 
2011b; Hackenbroch and Hossain 2012; Hossain 2012; Hackenbrock 2013; Atkinson-
Sheppard 2015; Suykens 2015; Banks 2016), the organisation and structure of 
violence, and the relationship between this and the lives of the poor, has not been 
systematically examined. 
Empirically, this thesis contributes to understanding the social order in urban 
Bangladesh in three primary ways. The first – and perhaps the most significant – 
empirical argument developed is that one of the dominant ways in which the urban 
political economy of Bangladesh has been understood, is out-dated. For decades the 
figure of the mastan, which is akin to a gangster, has held a central place for 
understanding the environment in which the urban poor negotiate their lives, and for 
understanding how party politicians maintain control locally. The argument made in 
this thesis is that the gangs that mastan, and other similar terms, denote, have largely 
ceased to exist. Nevertheless many of the roles associated with these figures - such as 
extortion networks, controlling illegal businesses and mobilising people towards 
political violence – all continue, but now under an explicitly party political guise, 
controlled by the wings and associated bodies of the ruling Awami League. 
Understood within the LAO framework, this represents a shift in the organisational 
forms through which violence can be expressed and legitimately included into the 
ruling coalition, and therefore also a shift in the dominant forms of intermediation in 
the lives of the kangali. This argument is made primarily through tracing the rise and 
fall of Picchi Hannan, an infamous gangster at Karwan Bazar.  
The second empirical contribution of this thesis is to offer a detailed account of how 
the kangali are integrated into the social order. A key argument developed is that the 
kangali are often highly dependent on violent intermediaries to maintain access to 
work and personal security, substantiating the posited relationship between violence 
and intermediation. The terms on which these are gained often necessitate payments 
and participation in political violence. These intermediaries represent a complex web 
of actors, critical among whom in the lives of the kangali are often labour leaders, 
known locally as sardar (headman, leader) or boro bhai (big brother). Despite the 
significance of these figures in Indian history, and their prevalence across Bangladesh 
today, they are rarely studied. These intermediaries play complex roles in people’s 
lives, they offer work, security, advice, support, access to savings and credit groups, 
and also position those underneath them in relation to wider social order. Groups of 
labour operate as factions in competition with others for work and power. Some labour 
leaders seek opportunities for their group by linking themselves to political leaders, 
and are thereby involved in wider political competition, which is often violent. The 
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privileged position of both labour and party political leaders enables them to extract 
financial benefits, and as such those beneath them often look at them with jealousy. 
These dynamics are explored through the cases of a group of market labourers at 
Karwan Bazar, drain workers at Osmani Uddyan park, and beggars outside the 
Supreme Court.  
The third key empirical contribution of this thesis is an analysis of the diverse ways in 
which the kangali negotiate an environment characterised by violent intermediation. 
Two important phenomena are particularly analysed. The first is how groups of 
organised labour compete for opportunities on the basis of their capability for violence. 
This is examined through the case of market labourers’ attempts to take over territory 
at Karwan Bazar, events included strikes, fights with the Chattro League (the student 
wing of the ruling Awami League) and police cases. The group also organised 
bombings on behalf of the opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). 
The means by which people demonstrate a capability for violence are diverse. They 
include showing physical strength, the ability to call on contacts and networks, and it 
is argued here that savings groups can be vehicles for violent party political and 
factional mobilisation. The second form of negotiation is qualitatively distinct from 
the first, and rather than referring to how people negotiate their status through 
violence, it refers to how people pursue opportunities around this violence. The notion 
of ‘defiled surpluses’ is proposed as a way of conceptualising how people purposefully 
exploit resources that are considered socially defiled but are also surplus, in that access 
to them is not controlled by some of the intermediaries described above. Examples 
include begging, living in the open and scavenging.  
This thesis is organised as such: chapter two examines the concept of social order and 
proposes seeing intermediation as inherent to how violence is organised in societies 
such as Bangladesh. This provides the core theoretical framework developed in this 
thesis. Chapter three examines the nature of intermediation in urban Bangladesh from 
both historical and contemporary sources, providing a background to the empirical 
chapters and introducing key debates regarding how intermediation is understood. 
Chapter four explains the methodology used in this thesis. Chapter five introduces the 
research context and people at the centre of this study. Chapter six examines the nature 
of intermediation in Dhaka today, challenging the view that mastan gangs are 
dominant, and explores the forms of party political intermediaries now prevalent. 
Chapter seven examines the significance of labour leaders as intermediaries in the 
lives of the kangali. Chapter eight and nine explore how people negotiate their lives 
within this order. The conclusion consolidates many of the key theoretical and 






2. UNDERSTANDING ORDER 
 
Whatever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, monopolize 
violence 
Tilly (1985: 171) 
This chapter builds on recent work on violence and social orders (North et al 2009) by 
positing a relationship between how order is maintained in societies such as 
Bangladesh, and intermediation, or brokerage, a dynamic to community life studied 
since at least the early 20th century. The connection is the organisation of violence. 
Mediating the access that other people have to resources is posited as a key means by 
which a ‘ruling coalition’ accrues resources, and therefore intermediation contributes 
to enabling social order. This suggests that the phenomenon of intermediation must be 
analysed in relation to how a ruling coalition is formed, and how this coalition 
maintains its status within society. In drawing attention to these relationships, this 
chapter opens up questions regarding patron-clientelism, the key concept used to 
frame these relationships, and in light of the proposition of the connection between 
violence and intermediation. The chapter further argues that where people are 
dependent on intermediaries to pursue their interests, it is in relation to these actors 
that people’s struggles and strategies to improve their lives should be examined. 
Empirical examples from South Asia and beyond are drawn upon to build and illustrate 
the arguments made. 
2.1. SOCIAL ORDERS 
2.1.1. THE ORGANISATION OF VIOLENCE  
The concept of social order can be defined in basic as ‘patterns of social organization’ 
that control violence and thereby enable social stability (North et al. 2009: 1). 
Conceptualisations of social order prominent within international development often 
rest on a Liberal democratic framework (Davis and McGregor 2000; Brett 2008), 
underpinned by Weberian assumptions around the structure and role of the state (Khan 
2010b). This framework informs how society is understood as functioning, how 
stability is ensured, and most critically for development practice, how change happens. 
According to this Liberal model social order is premised on the impersonal rule of law 
(Somers 2008; North et al 2009), which is enforced by a central state monopolising 
violence (Khan 2010b). In this model, individuals exist within such societies on the 
basis of their status as citizens. Within liberal democracies, all citizens thus 
theoretically relate to one another, and to society as a whole, on the basis of individual 
rights accorded to them impersonally by the state (North et al. 2009). As Kabeer (2002: 
9) explains, ‘the idea of citizenship… [is] rooted in an ontology of personhood which 
recognises individuals as bearing rights which are prior to, and independent of, their 
place in status hierarchies’.  
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Within this model, the role of the state is to ensure that citizens have these rights, and 
that all have them equally, and it does so by maintaining the rule of law. Fundamental 
to how the state maintains the rule of law is by monopolising violence within the 
apparatus of the state, such as the police and armed forces. More generally, such 
societies are conceptualised as being structured through three demarcated “spheres” - 
the market, civil society and the state – which are independent, and yet interdependent, 
complementing and balancing each other. This is what Axtmann (1997: 65) terms a 
‘tripartite structure’, and was conceptualised clearly in the work of De Tocqueville. 
Within this framework, civil society is seen as denoting ‘the organised sphere of 
citizens activity beyond the state, market and household’ (Lewis 2011: 125). This 
activity is however imbued with a particular normative content. It is seen as promoting 
a very particular set of ‘civic’ values, providing a check against the power of the state 
(North et al. 2009: 7), and part of ‘the ongoing struggle for egalitarian diversity’ 
(Keane 2009: 4).  
The analytical relevance of a Liberal and Weberian models of the state in much of the 
world is challenged by recent work on political settlements (North et al 2009; Khan 
2010b). For North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) societies are organised in 
fundamentally different ways. The key difference, they argue, lies in how societies 
control organised violence and they posit a distinction between two types of social 
order – ‘limited access orders’ (LAOs) and ‘open access orders’ (OAOs). The latter of 
these broadly corresponds to the Liberal model of society discussed above, while the 
former refers to most of the world’s societies, including those in the Global South. In 
the case of OAOs violence is controlled through institutionalised rules controlling 
competition, which regulate impersonally through incentives and punishment, based 
on the rule of law. The defining characteristic of OAOs is impersonality (Ibid: 23), 
and it is on this basis that citizens relate. The state has a monopoly in organised 
violence, with the police and armed forces subservient to the government and 
democratic interests; and more broadly such social orders are characterised by 
‘competition in political and economic markets’ (Ibid: 21-22).  
By contrast, in LAOs the impersonal rule of law is weak. In such contexts, violence is 
controlled, and hence stability enabled, through the distribution of benefits to a 
coalition of actors that have established a greater capability for violence than rivals7. 
                                                 
7  They further sub-divide between three forms of LAO - fragile, basic and mature – which are 
distinguished according to the complexity of institutional structures they can maintain. LAOs are also 
termed ‘natural states’. North et al (2009) posit a number of conditions necessary for a transition 
between a LAO and an OAO. They argue this transition occurs in two stages: first, there is the 
emergence of impersonal intra-elite relationships; and second, these impersonal relationships are 
extended to others within society. The conditions that enable the first of these transitions are labelled 
‘doorstep conditions’. These are conditions that enable intra-elite relationships to be impersonal. They 
are: first, the rule of law for elites, which enables the elite to relate on impersonal terms to one another; 
second, ‘perpetually lived forms of public and private elite organizations, including the state itself’, 
meaning that organisations can exist beyond the rule of particular ruling coalitions, and beyond the 
death of any particular members; third, that there is political control over the military (Ibid: 27). By 
contrast, in Khan’s model (2010b) attention is given not to these doorstep conditions, but to how the 
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A coalition is required because no one single actor can monopolise violence. The 
benefits accrued and distributed are diverse, including the ‘manipulation of economic 
privileges’ (Ibid: 122) - for example the right to trade, control or have a monopoly 
over a market – as well as the ability to organise. Violence is controlled by actors 
within that coalition agreeing to maintain their mutual privileges but excluding others 
from these, thereby creating incentives to cooperate within coalitions. Controlling 
these resources is also a means by which these actors can maintain their own power, 
through, for example, incentivising members to remain supportive of them. In their 
own words, a LAO 
manages the problem of violence by forming a dominant coalition that limits 
access to valuable resources – land, labor, and capital – or access to and control 
of valuable activities – such as trade, worship, and education (Ibid: 30). 
This proposition radically challenges the demarcation of “spheres” essential to the 
Liberal notion of social order, reorienting a framework around the idea of a ‘ruling’ or 
‘dominant’ coalition, and the distribution of benefits. Fundamental to this framework 
is an understanding of how violence is organised in societies that is radically different 
to Liberal Weberian assumptions about the monopolisation of violence by a 
centralised state. LAOs are characterised by the dispersed ability for organising 
violence, which is why social order rests on these actors being sufficiently incentivised 
not to use this ability. As Khan (2013: 34) writes, a basic LAO ‘can only be stable if, 
by accident or design, enough of the potential organizers of violence are included 
within the ruling group’. For order to emerge, a LAO has to enable a ‘double balance’ 
(North et al 2009), where the potential one has for violence corresponds to the – most 
often economic - benefits one receives.  
The forms that LAOs take differ and given the breadth of the model, a whole range of 
ostensibly different societies are included under this label. Despite this diversity, 
according to this framework these societies share basic structural characteristics, in 
that the ruling coalition is organised as factions linked hierarchically. Khan (2010a: 
12) argues that 
Looking from the bottom up, the basic component of any party or coalition, 
however large, is a myriad of basic patron-client factions. Each of these is 
organized around a single or small group of leaders. 
Despite the conceptual significance of factions, the literature used to conceptualise 
social order in this section does not clearly define its meaning. Nicholas’ (1965) 
definition is adopted in this thesis, and in summary refers to a group, organised 
hierarchically under a leader that is in conflict with other groups of similar 
characteristics for status and resources. More specifically, five interrelated 
characteristics are emphasised: first, that factions are conflict groups; second, that they 
                                                 
emergence of capitalist organizations enable ‘formal power’ to dominate society, creating a capitalist 
political settlement rather than those premised on ruling coalitions structured through factions. 
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are political in the sense that it is through factions that conflict for power takes; third, 
they are timebound and not corporate groups; fourth, members are recruited by a 
leader and fifth, these members are recruited on diverse principles (Nicholas 1965: 27-
29). 
Although Khan (2010b) and North et al (2009) agree that social order in LAOs rests 
on the role of a dominant coalition, they differ in where they see power as concentrated 
within these coalitions. North et al (2009) focus on the ruling coalition as a set of elites 
who stand at the head of wider organisations and networks, which are organised 
throughout society. Social order is maintained through elite competition, and by 
mobilising other actors to support them. By contrast, Khan (2010b; 2013) offers a way 
of conceptualising different forms that a dominant coalition can take, and how these 
include actors at various hierarchical levels within society. For Khan, social order then 
refers not only to an arrangement between elites, but the interconnection between 
groups of people at different levels of society. He argues that while all coalitions 
require a degree of support from different hierarchical levels in society, they differ in 
terms of the factions and networks included, and the balance of power between these.  
More specifically, Khan (2010) distinguishes the forms that a ruling or dominant 
coalition takes according to the relative power along horizontal or vertical lines, the 
former referring to the balance of power between factions within and outside the ruling 
coalition, while the latter referring to the balance of power between higher and lower 
factions within the coalition. Within Khan’s schema ruling coalitions can take four 
forms according to these differences, though in practice they may differ in degree 
rather than categorically8. A prominent form of political settlement across the world 
and empirically within this thesis due to its application to Bangladesh, is the 
‘competitive clientelism’ model, where both excluded factions and lower level 
factions within the coalition are strong. In such societies a dominant coalition balances 
the inclusion of potential factions with the ability to distribute benefits, and factions 
outside of this coalition mobilise to either attempt inclusion or form a new coalition. 
The extent to which a dominant coalition remains stable clearly differs across contexts 
and throughout history. It has been very common for new coalitions to emerge and 
replace existing ones, a process that is often violent (North et al 2009).  
The recognition that social order rests on a coalition organised at different levels of 
society, draws attention to the roles of ‘violence specialists’ (Tilly 1985). This 
incorporates a wide set of actors. In his analysis of European state building, Tilly 
(1985: 174) argues that monarchs ‘relied on indirect rule via local magnates’ where ‘a 
                                                 
8 Within Khan’s (2010b) model, clientelist political settlements – or what North et al term LAOs – can 
be distinguished by these two key variables in the balance of power. The potential for growth and 
development is strongest when both lower and excluded factions are weak, because the dominant 
coalition has longer time horizons. Khan terms this a ‘potential developmental coalition’. Where 
excluded factions are strong, however lower factions within the coalition weak, the state is authoritarian 
but vulnerable. By contrast where lower factions within the coalition are strong, but excluded factions 
weak, the settlement is charactersed by a dominant party. The fourth model – competitive clientelism – 
is explained in the text above.  
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king's best source of armed supporter was sometimes the world of outlaws’ (Ibid: 173). 
Historically, European monarchs and states relied on a wide range of actors to 
maintain a dominant capability for violence and govern the societies they ruled. More 
broadly, the organisational forms through which violence is expressed clearly differ, 
and could include knights, standing armies, mafia, gangsters, militia, guerrillas and 
many more. Indeed, internationally European states often relied on privateers and 
mercenaries to maintain and increase their power (Thomson 1996). Which actors 
constitute the ruling coalition, the precise relationships between these and between 
members within these groups, are contextually specific empirical questions. 
Furthermore, within the LAO framework, the means of violence is never completely 
monopolised by the dominant coalition, and it is logical to assume that actors outside 
of the coalition have some degree of control over resources, which are valuable in their 
own right, but also instrumental to maintaining an ability for violence.  
Within the LAO framework the ability for violence is central to gaining access to the 
dominant coalition. Khan (2010a, 2010b, 2013) uses a range of similar terms to 
describe this, including ‘organizational power’, ‘organizational muscle’, ‘instruments 
of violence’, ‘violence capabilities’ and ‘disruptive capacity’. North et al (2015) 
similarly write of ‘violence capacity’. For Khan (2010b: 6) this ability forms part of 
what he terms ‘holding power’, which refers to ‘the capability of an individual or 
group to engage and survive in conflicts’ and thus conceptualises how groups compete 
for status within and in relation to a dominant coalition9. Holding power involves both 
‘imposing’ and ‘absorbing’ costs, for which economic strength, a perception of 
legitimacy and the ability to organize violence all form part (Ibid). Within this concept, 
these characteristics interact, for example economic strength can enable an ability to 
organize. Given the centrality of violence within the framework of social order 
outlined above, the term ‘capability for violence’ or ‘violence capability’ is focused 
on in this thesis as a way of conceptualising how actors impose costs on each other, 
and this opens up empirical questions regarding how this capability is constituted and 
how it interacts with other characteristics, factors or qualities to enable a group to 
impose or absorb costs10.   
These notion of a ‘capability for violence’ can be further theorised through 
consideration of Lukes’ (2004) three ‘faces’ or ‘dimensions’ of power 11 . Within 
Lukes’ framework, power in both the first and second dimensions refer to observable 
                                                 
9 The notion of ‘holding power’ resembles the ability to coerce and resist coercion from others. Tilly 
(2008: 19) describes coercion as that which ‘includes all concerted application, threatened or actual, of 
action that commonly causes loss or damage to the persons or possessions of individuals or groups who 
are aware of both the action and the potential damage’. 
10 The focus given here to the capability for violence is not to suggest that this capability underlies all 
forms of authority and hierarchy, nor that all decisions and preferences are formed on the basis of an 
unequal capability for violence. The authority gained from seniority within organisations such as NGOs 
may or may not be underpinned by an association with violence for example. The point emphasised 
here is that in societies where a balance between the distribution of resources and a capability for 
violence is essential to social order, it is this capability that should be viewed as a fundamental form 
that power takes. 
11 Thank you to Joe Devine and Geof Wood for suggesting this usage.  
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conflict. Power in the first dimension is making someone do something against their 
interests, and analysis of power in this sense focuses on examining conflict, people’s 
behaviour and interests. Power in the second dimension is the ability to control an 
agenda, as in what does or does not become an object of conflict. Analysis of power 
in this sense focuses on how conflict can therefore exist in non-decision making. 
Finally the third dimension of power, Lukes’ primary theoretical contribution, is 
conceptualised as the most powerful. This dimension draws attention away from 
observable conflict and towards the power to control preferences about what one does 
or does not want. According to this third dimension, conflict is not necessarily 
manifest but can be ‘latent’ (Ibid: 28). As Lukes (2004: 27) writes, ‘the most effective 
and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place’. 
Reflecting on the difference between the first and third dimension within this 
framework enables us to draw a conceptual distinction within the notion of a capability 
for violence. While in relation to the first dimension, the capability for violence can 
be thought of as an ability to use direct force, in the third dimension it refers to how a 
capability for violence can inculcate perceptions in others about what is or what is not 
possible, such that people adhere to interests without violence being used, and without 
conflict being made manifest. Though not manifest, conflict or violence can 
nonetheless be ‘latent’, underlying the relationships and phenomenon observed.  
At its most basic then the capability for violence refers to the capability of an actor to 
coerce others through direct force. It can denote that they have the physical and mental 
attributes associated with this (including an association with a weapon for example). 
Often actors wield this capability indirectly. We can think of how people utilise 
connections with figures of authority (in the army or police for example) who can 
themselves directly draw upon a capability for violence. This also characterises the 
ways leaders utilise faction members to compete, a primary focus in this model of 
social order (North et al 2009; Khan 2010b). The capability for violence within 
factions comes from the ability of a leader to direct followers towards that end. In both 
the case of a faction and connections with a wider authority, a range of factors 
contribute to enabling this capability, as in the notion of holding power (Khan 2010b). 
Being able to provide materially may be critical in both instances, and is theorised in 
this model as essential to incentivising faction members and therefore a capability for 
violence (North et al 2009; Khan 2010b). Other factors including charisma for 
example may also strengthen the resolve of a faction and thereby increase their 
capability for violence. In line with Lukes’ third dimension of power, the capability 
for violence can also refer to the capability of an actor to coerce people through the 
threat or potential for violence, without needing to in fact use it. Indeed, a greater 
capability for violence is associated with a reduced need to use it, as people perceive 
the costs of testing it as too high (Khan 2010a: 68). As Tilly (2003: 36) writes the 
‘genuinely effective specialist deploys threats of violence so persuasively that others 
comply before the damage begins’. Though the notion of a threat may seem overt and 
explicit, it can also be implicit or latent. The capability for violence may refer to a 
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common understanding that people have about the potential consequences of a specific 
actions and therefore a disinclination or calculation to avoid such actions.  
This model of social order draws analytical attention to the structure of a ‘ruling 
coalition’, the capability for violence, and the way in which this coalition controls the 
distribution of resources within society to ensure order. By demonstrating how social 
order rests on a dispersed rather than centralised capability for violence this framework 
challenges the application of a Weberian model of the state. For this reason, North et 
al (2009: 72-73) have pointed to the ‘futility of drawing hard and fast lines around 
governments in natural states and calling them the state’. Rather than the state being 
conceptualised as a single, unitary or centralised actor, it may be thought of as the 
ruling coalition itself, hence the claim that in LAOs the state is an ‘organization of 
organizations’ (North et al 2009: 31). This model furthermore deconstructs a Liberal 
distinction between “spheres” by arguing that the state and market are deeply 
intertwined, partly because it is the distribution of economic benefits, which creates 
the credible incentives to cooperate and thereby enable social order. Civil society – if 
the concept it used at all – may not be the counterbalance to the state imagined in the 
Liberal model, but rather ‘function[s] with the explicit support of the state’ (North et 
al 2009: 7). This resonates with arguments from other authors who have also contested 
the boundaries between these spheres (Bierschenk et al. 2002; Harriss-White 2003b; 
Berenschot 2010; Wood 2014). Wood (2014), for example, argues that in such 
contexts political and economic life are ‘interlocked’. Similarly, De Bierschenk et al. 
(2002: 36) argue that in Africa the boundaries between the state, civil society and 
‘formal local political organisations’ are ‘overlapping and… marked by phenomena 
of alliance and rivalry, which renders these ‘bounded’ categories less efficient as 
means of understanding the nature of the changes underway’. The next section builds 
on this model by further conceptualising the place of individuals within such societies.  
2.1.2. INTERMEDIATION  
The previous section outlined the LAO framework, discussed the forms that ruling 
coalitions can take (Khan 2010b, 2013), and considered the role that the capability for 
violence has within such societies. Using these ideas, this section theorises the place 
of individuals within such societies. The key argument developed is that this model of 
social order translates into people’s lives through the phenomenon of brokerage or 
intermediation. Intermediation is proposed as a way in which actors with the capability 
for violence accrue resources, and limit the access other have to them, and therefore 
the phenomenon of intermediation which has been observed across the world should 
be understood in relation to how the capability for violence is organised and thus how 
social order is maintained.  
In LAOs, people are not considered as individuals on the basis of impersonal rights, 
applied and guaranteed through the rule of law – as in the Weberian Liberal model - 
but on the basis of ‘personal relationships, who one is and who one knows’ (North et 
al. 2009: 2). Chatterjee (2004: 38) argues similarly in the context of India 
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In terms of the formal structure of the state as given by the constitution and the 
laws, all of society is civil society; everyone is a citizen with equal rights… 
[However] most of the inhabitants of India are only tenuously, and even then 
ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by 
the constitution. They are not, therefore, proper members of civil society and 
are not regarded as such by the institutions of the state. 
That people need personal relationships to survive and seek opportunities has been 
observed across the world through a long lineage of studies within the social sciences. 
This is often framed this in terms of the need for ‘brokers’ or ‘intermediaries’ (Wolf 
1956; Tilly 1985; Auyero 2000; de Sardan et al. 2002; Wood 2003; Devine 2009). 
Though the term broker is often colloquially used to refer to very specific actors within 
societies, a wide range of actors can be understood as involved in brokerage12. At its 
most basic brokerage can be understood as the ‘production of a new connection 
between previously unconnected sites’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 31). Research on 
brokerage can be traced back to work by British Africanists in the 1930s, and more 
clearly through the field of political anthropology until the 1960s (de Sardan et al. 
2002)13. Wolf (1956: 1076), for example, portrays brokers as actors who ‘stand guard 
over the crucial junctures of synapses of relationships which connect the local system 
to the larger whole’. Some have suggested that the role of these brokers or 
intermediaries is so considerable that they are inherent to the structure of certain 
societies. Wood (2010) writes of ‘intermediation societies’, while Berenschot (2010) 
similarly writes of a ‘mediated state’.  
The argument advanced here is that the phenomenon of intermediation or brokerage 
observed across the world is inherently linked to how social order is maintained, which 
is to say, how the capability for violence is organised and resources controlled. The 
logic of this argument is as follows: within the LAO framework, a dominant coalition 
forms through its superior capability for violence. On this basis actors within the 
coalition are able to accrue resources from society; and indeed they need to do so in 
order to maintain their capability for violence and thus status within the coalition. This 
raises the question of how these actors accrue these resources. Khan (2010a: 86) argues 
that these are accrued from varied non-formal sources in society: 
If political leaders running mass clientelist coalitions do not have resources 
from non-formal sources, they will be unable to manage the informal 
distributive arrangements on which a clientelist political settlement is based. 
                                                 
12 In Bangladesh for example the term for a broker or middleman is dalal, and to say someone does 
dalali, is to say they are acting as a middleman/broker. In practice however a far wider range of actors 
beyond those explicitly identified as dalal broker people’s access to resources. Furthermore, the 
language of brokerage often implies a limited exchange, however the emphasis here is on longer-term 
relationships. For these reasons intermediation is the preferred term in this thesis.  
13 An interest in brokerage has re-emerged within anthropology, sociology and development studies 
since the late 1990s, with a particular focus on political brokers, but with the concept being applied 
more broadly, even to the development sector (Bierschenk et al. 2002; Mosse and Lewis 2006). 
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It can be argued that a prominent means by which these resources are accrued is 
through mediating the access that others have to the resources they need to pursue their 
livelihoods and interests. Viewed bottom-up, this is experienced in people’s lives as a 
need for intermediation, a personal relationship to gain access to resources14. This 
raises empirical questions about what is mediated in any given context, but to name 
only a few such resources it could include: labour markets, the right to trade, housing, 
state services, justice and personal security15. In mediating access to resources, a 
coalition is able to accrue sufficient resources to maintain its own power, while also 
enabling them to limit the resources that others and rivals have, thereby ensuring other 
actors outside of the coalition do not enjoy the same privileges. Given that coalitions 
are organised as factions, leaders of factions need to accrue resources in order to 
maintain the viability of their faction, their place within the ruling coalition, and hence 
the stability of the coalition and social order. What this suggests is that the 
phenomenon of intermediation or brokerage is partly a function of how social order is 
maintained in LAOs.  
This argument posits a close relationship between being an intermediary and being a 
violence specialist. The historical connection between intermediation and a ruling 
coalition emerges also from Tilly’s work on European state building. Tilly (2008: 
104), wrote  
Larger states… invariably opted for some form of indirect rule, co-opting local 
powerholders and confirming their privileges… Before the seventeenth 
century, every large Euopean state ruled its subjects through powerful 
intermediaries who enjoyed significant autonomy, hindered state demands that 
were not to their own interest, and profited on their own accounts from the 
delegated exercise of state power16 
Understood in relation to the LAO framework, this quote also suggests a number of 
further dynamics to intermediation. First, it indicates that by virtue of this capability 
for violence those within the ruling coalition are able to control resources to pursue 
their own interests, above and beyond what is needed simply to maintain power17. The 
actual dynamics of intermediation may be a function of the interests that individuals 
actors within the coalition have and the conditions they face. Second, as already 
                                                 
14 It is recognized that not all forms of brokerage involve people of lower status seeking resources 
through people of higher status (Scott 1972); however these other forms of brokerage are not focused 
on in this thesis. 
15 This is not to assume that actors with a capability for violence necessarily mediate access to all 
resources. Which resources are not mediated in this way is an interesting empirical question, and 
explored particularly in chapter nine within this thesis.  
16 The idea of state power being ‘delegated’ is not entirely in accord with the Northian model proposed 
here. Delegation implies that power is rooted in the centre and disperses from there, whereas the model 
described emphasizes how status stems from a dispersed capability for violence.  
17 As Tilly (2003: 40) writes of violence specialists: ‘specialists in violence do not simply serve the 
interests of the larger entities (governments, parties, communities, ethnic groups, or others) with which 
they are currently aligned. They follow dynamics of their own. They regularly engage in exploitation 
and opportunity hoarding, sometimes at the expense of their own nominal employers or constituencies’ 
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suggested in the previous section, the quote also indicates how the balance of power 
within a coalition can vary. If lower level factions within the ruling coalition have 
significant power – as it appears in the quote from Tilly above – it may be that they 
are more able to pursue their interests, which may have significance for how other 
people relate to these actors as intermediaries. Similarly, if the balance of power 
between the ruling coalition and rivals outside the coalition is almost balanced, it may 
mean that people and groups with a capability for violence still control resources and 
operate as intermediaries from outside the ruling coalition.  
An implication of the intermediation-violence framework is that it brings together 
analysis of a wide range of actors. Tilly (2008: 104) describes the ‘intermediaries’ or 
‘middlemen’ under systems of indirect rule by overarching states in the historical 
setting of Southeastern Europe as including ‘clergy, landlords, urban oligarchies, and 
independent professional warriors’. More recently Auyero’s (2000: 58) analysis of 
intermediation, and the ‘problem-solving networks that link “clients,” brokers, and 
political patrons’ at the grass roots in Buenos Aires highlights the brokering roles of 
‘NGO leaders, development agents, peasant association chairmen, association 
activists, facilitators, co-ordinators, politicians, clerks…’ (Ibid: 20) 18. In line with this, 
when understanding intermediation in relation to violence and social order, actors who 
are often seen in qualitatively different terms can be analysed as playing structurally 
similar roles. In South Asia the term intermediary has been used to refer to, for 
example, labour leaders (RCLI 1931; Mishra 2015; Wadauer et al. 2015), NGOs 
(White 1992, Devine 1999), as well as actors straddling criminality and party politics 
(Ahmed 2004, Devine 2007; Berenschot 2011; Wood 2014). Whether all actors 
identified as intermediaries do so on the basis of a capability for violence is an 
empirical question, and also raises questions regarding the extent to which actors that 
are seen as embodying different values are able to operate without this capability, or 
in conflict with actors who do have this capability (Devine 1999)19. 
Recognising how social order is contingent on a dominant coalition mediating access 
to resources helps understand why violent intermediaries have been observed to be so 
prevalent across the world. In urban South Asia for example, much attention has been 
given to the intermediary roles of violent criminal figures integrated into both local 
communities and wider party politics. What these figures look like in Bangladesh will 
be discussed in the next chapter, however in India the figure of the goonda is often 
examined (Michelutti 2007; Berenschot 2011; Piliavsky and Sbriccoli 2016). The term 
                                                 
18 Studying a slum outside Buenos Aires, Ayuero argues that the poor were, at the time of his study, 
increasingly reliant on political networks to gain access to state resources such as public jobs and social 
protection. These are managed through “brokers” or “gatekeepers” who are local leaders, connected to 
wider political and state institutions. 
19 The notion of intermediation in the sense it is used here resonates with Khan’s (2010b) use of 
Kalecki’s (1972) notion of an ‘intermediate class’. Khan refers to how ‘intermediate classes’ between 
the poor and capitalists, dominate the organisation of patron-client politics. For Khan, though classes, 
they function on a factional rather than class basis. The sense that intermediation is concentrated within 
particular classes is useful, though as will be clear from this thesis, actors living in bazars or the streets 
can also operate as powerful intermediaries within their context. 
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goonda is historically translated as ‘ruffian’ or ‘hooligan’, and is a prominent figure 
in urban South Asian politics throughout the 20th century (Das 1994). Berenschot 
(2010, 2011) has examined how these figures are essential to party politicians 
maintaining local control, helping rig elections, raise money for political campaigns, 
and generally enforcing the politicians control through violence. He argues that it is 
these figures that partly enable politicians to serve as intermediaries between the 
government and the poor. In literature from Latin America and the Caribbean the roles 
of gangs and gangsters have been highlighted as playing similar roles (Johnson 2005; 
Arias 2006; Rodgers 2006). Johnson (2005), for example, documents the ways 
‘community dons’ or ‘garrisons’ mediate between poor communities and the state in 
Jamaica, highlighting the significant control and capability for violence these actors 
have. Similarly, Arias (2006) examines how drug traffickers play a key brokering role 
between favela communities in Rio de Janeiro and politicians. A theme of this work 
is demonstrating how these actors represent not disorder, but a way in which society 
and communities are organised (Johnson 2005; Rodgers 2006; Arias 2006). Studying 
a youth gang in Nicaragua against the backdrop of state breakdown, Rodgers (2006: 
273) argues that they give an order to the community in which they live, and thereby 
‘attempts to mitigate… insecurity’, but at the same time sit at a distance from the state. 
As this highlights, it is important to note that the extent to which these gangs are linked 
hierarchically to more senior actors, and hence the ruling coalition, differs. Similarly 
Volkov (2002: 1) explores the rise of ‘violent entrepreneurs’ in Russia in the 1990s, 
describing how the breakup of the Soviet Union allowed for ‘the advance of bandits’ 
in cities, specialising in protection racketeering20.  
Finally, it is important to give the term intermediation a second meaning. Up to now 
it has been used to refer to the how personal relationships are relied upon to access the 
resources needed to pursue livelihoods and interests. As argued, this is intimately 
connected to the ruling coalition and ultimately to how violence is controlled. 
Intermediation can also be conceptualised as referring to the role that identities play 
in mediating people’s access to resources. In contexts where ‘who one is and who one 
knows, form the basis for social organization’ (North et al. 2009: 2), identities interact 
with intermediation in the first sense to mediate access to resources, and hence 
determine experiences of opportunities, risks and so forth. Intermediation can then 
also be conceptualised as referring to how access to resources is determined by the 
identities people are understood as having21. As Mosse (2010: 1163) argues, ‘the 
organisation of categories takes precedence over the attributes of individuals’, 
                                                 
20 It is important to offer a caveat at this point. The discussion so far has taken societies as the unit of 
analysis, with the assumption being that arguments relate equally across any given society. This is not 
necessarily the case. While a society may be categorised as a LAO or OAO this does not mean that all 
communities within that will, at a micro-level, demonstrate patterns of organisation that always conform 
to these ideals. Rather, we should see this broad distinction as reflecting the balance of weight, but not 
as accounting for all dynamics present in that context. Hence forms of intermediation may exist in all 
societies, but these do not connect to a ‘ruling coalition’ and how social order is maintained.  
21 That intermediation refers to these two processes mirrors Mosse’s (2010) incorporation of both 
economic and political relations, as well as ‘social categorisation and identity’ in his notion of a 
‘‘relational’ approach to poverty’. 
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meaning that individuals exist on the basis of a wide range of identities. These are 
categorised and ‘labelled’ by others in society (Wood 1985) and can condition the type 
and nature of intermediation people are able to experience, and hence the nature of 
their access to resources. ‘Categorical’ inequalities can thus form along these lines 
(Tilly 1999), with ‘bounded’ categories representing deeply rooted or permanent 
identities relating to, for example, caste, ethnicity or gender. The ways and extent to 
which these two forms of intermediation interrelate are empirical questions.  
This section has argued that the phenomenon of intermediation or brokerage which 
has been studied across the world should be understood in relation to how social order 
is maintained. Following the LAO framework, this rests on a ruling coalition 
establishing a superior capability for violence which they utilise to mediate the access 
other people have to resources. The second half of this chapter engages further with 
the dynamics of intermediation, asking how such relationships can be conceptualised, 
and what this means for how people negotiate and advance their interests within such 
societies.   
2.2. THE DYNAMICS OF INTERMEDIATION 
This chapter has built from recent macro theoretical frameworks on social order (North 
et al 2009; Khan 2010b), to conceptualise how the poor experience societies where 
social order rests on controlling a dispersed capability for violence. The phenomenon 
of intermediation has been posited as critical to how social order is maintained, 
because mediating the access others have to resources is arguably a key means by 
which a ruling coalition accrues the resources they need to maintain their power. If the 
connection between violence capabilities and intermediation is accepted, then this 
should be seen as central to how the poor pursue their livelihoods and interests. This 
section opens up a discussion about how we can understand the dynamics of 
intermediation. The first section reflects on how intermediation is negotiated; while 
the second further examines how we conceptualise the relationships people have to 
intermediaries.  
2.2.1. THE POLITICS OF INTERMEDIATION 
If intermediation is a structural characteristic to LAOs, then relationships with actors 
who have a capability for violence are fundamental to how people negotiate their lives 
within such societies. The model of social order from which this chapter has built 
however holds that the actors who form a ruling coalition, the resources that they 
control and the limits to these, are not fixed, but in flux as factors internal and external 
to society change (North et al 2009). Logically the status people have in such societies 
should also not be seen as fixed, but contingent on the relationships that they build, 
maintain and negotiate, and subject to the ways these are influenced by wider factors. 
The sense of movement that this understanding creates is captured well by the concept 
of ‘social navigation’, which refers to the ‘the act of moving in an environment that is 
wavering and unsettled’ (Vigh 2009: 420). Social navigation draws attention to the 
dynamic reality of people navigating their lives, continuously assessing and 
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strategizing, and moving in ways that try to predict and foresee what will be 
advantageous22. Whereas analogies of ‘fields’ or ‘landscapes’ create an image of a 
fixed environment, navigation has the advantage of pointing to the ‘socially immediate 
and the socially imagined’ (Ibid: 425, italics in original), where people ‘constantly live 
– on one level or another – with an eye to movement’ (Ibid: 431)23. 
These descriptions create the sense that people are strategic actors, however some 
authors take issue with this idea. For Scheper-Hughes (1992: 471) the term ‘strategy’ 
is inappropriate to describe the ways people survive in everyday life because it  
implies that people are consciously organized and prepared for action. It 
suggests that they have a clear-sighted vision of the lay of the land and a certain 
knowledge of the “enemy,” that they can look (optimistically) to the future, 
and that they can plan toward an upset victory. 
Drawing on the work of De Certeau (1984) she prefers the term ‘tactic’ which are 
‘defensive and individual, not aggressive and collective, practices’ (Scheper-Hughes 
1992: 472). Read another way however strategy can simply imply planning ahead, 
assessing where we are, what lies before us, and trying to manoeuvre in a way that 
meets certain ends. Whether for the poor, the ‘power that constrains them is so 
encompassing… that it has obscured their field of vision’ (Ibid: 472) is an empirical 
question and it does not seem fair or reasonable to deny any possibility that people are 
strategic just because they are poor.  
While navigation then serves as an analogy to understand people’s approach to social 
environments, the notion of negotiation perhaps more accurately captures the 
exchanges and dynamics of people gaining, maintaining and improving access to 
resources through relationships. The centrality of violence to the understanding of 
social order built upon here suggests that negotiation must be understood in relation 
to a capability for violence. The power of the ruling coalition is conceptualised as 
premised on this capability, and intermediation has been posited here as a means by 
which this capability is maintained. This suggests that a primary means by which 
people attempt to improve their status in such societies is through using violence. As 
Khan (2010b: 7) writes, ‘conflict itself is often the only mechanism for demonstrating 
and establishing holding power so that subsequent distributions reflect this underlying 
                                                 
22 In Guinea the sense of navigation is expressed through the concept of dubriagem (Vigh 2009: 423). 
Searching for equivalents in other languages, Vigh suggests ‘muddling through’, though this seems to 
be a quintessentially English way of downplaying something more significant or purposeful. A more 
accurate sense could be the idea of ‘reading a situation’.  
23 Speaking of an encounter with his research informants in Guinea, Vigh eloquently describes them: 
‘as they were talking, Pedro started moving his upper body in a disjointed yet rhythmical sway. Looking 
somewhat as if he was shadow boxing he wove and bobbed his torso back and forth as though dodging 
invisible pulls and pushes. Only later did it dawn on me that what he was in fact dodging were the pulls 
and pushes of social forces. His metaphorical shadowboxing was an embodied description of how one 
moves through a social environment in motion’ (Vigh 2010: 150). This is similar to Venkatesh’s (2013: 
54) descriptions of how people in poorer neighbourhoods navigate New York City. He describes the 




power’. To be able to control resources, one must then establish and demonstrate a 
capability for violence. This way of negotiating access can be deepened through 
considering Tilly’s (1997, 2003) notion of ‘contentious politics’. For Tilly contentious 
politics builds on ‘three familiar features of social life: contention, collective action, 
and politics’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:  4). Contention involves making claims, which 
are ‘statements of preference with respect to the behaviour of specific other people’ 
(Tilly 1997: 56). Public claims include ‘demands, attacks, petitions, supplications, 
affirmations of support or opposition, and declarations of obligation’ (Ibid: 56). 
Collective action is where there are ‘coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests 
or programs’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 5); and finally, contentious collective action is 
defined as politics when it involves the state or government.  
Some authors have however critiqued this focus for its ‘damagingly narrow and 
poverty-stricken view of political action’ (Scott 2008: 33) that has been ‘enormously 
distorted in a state-centric direction’ (Ibid: 49). Scott points to a multitude of different 
activities which for him constitute politics, but which are not directed towards the 
state. These include surreptitious forms of resistance to local elites, the so-called 
‘weapons of the weak’, which emphasise how ‘quiet, disguised and anonymous’, as 
well isolated, unorganised and often individual acts are in fact ubiquitous examples of 
class conflict in normal life (Scott 2008: 37). This debate about what should constitute 
politics is often characterised through a distinction between ‘big’ and ‘little’ politics. 
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) give three ‘big reasons’ why they focus on the government: 
the government is a power base, they control the rules that govern contention, and they 
control the means of coercion. In a LAO, however, ‘the state’ is not so easy to define, 
and North et al (2009) frame it in terms of the ‘ruling coalition’, a coalition of actors 
that is weaved throughout society as a network of factions. Logically then ‘the state’ 
is not a distant entity but can be very much present in people’s lives. This suggests 
that in LAOs conventional distinctions between ‘big’ and ‘little’ politics are not as 
dichotomous as they are often presented to be.  
Understanding how people employ violence or its threat to gain access to resources is 
therefore an important empirical question. Factional conflict has long been identified 
as a dominant form this takes (Nicholas 1965; Bailey 1969; Scott 1972) however we 
need to be attentive to the diverse ways this can be materialised. Hossain’s (2010) 
concept of ‘rude accountability’ offers one such example. Rude accountability refers 
to the ways in which people informally negotiate access to resources in contexts where 
resource distribution is not managed on the basis of impersonal rules. Examples 
include the subtle threat of humiliation, or even the veiled threat of an angry crowd. 
Hossain demonstrates how even a complaint, when creatively orchestrated can be a 
‘relatively powerful weapon’ (Ibid: 914). These forms of negotiation do not serve to 
improve institutional performance, or the rules by which resources are distributed, but 
represent idiosyncratic and opportunistic ways in which individuals and groups 
negotiate their status and access to resources.  
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While we then to be open to the diverse and subtle ways in which violence is used, we 
perhaps also need to be aware of how people negotiate not through violence, but 
around the violence capabilities of others. Indeed, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
people often employ non-violent means of negotiating access to resources through 
relationships. These resonate with some of the activities Scott defines as ‘weapons of 
the weak’, including ‘foot-dragging, dissimulations, false compliance, feigned 
ignorance, desertion, pilfering, [and] smuggling’ (Scott 2008: 34). As Bayat (2010) 
notes however, these are conceptualised as acts of ‘defiance’, and as therefore 
defensive. The emphasis on intermediation as being a means by which access is gained 
draws attention away from the language of ‘weapons’, and away from acts of defiance, 
and towards how people constructively negotiate access to resources. The idea of 
‘tools’ as opposed to ‘weapon’, can be tentatively suggested as a way of 
conceptualising this.   
The centrality of violence capabilities to intermediation suggests that the ways in 
which access to resources are negotiated have to grapple with this violence; perhaps 
directly using violence, negotiating around the violence capabilities of others, or both. 
Rather than draw a sharp distinction between certain strategies or forms of behaviour, 
the negotiation of intermediation is conceptualised here as the ‘politics of 
intermediation’ (Devine 1999: 252). Intermediation can be seen as the battleground 
for people’s struggles and strategies to improve their lives, opening up empirical 
questions about the forms that the politics of intermediation takes. The following 
section deepens an understanding of intermediation, by reflecting on how we 
conceptualise these relationships.  
2.2.2. UNDERSTANDING CLIENTELISM 
Relationships between people of unequal status within LAOs are conceptualised 
through the notion of patron-clientelism (North et al 2009; Khan 2010b). North et al 
(2009: 35) write that in LAOs, people find security in ‘patronage or clientage 
networks’, and it is through these that people ‘usually’ also advance within society 
(Ibid: 37)24. More widely patron-clientelism has long been used to conceptualise 
relationships in a variety of contexts across the world (Scott 1972; Blok 1974; Wood 
2003); and it is therefore the most prevalent and relevant concept for understanding 
intermediation. Because of its frequent use however, it has come to refer to a ‘wide 
and rich range of experiences’ (Devine 2006: 96), and in the process lost a degree of 
analytical clarity. To regain its relevance therefore, we need to interrogate what Davis 
(2005: 44) describes as the ‘black box approach’ to the concept. This section 
contributes to understanding relationships of intermediation by deconstructing patron-
clientelism in light of the intermediation-violence connection outlined above. The 
section begins by problematizing how we delineate patron-client relationships, before 
                                                 
24 It should however be noted that North et al (2009: 35) recognise that there are a number of other 
organisational forms in LAOs beyond those organised along patron-client lines, though they use the 
term as a ‘stand-in for many types of social networks’. What these other types look like is not clarified. 
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examining the content and outcomes of such relationships as two routes by which we 
can further investigate the concept, and nuance the way we use the term.  
Patron-client relationships are in basic defined as ‘asymmetric but mutually beneficial 
relationships of power and exchange’ (Roniger 2004: 353). Khan (2010: 10) argues 
that ‘any informal relationship or organization that involves individuals with different 
degrees of power can be broadly described as some variant of a patron-client 
relationship’. Similarly, he writes that ‘the goals of patrons and clients, their relative 
power, and the distribution of benefits they achieve can all vary widely’ (Ibid: 10). If 
these statement is accepted, then most if not all relationships between people of 
unequal statuses in LAOs can be described under this term25. By contrast, in a much 
earlier examination of the concept, Scott (1972: 92) argues that patron-clientelism is 
distinguished from other forms of relationships – such as those based on coercion or 
‘formal authority’ - by its reciprocal quality, arguing it refers to ‘a special case of 
dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship’. He defines three 
further essential features of such relationships: first, that there is an inherent inequality 
in the exchange – a ‘debt of obligation’ binds the client to the patron. Second, they are 
‘face to face’ - ‘the continuing pattern of reciprocity that establishes and solidifies a 
patron-client bond often creates trust and affection between the partners’ (Ibid: 94). 
Finally, that they are ‘diffuse, “whole-person” relationships rather than explicit, 
impersonal-contract bonds’ (Ibid: 95).  
For Scott a defining characteristic of a patron-client relationship is that it is not based 
on coercion. This definition seems problematic however in light of the place that 
violence has in relation to social order and intermediation. According to the framework 
outlined above, social order is underpinned by the power for coercion that a ruling 
coalition is able to establish and maintain. Whether factions and individuals within 
factions face a degree of coercion in forming such relationships and negotiating in this 
way is an open question. Furthermore, in the framework developed individuals and 
groups depending on actors within the ruling coalition for access to resources are far 
more likely to face forms of coercion given the imbalance in the capability for 
violence. This suggests that reciprocity and coercion may be able to function together, 
questioning whether it is analytically useful for the absence of this characteristic to 
define patron-clientelism.  
One way of further nuancing the use of the term is to better describe the content to the 
relationships highlighted. When examined in terms of democratic political systems, 
there has been a tendency to frame patron-client relationships in terms of resource 
                                                 
25 Part of the reason why the term appears to have lost its analytical teeth, are its application in rapidly 
changing environments. As Arias (2006: 2) argues, the term was originally developed in relation to 
agrarian relationships often involving landlords and workers or peasants. It seemed to give a sense of 
the depth to the long term and complicated relationships that emerge in such contexts. But as societies 
have developed, and as academic attention has shifted, the term has been continually applied to even 
more complicated and dynamic contexts, without significant conceptual advancements. 
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‘flows, exchange, [and] rational choice’ (Auyero 2000: 23). The predominant 
exchange has been perceived as  
the distribution of resources (or promise of) by political office holders or 
political candidates in exchange for political support, primarily – although not 
exclusively – in the form of the vote (Gay 1990: 648, cited in Ayuero 2000: 
57). 
The recognition that under LAOs, political and economic lives are ‘interlocked’ 
(Wood 2014) and that access to resources are mediated in order to provide benefits to 
a ruling coalition, necessitates attention to exchanges beyond that highlighted above26. 
A defining characteristic of the framework developed is that intermediation is 
intimately linked to the capability for violence. The bearing that violence has on 
people’s lives is an empirical question, however this framework suggests that violence 
forms part of such relationships ‘content’. Fundamental to the LAO framework is that 
factions have a capability for violence27 . North et al (2009: 10) describe patron-
clientelism in the context of factions in terms of ‘organizational support in exchange 
for benefits that the patron offers’. The stability of a faction, they argue, rests on the 
balance between patrons and clients, and the ability of the patron to mobilise their 
clients to ‘inflict violence on the clients of other patrons’ (Ibid: 36). This opens up 
questions regarding how and whether this is the case empirically, but also how 
violence also forms part of relationships between actors within and outside the ruling 
coalition.  
A further way of understanding the ‘content’ to patron-clientelism is by interrogating 
the motivations behind such relationships. As North et al (2009: 37) state, patron-client 
relationships can be ‘based on kinship, ethnicity, geography, religion, criminal 
activity, or other factors’. Khan (2010: 11) argues that although organisationally 
factions may overlap with class, ethnic and kin alliances they are more fundamentally 
driven by a ‘rational calculation of interests by both patrons and clients’. Relationships 
are then conceptualised as instrumental to personal economic or political interest 
(Ibid). In line with earlier conceptualisations of such relationships (Scott 1972), 
Hickey (2013: 15) critiques such a view for having a ‘rational-actor bias’, focusing on 
‘instrumental rather than value-based forms of rationality’. The risk with such 
understandings is that in ascribing to a particular notion of rationality, they become 
blind to objectives and dynamics within such relationships that sit outside this. In a 
similar vein, Devine (2006: 92) argues that 
                                                 
26 Understanding clientelism in relation to a LAOs points to a need to re-frame an understanding of 
political clientelism. Where party political actors have a far greater and more comprehensive role in 
day-to-day life (regulating business, determining security, providing access to services) the meaning of 
political clientelism must be equally multi-faceted. To limit political clientelism to exchange between 
votes and resources is to ignore the fact that it can be a political status that enables wider control over 
resources.  
27 Framing patron-clientelism in relation to factions is itself important analytically. As Devine (2006: 
94) argues, the concept of clientelism has a tendency to ‘atomize clients’, neglecting how individual 
relationships are embedded within wider groups, networks, alliances and so forth. 
35 
 
Clientelism matters not only because it offers material benefits, but because it 
establishes a particular form of affective relationship that attends to a wider set 
of obligations and commitments besides the provision of goods or services. 
This calls for attention to be given not only to the transactional content of such 
relationships but also the ‘social’; not only what is exchanged but the ways in which 
exchanges are embedded in deeper relationships and identities. So-called ‘patrons’ and 
‘clients’ may have symbolic and emotive ties – ‘fictive kinship’ or friendships - framed 
in terms of responsibility, obligation and good will. Auyero (2000) argues that 
building these may in fact be the root motivation for such relationships, and there is 
therefore a need to focus on the ‘enduring webs of relationships that brokers establish 
with their clients, and in the – sometimes shared (although seldom cooperatively 
constructed) – array of cultural representations’ (Ibid: 23). Attention to these identities 
and cultural references is in line with the concern to bring ‘ideas’ and ‘ideology’ back 
to analyses of politics concerned often only with ‘interests’ (Hickey 2013; Rodrik 
2013). Even if we accept the proposition that social order rests on a ruling coalition 
maintaining a superior capability for violence, the interests and motivations behind 
actors within this coalition cannot necessarily be confined to a rational calculation of 
interests and material benefits.  
A final way of interrogating the term patron-clientelism, is by deconstructing the 
negative dynamics the relationships it denotes are often understood as having. Indeed, 
fundamental to understanding the significance of intermediation in the lives of the 
poor is exploring the extent to which such relationships are ‘problem solving’ (Auyero 
2000) and ‘problem-creating’. In one sense, the concept of intermediation inherently 
values these relationships: people receive resources through them such as work, 
shelter, services and security. Clientelism itself can be understood as a ‘form of 
bargaining’ (Fox 1994: 153), representing both an outcome of a negotiation, but also 
a continuous negotiation, with relationships and the balance of power within them 
constantly changing. Furthermore, as already argued, at a societal level ‘personal 
relationships and rent-creation provide the incentive systems that contain violence and 
allow cooperation in a natural state’ (North et al 2012: 37). And yet the notion of 
clientelism, and hence highly diverse relationships, are characterised negatively as 
unjust, exploitative and corrupt, contrasted against relationships based on rights as 
citizens (Hopkins 2006).  
These judgements are often based on analyses of the consequences of these 
relationships, understood in terms of agency. Scott (1972: 94) argues that ‘affiliating 
with a patron is neither a purely coerced decision nor is it the result of unrestricted 
choice’. Though patron-client relationships can be defined by a degree of initial 
agency, and as bringing certain benefits – security, work, services – they are theorised 
by some as having longer term negative outcomes on individual agency and thus 
closely associated with the replication of poverty (Auyero 2000, Wood 2003, Mosse 
2010). Auyero (2000: 70) argues that they reflect ‘relations of clientelist domination’, 
and more widely this point has been conceptualised as ‘adverse incorporation’ (Wood 
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2003; Hickey and du Toit 2007; Davis 2011). Wood’s (2003: 455) argument of 
‘Faustian bargains’ is the most sophisticated representation of this point, an argument 
most simply summarised as: ‘the pursuit of immediately needed security places [the 
poor]… in relationships and structures which then displace the longer term prospects 
of a sustained improvement in their livelihoods’. As Auyero (2000: 175) argues 
similarly 
If they [clients] resist the broker’s domination, they will lose access to vital 
resources and thus make their already bad living conditions even worse. 
Resistance is therefore out of the question (and probably futile). If, on the other 
hand, they assimilate… [they] partake in the reproduction of the hierarchic 
relations prevailing in the local political arena and thus in their own 
subordination. 
The relationships and structures through which the poor find security thus come ‘at a 
price: of dependency and the foreclosure of autonomy. Becoming a client, in other 
words.’ (Wood 2003: 456). Though the poor therefore find security in such 
relationships, this is ‘dependent’ rather than ‘autonomous’ (Wood 2007).  
It can also been argued however that clientelism and agency are not the dichotomy 
they are often analysed to be. Devine (2006) makes this argument drawing on literature 
from social-psychology (Chirkov et al. 2003). Rather than preventing autonomous 
action, some forms of dependency may in fact may be the means through which 
‘clients’ can act autonomously and pursue their own interests. Devine’s (1999, 2002, 
2006) analyses of the relationship between clientelism and collective action suggests 
that clientelist organisation can be the basis on which collective action can promote 
the interests of the poor and increase their agency. More generally outside of patron-
client relationships this principle has strong resonance. A simple analogy is that of the 
dependency a child, teenager or young adult often has on their family. The dependency 
is real and multi-faceted (emotional, economic), yet it is through that dependency - the 
reliance and the security it brings - that the child can (at least in ideal) pursue their 
interests and build their future. Devine et al (2008: 27) argue ‘the right kind of 
dependency relationship can be an important and creative vehicle within which the 
poor can effectively exercise greater agency and autonomy’. This therefore raises the 
question of what constitutes the ‘right kind’ of dependency. It also suggests moving 
away from deontological assertions of moral worth, and moving towards more 
teleological judgements (Piliavsky and Sbriccoli 2016).  
This can be examined further by asking questions about the relative power between 
patrons and clients, and the extent to which there is ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Schaffer 
and Lamb 1974: 82). Inter-dependency is inherent to the definition of patron-
clientelism. The stability or legitimacy of the patron is contingent on the actions of 
clients, and the levels of relative bargaining power vary between contexts (Scott 1972). 
This can be seen as partly a function of the degree to which ‘exit options’ are available 
(Hirschman 1970). Gay (1998: 14), writing from a Latin American context, argues 
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that clientelism is ‘an increasingly voluntary, transactional and, as a result, unstable 
relationship between both political elites and masses’. Similarly, Hopkins (2006: 3) 
argues that traditional patron-client relationships have become more ‘democratic’, and 
though relationships are unequal the client ‘feels increasingly free to use her vote as a 
commodity to be exchanged for whatever maximizes her utility’. As such, these 
relationships are more unstable and malleable. Devine (1999: 253) writes that ‘the net 
effect of the mutual influence of 'dependence' and 'autonomous power', 'clientelism' 
and 'voice' is politically contingent and evolving, never fixed and static’. Other studies 
indicate a far greater sense of control by such ‘patrons’ over the communities within 
which they live (Johnson 2005; Arias 2006). Furthermore, Auyero (2000) argues that 
the term patron-clientelism should be confined to refer to the inner circles of brokers. 
The intensity of such relationships is determined by their proximity to the broker and 
in many cases outside of this, he argues, people may receive goods or services without 
giving loyalty, and therefore without a sufficient degree of reciprocity to merit 
classification through the term patron-clientelism.  
In summary, this section helps guide an analysis of people’s relationships with 
intermediaries through critically engaging with how patron-clientelism is understood. 
In line with the framework of this chapter, the ‘content’ of such relationships must be 
understood both in relation to violence, as well as being socially embedded, and 
therefore their dynamics more complex than the language of ‘interests’ and 
‘exchanges’ can capture. Furthermore, the actual outcomes of such dependencies in 
people’s lives may be complex, and we need to avoid the negative connotations that 
the term patron-clientelism is laden with.  
2.3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established the conceptual framework for this thesis by proposing a 
relationship between how social order is maintained and the nature of intermediation. 
The key link between these is how societies manage a diverse set of actors having a 
capability for violence. In LAOs social order is theorised as predicated on a dominant 
coalition forming across society on the basis of a superior capability for violence than 
a rival coalition. This is structured through factions organised hierarchically. Social 
order is dependent on these actors accruing sufficient resources to maintain their 
power, while at the same time limiting the access rival actors have to resources (North 
et al 2009). Controlling the access that other people have to resources – a phenomenon 
that can be termed intermediation or brokerage – is posited as an important means by 
which a dominant coalition maintains its viability. This suggests that intermediation, 
which has been studied across the world within Western social sciences since the early 
20th century, can be understood in relation to the capability for violence of a ruling 
coalition. The relationship between intermediation and violence is however one that 
should be demonstrated empirically, a task for subsequent chapters.  
Positing a relationship between a capability for violence and the dynamics of 
intermediation opens up significant questions about the nature of the relationships that 
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people have with these intermediaries, and the means through which people negotiate 
access to resources. Questions regarding patron-clientelism, the dominant concept 
used to understand these relationships, have been posed, relating to where the concept 
should be applied, the content of these relationships, and the outcomes they have. It 
has been argued that in terms of content, greater attention should be given to the 
capability for violence, and how this conditions the relationship between people and 
intermediaries. This framework also demands attention is given to how people 
negotiate access through these actors, how they build relationships and negotiate the 
terms of these. This is the ‘politics of intermediation’. The framework within which 
this politics is conceptualised assumes that violent factional competition is a prevalent 
form this politics takes, but also necessitates seeing more diverse and potentially rich 
ways in which people negotiate access.  
3. INTERMEDIATION IN DHAKA CITY 
 
‘intermediaries’ (ranging from godfathers, mastans, corrupt officials, hired goons, 
and the like) end up holding the real power, with both MPs and the people becoming 
dependent on them 
Ahmed (2004: 107) 
 
This chapter applies the theoretical framework of violence, order and intermediation 
to the context of Dhaka on the basis of academic and historical sources. Given this 
thesis’ empirical focus on the kangali, emphasis is placed on the condition of the urban 
poor and understanding the nature of intermediation from their perspective. Over the 
past decade or so a body of literature has emerged from urban Bangladesh arguing that 
poor communities are organised in complex ways, and controlled by a range of party 
political and violent actors who mediate access to valuable resources (Wood and 
Salway 2000; Banks 2008; IGS 2012; Hossain 2013; Hackenbroch and Hossain 2012; 
Suykens 2015; Atkinson-Sheppard 2015). This chapter questions how intermediation 
is understood in urban Bangladesh, setting the basis for the empirical contribution of 
this thesis. Two arguments are in particular advanced: first, that a broader set of actors 
than those often identified play important roles in the lives of the urban poor; and 
second, that we need to deconstruct the role that violent urban actors known as mastan 
have been argued to play in Bangladesh. Approaching the lives of the urban poor in 
Bangladesh through the framework developed here, furthermore poses significant 
questions regarding how the capability for violence is distributed in poor communities, 
the nature of relationships with intermediaries and how these relationships are 
negotiated; all questions that have to date been neglected in urban Bangladesh.   
The first half of this chapter argues for the significance of labour as a way in which 
the urban poor are organised, and hence labour leaders as key intermediaries. 
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Historical sources suggest that groups of labour in Dhaka28 were organised by caste 
and trade through a type of faction or union, known as dal or panchayat. These were 
led by labour leaders; often called sardar in Bengali. Labour leaders played important 
roles in the colonial state, and were contentious and ubiquitous intermediaries to whom 
the urban poor looked for work and security. These actors are almost entirely neglected 
by contemporary literature from Bangladesh, however the few recent references there 
are indicate that they continue to play a significant role in Dhaka (Khan 2000).  
The second half of this chapter critically examines the violent figure of the mastan, 
who are identified within literature as playing significant roles in poor urban 
communities in Bangladesh (Wood and Salway 2000; Banks 2008; IGS 2012; 
Suykens 2015; Atkinson-Sheppard 2015). Mastan have been seen as powerful 
intermediaries to whom the urban poor look, controlling access to services, space and 
work and determining people’s experiences of security. Their deep connections to 
party politics led to conceptualisations of the Bangladeshi state as itself a 
‘mastanocracy’. Though often cited as significant, there is relatively little research on 
who these actors are or the roles they play. This chapter deepens our understanding of 
these actors through first, understanding them within the LAO framework (Khan 
2010a, 2013) and second, by contextualising them in relation to historical 
understandings of urban criminality within South Asia.   
3.1. CASTE, LABOUR AND LEADERSHIP 
To understand the nature of intermediation in urban Bangladesh today it is important 
to appreciate how it has evolved historically. Sources available from the early 19th 
century draw analytical attention to how ethnic and cultural differences have 
intertwined with socio-economic and political structures to organise the poor. While 
most of these ethnic and cultural differences have now eroded, the way in which these 
groups were organised give insight into what was – and what some studies suggest 
still is – a ubiquitous intermediary and form of organisation: the labour leader and 
groups of organised labour. It should be acknowledged from the outset that historical 
sources only offer limited information as to how these groups were placed within the 
colonial state and how violence connects to these forms of intermediation. This section 
should therefore be seen as important in pointing attention to certain forms of 
intermediation, rather than offering clear-cut insights regarding the nature of this. As 
empirical chapters will demonstrate, this form of organisation is critical to 
understanding the lives of the urban poor in Dhaka today, as well as for understanding 
the dynamics of factionalism at the lowest rungs of political parties.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Dhaka was previously spelt as the anglicised ‘Dacca’. Dacca is used here where it appears in the 
source quoted.  
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3.1.1. CASTE AND OCCUPATIONS 
Last year I was a Jolaha, this year I am a Shekh; next year if prices rise I shall be a 
Saiad29 
Bengali proverb, cited in Census of India 1901 
By contrast to the 19th and much of the 20th centuries, Dhaka today is culturally 
homogenous, dominated by Bengali Sunni Muslims. There are important exceptions 
to this including the so-called Bihari 30 , a prominent Shia community, Hindu 
communities distinguished by caste, as well as smaller Christian and Buddhist 
communities. The vast majority of urban poor people however identify as Bengali 
Muslims. Where people distinguish their identities from others this is more likely to 
be done through reference to their place of birth, their bari, among other factors. Prior 
to partition in 1947, the population of what is now Bangladesh – and thus also the 
urban poor – had been far more diverse. Sources from the colonial period31 indicate 
that complex ethnic, cultural, religious and racial differences mediated people’s access 
to the labour market, business and more generally right to participate in society (Taylor 
1840, Wise 1883, Census of India 1901). This was of a magnitude not seen in Dhaka 
today. These differences became framed as ‘caste’, partly through the process of 
census and survey administered by the colonial state, which attempted to draw clear 
boundaries around more fluid and tangled identities (Samarendra 2011; Walby and 
Haan 2012). The term caste then captures a broad set of identities that have differing 
dynamics and relevance to people’s lives. Underlying these identities, as across South 
Asia, were notions of purity and pollution, with castes of lower status generally 
associated with occupations connected to symbolic and physical pollution.  
These identities mediated the access that both Hindus and Muslims had to the 
resources needed to pursue livelihoods and interests (Taylor 1840, Wise 1883, Census 
of India 1901). In the case of low-caste Hindus, some of the communities and 
dynamics continue in Dhaka today (Sultana and Subedi 2016). Some of the most 
                                                 
29 A Jolaha is a weaver, a Shekh refers to having Arab ancestors, and Saiad denotes a descendant of 
Mohammed.   
30 The groups known as Bihari in Bangladesh are non-Bengali Muslims from different socio-cultural 
backgrounds, with roots in adjacent states in India.  
31 This section draws on a number of colonial era sources for arguments developed here. Colonial 
literature should not however be drawn upon uncritically. The crude and offensive descriptions found 
represent an imperialist ideology, reinforce local hierarchies and reimagine them through the ‘scientific’ 
anthropology prevalent at the period (Walby and De Haan 2012). Despite this, the quasi-science they 
represent – surveys, classifications of occupations and groups - accompanied at times with not 
uninformed commentary, can offer insight into the nature of urban order. From the early 19th century 
two sources stand out: Henry Walter’s 1830 Census of the City of Dacca (published in 1832), and James 
Taylor’s 1840 Sketch of the Topography and Statistics of Dacca (based on his census of the city in 
1838). By 1871 there is the first nation wide census, representing a more rigorous – albeit deeply flawed 
- attempt to document and classify human life. Perhaps more interesting that the statistics, these sources 
often contain sociological and ethnographic commentary, which at least offers insight into the colonial 
perspective at the time. In the late 19th century James Wise, the civil surgeon stationed in Dhaka district, 
offers one of the most detailed accounts of the social fabric of the city in his Notes on the Races, Castes 
and Trades of Eastern Bengal 1883. A major weakness in my historical sketch is that I am limited to 
English language texts. 
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outcast groups of urban dwellers were and are referred to as dom, or the ‘domra, doma, 
dombra, dama’ (Wise 1883: 265; Sultana and Subedi 2016). In practice this referred 
to people as diverse as fisherman, sweepers, and ‘pagoda slaves’ in Arakan united only 
by ‘their degraded position in the eyes of the people’ (Ibid: 265). These groups were 
held as having a lower, defiled status: ‘the presence of a Dom at any gathering of pure 
Hindus defiles them all’ wrote Wise (1883: 268). A similarly broad term which is still 
also used today is mihtar or methor, referring to people associated with waste. This 
was also a category employed by censuses32. Wise (1883: 338) lists disparate groups 
identified under the label - ‘Lalbegi, Khakrob, Bhangi, Raut, Hela, Halal-khor, Sekri, 
or Chuhra’. To be identified as being a methor indicates an association with defiled 
forms of work and social status, such as household or industrial waste, excrement, 
animal carcasses, dead bodies, and as such were associated with the streets, sewers, 
gutters and cemeteries. 
Both Hindus and Muslims were associated with being defiled and of low caste. 
Through to the early 20th century, a common distinction is drawn (at least within the 
literature) between three classifications of Muslims in the Bengal – Ashraf, Ajlaf and 
Arzdl (Census of India of 1901). 33  Ajlaf implied ‘wretched’ or ‘worthless’, and 
incorporated groups such as the Jolaha (weavers), Dhunia (cotton-carder), Kulu (oil-
pressers), Kunjra (vegetable sellers), Hajjam (barbers) and Dazri (tailors); while Arzdl 
or ‘lowest of all’ consisted of the ‘very lowest castes, such as the Haldlkhor, Lalbegi, 
Abdal and Bediya’ (Ibid: 439). Whether caste operated in the same way within these 
groups as it did within Hindu communities is debatable. Lewis (1868: 8) comments 
that the ‘Lower classes of Mahomedans are divided into communities according to the 
occupation they follow, and many of these are quite as exclusive as the Hindoo castes, 
in regard to marrying and eating with each other’. There are hence references to the 
Hajjam, a muslim barber, who ‘occupies one of the ‘lowest ranks, and no respectable 
family will associate, or intermarry, with his’ (Wise 1883: 69). Or of the Muslim 
butchers, previously divided between bakri-kasai (goat killers) and goru-kasai (cow 
killers), the latter of whom ‘were formerly regarded as a degraded race’ until recently 
when intermarriages between the two groups took place. Fishing was deemed ritually 
unclean at this period, and throughout East Bengal is associated with indigenous 
“tribes” (Ibid: 90). In the late 19th century there was a group of around 80 families 
belonging to a community of fisherman known as ‘mahi-farosh’ who were excluded 
from wider Muslim society. Some Muslims were implicitly associated with their low-
caste Hindu roots, and despite being Muslims, retained Hindu practices. The idea that 
such groups were ‘remnants of semi-Hinduized aboriginal tribes’ (Ibid: 338) indicates 
the ambiguous associations they retained.  
                                                 
32 In origin the term appears to have referred to a prince, and it is possible it was therefore an ironic way 
of referring to the lower castes.  
33 Ashraf means noble and was used to refer to people of foreign Muslim extraction - Mughal, Turk, 
Arab and Pathan - the descendants of the traders and colonisers of bygone eras among whom the ‘pride 
of blood… amongst the Muhammadans of foreign descent is considerable’ (Ibid: 441). This source 
indicates it could also refer to high caste Hindu converts. 
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While today it is very rare to find a Hindu beggar, historically both Hindu and Muslim 
beggars were common in Dhaka city. In 1830 there were 101 Brahmin beggars in 
Dhaka City. 61 of whom were men and they lived in a total of 29 houses. Alongside 
these however there were 628 Muslim beggars, together constituting approximately 
1.3 percent of the urban population. A sizeable proportion of these beggars were 
fakir34. As Lewis (1868: 9) writes 
Fakirs are numerous in the city, and subsist principally on the bounty of the 
wealthy Musalman inhabitants… These idle vagabonds are in great force, 
more especially during the festivals of Mohurrum and Ramjan 
In what must be one of the earliest attempts to categorise poverty in Dhaka Taylor 
(1840: 316) identifies the worst off of all as the ‘lame, blind and diseased, of which 
lepers form a large proportion’. He notes they survive by begging in the streets and 
are ‘all truly pitiable and deserving objects of charity’. Socially stigmatised 
occupations associated with waste and that which is impure are familiar in Dhaka city 
today, as will be explored in later empirical chapters. Unlike today however, in 
colonial Dhaka, labourers and beggars lived alongside slaves, maintained by elite 
households in the city for domestic work (Taylor 1840; ILC 1841; Wise 1883).35 
Slaves went by different names, and Ghulam, or Bhandaree were common for 
Muslims and Hindus respectively (Taylor 1840: 319). Some were born into slavery, 
their families being tied to masters hereditarily, others sold themselves into it, while 
others still were captured or kidnapped and forced into work. Slavery was used as a 
coping strategy to deal with famine (ILC 1841), and both Taylor and Wise note the 
greater prevalence of slavery in East rather that West Bengal, stemming ‘perhaps’ 
from the ‘frequent occurrence of destitution and distress’ (Taylor 1840: 319).  
Domestic slaves were seen by one author as being comparatively well treated - ‘with 
rare exceptions he is kindly treated, and in return he regards the welfare and happiness 
of each member of the family as inseparable from his own’ (Wise 1883: 317). Male 
slaves were permitted to marry, and at least on paper could be married to up to around 
eight female slaves who were in reality used for sex by their owners (Taylor 1840). 
Those sold into slavery in Dhaka were generally girls, having been ‘decoyed away 
from their parents… under pretext of marriage… and disposed of either to public 
women, or to rich individuals as servants’ (ILC 1841: 15)36. Wandering fakir were 
                                                 
34 Fakir refers to a Muslim beggar identified as having a commitment to a religious or spiritual way of 
life, often within a broadly Sufi tradition.  
35 Outside of the cities Zamindar often relied heavily on the labour of slaves (in this context, bonded 
peasants) in their estates, and it appears that in some areas a remarkably high proportion of the 
population were classified as such. In “Tipperah” for example they were estimated to constitute one 
whole quarter of the population while in Sylhet they were estimated to be one third (1841: 8-9). 
Interestingly there appear to have been very clear concentrations of ‘slavery’ within the Bengal. In 
contrast to Tipperah or Sylhet, in “Rajeshahy” they were seen to constitute between two and three 
sixteenths of the population.  
36 The slave trade was however international. It seems that at least by the late 18th century ‘Dacca and 
its neighbourhood furnished the greatest number of the children whom the low Portuguese of Dacca, 
Calcutta… used to purchase and collect clandestinely, and export by sea’ (1841: 18).  
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identified as some of these tricksters. 37  Some girls were later ‘disposed of’ to 
prostitutes in Dhaka (Taylor 1840), where sex work was common. Allen (1912: 60) 
wrote that ‘prostitutes are to be found in every bazar and in considerable numbers in 
Dacca city’. Brothels were plentiful, and ‘not unfrequently the scenes of assaults, 
thefts and homicides’ (Taylor 1840: 282).  
In the case of all of these groups of urban poor, sources portray caste identities as 
maintaining severe restrictions around social interaction and people’s life possibilities, 
but also as evolving, being ambiguous, and being transcended, as the quote at the 
beginning of this section indicates. Referring to caste/occupation groups, the author of 
the Census of India 1901 wrote that a  
member of one such group cannot ordinarily gain admission to another, and he 
retains the designation of the community in which he was born even if he 
abandons its distinctive occupation and takes to other means of livelihood 
(Census of India 1901: 441).  
Identities necessitated following strict social rules. The Lalbegi, who were mentioned 
earlier, self-identified as Muslims and yet ate pork and were not circumcised. They 
‘dare not enter a public mosque’ (Wise 1883: 339), they followed Hindu festivals such 
as Diwali, and were not allowed to be buried in Muslim graveyards, resorting to bury 
their dead in jungle and waste space. Similarly, the Census of India (1901: 439) 
describes the Muslim ‘Haldlkhor, Lalbegi, Abdal and Bediya, with whom no 
Muhammadan would associate, and who are forbidden to enter the mosque or to use 
the public burial ground’. Centuries of ‘caste violence’ across South Asia have 
demonstrated how the boundaries to caste groups access to resources are enforced 
through the violence of higher castes, often drawing on the apparatus of the state.   
Alongside this however, ‘caste’ groups also worked in diverse occupations, a fact 
likely related to the comparatively diverse and dynamic nature of the urban economy. 
Labourers for example had diverse roots. The 1830 census testifies to this, noting the 
10 khettri coolie, 208 Sudra Kayat coolie, 235 Kandu coolie and the 1678 muslims. 
These would have serviced the city’s transport terminals (at the time most notably 
sadarghat in old Dhaka), as well as the city’s many bazars. The Kandu, apparently 
came from Damdaha, Purneah (Wise 1883) in modern day Bihar, and as well as 
coolies, worked as ‘confectioners… watchmen, [and] domestic servants’. There is also 
reference to the dosad or dosadh, a ‘semi-Hinduized aboriginal tribe’ with fifteen or 
so families in Dhaka, working as ‘house bearers, syces, pankha coolies, and porters’ 
(Ibid: 269). Slaves were not necessarily tied for life, and on the death of their masters 
some found other work – ‘in Dacca [they] are employed as confectioners, coolies, 
brasiers, shopkeepers, and venders of Pan and Indian hemp’ (Ibid: 317)38. In the early 
                                                 
37 It is possible that some form of slave market had existed previously in Dacca, though no reference 
has been found. The most noted was in Hooghly, north of modern day Kolkata in West Bengal. 
38 More generally history documents many examples of slave eunuchs who have become famous and 
powerful, rising up in the courts of their masters. An example from the Bengal who will also be 
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20th century Allen (1912: 65) writes that the vast majority of Muslims belong to the 
same caste and ‘therefore approach the condition where there is no such thing as caste 
at all’. These indicate that even for the lower classes and castes there was a degree of 
mobility, of movement between occupations, and processes by which older mediating 
identities eroded. The next section examines how these groups of people were linked 
into the wider state through intermediary actors and group structures.  
3.1.2. LABOUR, SARDAR AND THE STATE 
The sirdars are the real masters of men 
 Royal Commission on Labour in India 192939 
In historic Dhaka, as across South Asia, the occupational and caste groups described 
above were often hierarchically structured, led by a leader who situated the group in 
relation to wider society and the colonial state. Working through some form of group 
and leader was a key form of intermediation that the urban poor experienced. The 
British utilised and institutionalised labour leaders more generally within industries 
and agriculture, and hence they are often described as a critical ‘intermediary’ of the 
colonial state. Studies from contemporary Bangladesh rarely highlight the significance 
of labour leaders and groups, however the few studies that do, indicate that they are 
still a prevalent and important figure in the lives of the poor (Bertocci 1970; Wood 
1994; Khan 2000).   
Systems of labour, caste and occupational group leadership have deep historical roots. 
Writing of nearby Bihar, Chatterjee (1996: 57) argues that long before the British 
came, systems of leadership within trades had emerged, often called ‘chaudhuri, 
mistri, or dangriya’, existing within ‘every trading, artisan or carrier group’ – from 
butchers to barbers to porters and scavengers – most notably in urban centres. These 
headmen were elected to lead panchayats, translated by this author as ‘professional 
organisations’. As leaders they would receive a ‘certain commission on all goods sold, 
or services rendered’ (Ibid: 58) but be responsible for the management of the group. 
They acted as intermediaries between the workers and the government – paying 
‘tributes’ to the administration and informing them of the condition of workers.   
The 1901 Census of India refers to panchayat as being drawn along ‘caste’ boundaries, 
as well as ‘functional groups’. In the context of Muslims in Bengal they note the 
‘striking point of resemblance’ between Hindu castes and Muslim ‘functional groups’ 
in that ‘they have the same system of caste management’ (Census of India 1901: 339). 
The purpose of such panchayat was to both manage the group, as well as to represent 
them within the wider society. The census author notes that the ‘panchayat takes 
cognizance of all breaches of caste custom in respect of trade, religion or morality’ 
(Ibid: 440). This meant ensuring people maintained customs regarding food 
                                                 
referenced later is Khwaja Ambar, the chief eunuch of Shaista Khan, the 17th century Mughal governor 
of the Bengal.  
39 cited in Chakrabarty (2000: 96). 
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consumption, and interaction (such as smoking the hukka) with people from other 
castes. They restricted members from doing work that is of a lower, and sometimes 
even higher, status. They regulated within trade competition - ‘no member of a caste 
may endeavour to oust another from any employment he has obtained, by offering to 
do the work for a lower wage or otherwise’ - and also organised trade strikes (Ibid: 
440). 
In Dhaka two panchayat systems existed – the first was as above, organising people 
of specific castes or trades, and the second was an area based system for managing 
Dhaka’s Muslim community. The Census of India (1901: 439) notes that in the case 
of Muslim communities of Dhaka the institution of panchayat was also referred to as 
matbar. Wise (1883: 262) refers to these trade and caste based panchayat through the 
language of “unions”, which he clarified was his translation of the Bengali term dal. 
The term dal today often has explicitly factional connotations, and the brief 
descriptions that can be found of these dal in historic Dhaka, also indicate that people 
of the same caste and trade were factionally divided. The Hindu spice or medicine 
dealers for example had ‘six powerful dals, or unions, in Dhaka city, the Dalpatis, or 
head-men being persons of great respectability’ (Ibid: 272). The Hindu pottery and 
brick makers - Kumar - had two ‘dals, or trade unions, one known as Islampur, the 
other as Bhagalpur40… the headman is styled Paramanik’ (Ibid: 334), while the Hindu 
garland makers – the malakara - had two unions in Dhaka. The group of outcast 
Muslim fisherman living in Dhaka mentioned earlier, the mahi-farosh, were often 
organised into a ‘union or dal, presided over by a Paramanik’ (Wise 1883: 90). The 
Hindu washers – the dhobi - had no ‘permanent union (Dal); but whenever disputes 
arise, or their interests are endangered, they quickly form one, reserving for such 
occasions a headman, or Para-manik’ (Ibid: 262). 
Different terminology is in use here, but all with similar meanings41. Leading one of 
these dal, or panchayat, was a powerful position, and as such was ‘much coveted’ 
(Census of India 1901: 440)42. At least one of these went on to become a trade union 
registered with the government under the Trade Unions Act of 1926, the ‘Dacca 
district scavengers union’43. Alongside these trade and caste based panchayat, sat the 
panchayat that represented the Muslim communities by their wards, or mahalla, a 
system common across South Asia. Each mahalla was represented through a 
panchayat, led by five elder (male) community members who themselves were led by 
a sardar (Ahmed 2010: 19). All Muslims except the Ashraf recognised its authority 
and the sardar from each mahalla met together. In the late 19th century they served as 
                                                 
40 It is possible Islampur refers to the area in current day old Dhaka, while Bhagalpur referring to a city 
in Bihar.  
41 A ‘pramānik’ is defined in John Shakespear’s dictionary (1834: 403) as ‘(in Bengal) a chief of a tribe 
among the inferior casts’. ‘Dalpati’ according to a Hindi-English dictionary is ‘chief or leader of a team, 
a captain’ (Allied Chambers transliterated Hindi-Hindi-English dictionary 1993). 
42 Lewis (1868: 10) notes that among the Hindus the president is designated differently according to 
caste – he is ‘styled “Dálpati” among the Brahmins, “Paramanick” among the weavers, goldsmiths, 
barbers &c., “Mukia” among the Tepális’.  
43 Note that the term scavenger refers to what today are often called sweeper.  
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conduits for the collection of income tax for the colonial revenue collection board, 
instead of local government institutions (Census of India 1901). 
The term sardar referenced above was a common way of referring to an important and 
prevalent actor in the lives of the lower classes in colonial India. Taylor writes of the 
300 street coolie in Dhaka in the 1840s 
who belong to the districts of Purneah and Bhagulpore. This class of people 
have been settled here for about 150 years; they live in sets, each consisting 
[of] twenty persons under the orders of a sirdar, who regulates their work, 
and divides their earnings among them at the end of the month. (Taylor 1840: 
311) 
 
Sardar or sirdar, is a way of referring to a ‘headman’ (Wise 1883: 83), or foreman, a 
low level labour leader who has responsibility for a small group of manual workers. 
In Hindustani ‘sar-dār’ can be defined as a ‘chief, a head man, commander’ 
(Shakespear 1834: 1065). ‘Sardār-ī’ is then ‘chiefship, supremacy, domination, 
lordship, rule’ (Ibid: 1065). Through the sub-continent there are a range of other terms 
used to describe leaders of broadly the same role. Discussing the labour at docks for 
example, ‘shipping companies… employ foremen, known variously as tindals, 
mukkadams, gang maistries, jemadars, joliwalas, or sardars’ (RCLI 1931: 185). 
These were referred to in colonial discourse as ‘jobbers’, the now antiquated English 
term for brokers or middlemen. The institutionalisation of their role within industries 
in India is referred to as the ‘jobber system’ (Chandavarkar 2008). 
Through drawing on broader literature it is possible to comment on the likely situation 
of labourers in Dhaka city. From the latter half of the 19th century colonial 
administrators institutionalised the role of jobbers within sectors that required 
organised labour. Sardar or a variant of them could therefore be found in tea 
plantations, mines and factories, but also in bazars and transport terminals such as train 
stations and ports. They were ubiquitous ‘intermediaries between employer and 
employee’ (RCLI 1931: 23), and it can be assumed they would have been present in 
the bazars, terminals and factories of Dhaka, and also among the city’s sweepers. The 
rationale for their introduction and promotion by the colonial state was the perception 
of Indian labour as ‘sedentary and overly mobile; difficult to recruit and impossible to 
control; incapable of organisation, yet averse to work discipline’ (Chandavarkar 2008: 
125). In many industries sardar, who were originally ordinary workers, were sent out 
to recruit labour from within their networks of kinship, caste and home village.  
He is not, however, merely responsible for the worker once he has obtained 
work; the worker has generally to approach him to secure a job, and is nearly 
always dependent on him for the security of that job as well as for a transfer to 
a better one… they may finance him [the worker] when he is in debt and he 
may even be dependent on them for his housing’ (RCLI 1931: 23) 
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The sardar benefitted financially not only from a recruitment fee that they usually 
earned from their employer, but they often also demanded a fee from the employee to 
gain work. Further, ‘in many cases a small regular payment has also to be made out of 
each month’s wages’ (Ibid: 24). Referring to extortion of workers by sardar, the Royal 
Commission on Labour in India 1931 notes that ‘it is said that even members of the 
supervising staff sometimes receive a share of the bribe’ (Ibid: 24). Combined with 
the benefits from providing other services such as credit and housing, they were 
portrayed as having an exploitative hold on the workers, as being an ‘evil’ force 
(RCLI: 24). ‘The clutches’ of the jobbers ‘keep him [the worker] in permanent 
bondage’ (Burnett-Hurst 1925: 48, cited in Chandavarkar 2008: 126-127). The power 
that these sardar had to exploit workers was perceived as resting not only on their 
structural position in relation to wider industries and the state, but also their direct 
capability for violence (Chakrabarty 1983; de Haan 1997; Chakrabarty 2000; Sen 
2002; Bhattacharya 2004). Sen (2002: 3957) wrote that ‘the threat of physical violence 
played an important role in the exercise of authority on the part of the sardars’. Some 
sardar were also local ‘dadas’ (meaning elder brother), having a status as being 
violence specialists in the local area, running gymnasium and running extortion 
networks, and utilised by factory owners to control the workers (Sen 2002). These 
sources describe the capability for violence of the sardar more in terms of direct 
physical violence, rather than as being indirect by drawing upon wider forms of 
authority. The potential for violence was then an important part of the authority that 
sardar maintained over workers, and that was instrumental to the colonial state 
maintaining control in economic settings44. Indeed, as colonial control weakened in 
the late 1930s, the power of sardar within Indian industries weakened (Gooptu 2001). 
Whether this is an appropriate characterisation of the sardar as an intermediary is 
however disputed (Sen 2010; Chandavarkar 2008; Bates and Carter 2016). Rather than 
seeing jobbers as ‘monolithic and homogenous’ (Chandavarkar 2008: 136), they were 
arguably ‘heterogeneous’ (Ibid: 141). There were ‘head jobbers’ as well as ‘lower 
jobbers’ (Ibid: 142). Sources from Dhaka cite ‘head-sardar’, ‘sardar’ and ‘sub-sardar’, 
with reference to municipal waste workers (The Municipal Office, Dacca, 1969). It is 
furthermore important to acknowledge the likelihood of differences between the 
management of caste groups and the management of labour within wider markets 
however. Labour leaders could be found in widely different forms of industry and 
service, from train stations to factories to mines. This means they often operated within 
‘a larger managerial hierarchy’ (Chandavarkar 2008: 144), the dynamics of which 
differed. In the case of cotton mills for example ‘authority was diffused and lodged at 
various levels’ such that ‘there were competing locations of power and alternative 
sources of patronage to which workers could turn’ (Ibid: 144). Similarly outside of 
work – where jobbers were seen as extending their power base - ‘the proliferation and 
                                                 
44  In the rural context, it has been argued the colonial state attempted to maintain order through 
improving the condition of the ‘intermediate’ class of rural landowners, the jotedar (Khan 2010a). It is 
possible that sardar – though lower hierarchically that jotedar – played a similar structural role in 
maintaining the power of the colonial state in the urban context, within industry and large agriculture.  
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rivalry of patrons was always liable to increase the options before the workers and 
afford them a measure of protection at the very point at which the benefactor appeared 
to enslave them’ (Ibid: 136).  
Competition between sardar, and between other intermediaries playing the broader 
roles that sardar often played, increased the overall exit options available to labour. 
Taylor (1840: 314), for example, writes of Dhaka that ‘almost every person engaged 
in business in the town is a pawnbroker’, requiring borrowers to pay interest of around 
2.5 to 6 percent a month. A jobber’s legitimacy was often contingent on their ability 
to provide access not only to work, but also these wider goods (housing and credit for 
example). As Bates and Carter (2016: 10) write of sardar in overseas colonies,  
it was not uncommon for them to retain a portion of the monthly wages of their 
labourers as a form of saving. This could then be returned when the labourer 
wished to remit money home or to go back to India, or if a labourer was ill or 
absent and his wage was docked, that portion of the past retained by the sirdar 
would then be used to provide him with support.  
But in certain contexts, in providing these wider goods they opened themselves to 
wider competition with locals, and had to situate themselves within the ‘moral 
economy of the neighbourhood’ (Chandavarkar 2008: 144). Jobbers could be 
undermined by those below them, and as such ‘had to remain responsive to the needs 
and expectations of the workers’ (Ibid: 141), and were therefore vulnerable. Similar 
to the sense of change and flexibility alongside clear caste boundaries, is then also the 
sense that the relationship with key intermediaries were also heterogeneous and 
shifting. 
These forms of intermediation described above are deeply related and cannot be easily 
disentangled. People of the same caste and occupation were organised as groups, led 
by leaders referred to in different ways and undoubtedly playing subtly different roles 
according to the demands and requirements of different communities and industries. 
Given the presence of different dal within the same caste or occupation, there is a 
sense that factions existed in historic Dhaka. Leaders situated and linked groups to 
wider society and the colonial state. A significant part of this relationship was the 
payment of tax and the collection of revenues. LAOs are built on a ruling coalition 
accruing resources. The actors that this includes in rural contexts are well documented, 
and were dominated by the landlords, the zamindar, described by Baden-Powell in 
1899 as the ‘great middleman’. Under the Mughals and later East India Company45 
and British Crown, a sophisticated and comprehensive tax system regulated life. Much 
of this was orientated around key points of exchange such as ‘gunges, ghauts and 
bazars’ where ‘duties or customs [were] levied upon almost every article of life, and 
of imposts on trades, professions and personal property’ (Taylor 1840: 197-198).  
                                                 
45 By the late 18th century all lands belonging to the Mughal government in the city of Dacca were 
transferred to the East India Company, and administered under the Board of Revenue in Calcutta 
(Taylor 1840: 205).  
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There were sales taxes on items from hookahs to looking glasses and combs, ‘for a 
goat, 1 to 2 annas were charged in the rupee: elephants and horses at the rate of 5 per 
cent’. An annual tax on vegetable sellers was levied, weighted to their sales46.  
Whether in Dhaka these systems of taxation extended down to the labourers through 
their leaders, their sardar, or any of the various associations is an interesting question 
without a clear answer. It is known that some people could be excluded from tax 
obligations due to poverty (Taylor 1830: 165). It should also be noted that with the 
brief introduction of an income tax in the 1860s, tax was paid collectively through 
panchayat rather than as individuals. Separate panchayat were institutionalised for the 
collection of the chaukidari tax (night watchmen)47. Writing more generally of the tax 
system, Taylor (1840: 197-198) argues that ‘the rate of assessment and mode of 
collection were not well defined, and being in most cases left to the uncontrolled 
management of renters and their subordinates, these taxes were generally very 
arbitrary and oppressive’.  
The structure and place of organised labour, as well as the figure of the labour leader, 
the sardar, have largely disappeared from contemporary studies from Bangladesh. In 
the urban context, the only source that does include analysis of them (Khan 2000), 
highlights the significant role that they continue to play in mediating people’s access 
to work and wider resources. Khan references the continued role that sardar play in 
mediating access to work, and also bringing labour groups from rural areas into the 
city. Similar to the account from colonial India, he writes that ‘many wage labourers 
have to pay the sardars… an amount of their earning and accept any sort of work the 
sardar offers’ (Ibid: 42). His analysis however also highlights the relationship that 
these sardar have to a more powerful actor in the urban context – the mastan – writing 
that ‘the labour gangs are directly controlled by violent gangs either through their 
members or through their trustworthy nominees’ (Khan 2000: 188), suggesting a new 
intermediary structure in which labour leaders operate today. While the sardar 
themselves have also been understood as having a capability for violence, since the 
early 20th century a more violent and entrepreneurial set of actors have been identified 
as playing extremely significant roles in the lives of the urban poor. These are explored 
in the second half of this chapter.  
3.2. PARTY POLITICS AND VIOLENCE SPECIALISTS  
Alongside labour leaders are a set of violent actors, both independent and 
interconnected with organised labour, who have played significant roles in the context 
                                                 
46 The importers and sellers of marijuana and opium were also taxed. By the mid 19th century there 
were over 20 opium shops in the city, as well as five licensed distilleries making fermented rice based 
drinks (Wise 1883). Further back, in ‘1793 the importers of ganjah paid a tax (Koot Mehal) of Rs. 2-4 
per maund, and the venders of it in the city, a duty varying from two annas to one rupee per month’ 
(Taylor 1840: 209). A more obscure form of tax was known as ‘Chundeena Dumdaree. A tax on bear, 
monkey, and snake dancers, on bird catchers, singers, fakirs and conjurers’ (Taylor 1840: 201). 
47 The position of nightwatchman may have reduced crime of one sort, but it also gave the 759 men 
initially recruited, the power to extort (Ibid: 158-159). Ahmed (2010: 36) notes that ‘it was repeatedly 
alleged that the chaukidari panchayats were a den of lowly and selfish people’. 
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of the lives of the poor in early 20th century urban Bengal and current day Bangladesh. 
While the vocabulary used to identify and refer to these actors differs, they are united 
in occupying similar structural positions within the urban environment, and in being 
‘violence specialists’ (Tilly 2003). Indeed, a capability for violence should be seen as 
the defining characteristic of these actors, and the basis on which they have gained 
authority and the ability to play broader roles in the lives of the urban poor and wider 
society. In Bangladesh mastan have been identified as powerful and dangerous 
intermediaries on whom both the urban poor and party politicians depend; while 
historically goonda were understood in very similar ways in wider Bengal. This 
section proposes understanding these actors as different expressions of the same 
phenomenon and examines their role in relation to the LAO framework. In so doing 
this section points to a significant lack of detail in understanding who these actors are 
and how people relate to them.  
3.2.1. THE RULING COALITION, GOONDA AND MASTAN 
The social order of what is now Bangladesh has changed significantly in the post-
Colonial period, and under the various governments seen in the country since 
independence in 1971; and the ruling coalition on which social order rests has 
incorporated a range of different actors (Khan 2010a). Through the 1990s and early 
2000s academic studies of poor communities in Dhaka pointed to the prevalence of a 
dangerous figure known primarily through the Bengali term mastan. A striking feature 
of contemporary research from urban Bangladesh has been the close association 
between intermediation and violence. The mastan have been portrayed as controlling 
access to services, running extortion networks and being closely tied to party politics. 
Despite their perceived importance, there has been very little detailed analysis of who 
precisely these figures are, and how or why they have the power they do. This section 
examines these figures through the LAO framework and Bangladesh’s recent history 
(Khan 2010a; Hassan 2013). In so doing it attempts to explain why these actors have 
emerged and gained the power they are renowned for. The core explanation proposed 
lies in the dynamics of party political competition (Devine 2007) under ‘competitive 
clientelism’ (Khan 2010a). The posited relationship between violence, party politics 
and mastan, also suggests that rather than being unique or new, the mastan 
phenomenon is a more recent incarnation of the dynamics expressed through the 
similar term goonda from early 20th century Bengal.  
Since at least the late 1980s mastan have been identified by both academics and the 
media in Bangladesh as being powerful in urban areas (Abdullah 1991; Siddiqui et al 
1993; Wendt 1997; Khan 2000; Wood 2000; Ahmed 2004; Sobhan 2004; Banks 2008; 
IGS 2012; Hossain 2013; Hackenbroch and Hossain 2012; Ruud 2014; Suykens 2015; 
Atkinson-Sheppard 2015; Banks 2016). The term mastan is translated differently into 
English. Bangladeshis very often portray it as meaning ‘muscle man’, some use the 
term ‘hoodlum’ (Siddiqui et al 1993) or a ‘strong man’ (Khan 2000), and English 
language media often writes of ‘thug’ and ‘goon’. ‘Mastani’ is a common way of 
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describing violent crime such as hijacking or extortion (Devine 2007). Van Schendel 
(2009: 252) describes these mastan as such:  
The archetypal mostan is young, urban, armed and testosterone-charged. He 
acts officiously as the leader of a locality, pushing aside respected elders and 
appointed authorities. An upstart, he rules through fear… 
Earlier references portray mastan as a low-level source of insecurity, as perpetrators 
of sexual violence, as robbers, extortionists and hired muscle for politicians (Siddiqui 
et al 1993), but by the late 1990s and early 2000s they had become emblematic of a 
corrupt political system. One prominent commentator described their presence in 
society as representing the ‘criminalisation of politics’ (Sobhan 2004). Others took it 
a step further, writing of Bangladeshi society itself as a ‘mastanocracy’ (Ahmed 2004), 
or as having a ‘mastan structure’ (Khan 2000; Ahmed 2004; Devine 2007; Wood 
2014). Today, mastan are still portrayed as both ingrained and ubiquitous in 
Bangladeshi society. One author writes that they are an ‘inescapable feature of street-
level political life’ (Ruud 2014: 304).  
The power of mastan is often understood as stemming from their party political 
functions, including serving as muscle for personal protection, mobilising labour and 
support for political events and campaigns (Khan 2000; Ahmed 2004; Sobhan 2004; 
Banks 2008; Devine 2007), and even providing vote banks. As such, they are seen as 
holding a unique ‘strategic role’ (Ahmed 2004: 101) or ‘structural position’ (Devine 
2007: 21), on which politicians are dependent. In the late 1990s they were portrayed 
in the media as such 
Mastans are able to sustain because of the various vested interest groups of the 
society. Whether the cause is political, commercial or personal, there is 
invariably a constant demand for mastans in the society (The Daily Star, 10 
June 199948) 
Khan’s (2010a; 2013) application of the LAO framework in Bangladesh helps to better 
theorise why these figures emerged so significantly in the late 1980s and 1990s. For 
Khan (2010: 12) factions competing and included in the ruling coalition range ‘from 
neighbourhood groups led by petty mafia bosses known in Bangladesh as mastans to 
village factions led by somewhat more respectable mattabars, dalals and upazila 
chairmen’. Mastan are perceived as emerging in the urban context during a period in 
which Bangladesh experienced significant political change. Following the ‘Father of 
the Nation’ Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s failed attempt to build a ‘populist authoritarian’ 
one party state (Khan 2013), and his assassination in 1975, the country’s subsequent 
leaders - President Rahman and then President Ershad - relied on bringing a broader 
set of actors alongside the military into the ruling coalition in order to maintain social 
                                                 
48  Cited in ‘Responses to Information Requests (RIRs), Bangladesh: Information on 
goons/thugs/mastans, and the nature of their relationship to political and police authorities (1998-
2003)), Immigration and Refugee Board, Government of Canada 
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order. As Khan (2013: 29) writes, the ‘new clientelist logic was to selectively include 
enough political organizers in the dominant coalition to minimize the required threat 
of force to an acceptable level’. During Ershad’s rule people formed organisations 
under different political guises in order to demonstrate their ‘holding power’ and 
therefore legitimate claim to inclusion in the ruling coalition, however as long as 
Ershad retained control of the military and bureaucracy the ‘top job’ remained his 
(Ibid: 19). Referring to the late 1980s Abdullah (1991: 98) wrote of the 
‘“mastanisation” of urban local level politics’, suggesting that there is a connection 
between the emergence of urban mastan gangs and the need for a wider set of actors 
to be included in the ruling coalition.  
Following the toppling of Ershad and the return to a form of parliamentary democracy 
however, the strongest political parties that had emerged through Bangladesh’s history 
competed for the ability to form a new ruling coalition. Two parties dominated: the 
Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; and 
the BNP, led by Khaleda Zia, the wife of a former President Ziaur Rahman. The means 
by which these parties competed in the early 1990s and since has been through 
demonstrating their ‘organizational power’ on the ground to mobilise people, inflict 
violence on others, and enable stability (Khan 2013: 29). The competition between 
these two parties, and the networks of factions they represent, constitutes ‘competitive 
clientelism’ (Khan 2010; 2013)49. In a society where political parties compete to 
establish the ruling coalition, the capability for violence is needed at the grassroots. 
Indeed, arguably elections are not processes which primarily judge the interests and 
ideology of voters, but rather where ‘the organizational strengths of the competing 
clientelist coalitions are revealed’ (Khan 2013: 60). Within this model, mastan are a 
means by which political parties compete (Devine 2007), and are thus included in the 
network of actors that together constitutes a ruling coalition. While there has been little 
direct research into the mastan, the work that there is has pointed to the complicated 
and multifarious relationships between party politics and these actors (Devine 2007; 
Ruud 2014). For Devine (2007: 23), though mastan are legitimised by political 
networks, the actual control over them by political leaders is ‘neither dominant nor 
comprehensive’, and they can therefore be understood as having a reasonable degree 
of independence or entrepreneurialism, competing with other groups of mastan and 
switching political allegiances. While intimately connected, mastan are thus 
conceptualised as distinct from party political leaders (Khan 2000; Hossain 2012).  
The emergence of mastan from the 1980s has been portrayed as a ‘unique’ 
development in Bangladesh’s history (Ahmed 2004), distinct from other criminals 
                                                 
49 According to Khan’s analysis, under a LAO defined by competitive clientelism, either party has the 
potential to win elections. Political organisations can be formed to ‘challenge the ruling coalition’ and 
businesses can be established without the direct support of the ruling coalition (Khan 2013: 30). 
Nonetheless ‘the operation of organizations still requires assistance from political and state actors that 
has to be “purchased” on a personalized basis’, in order for ‘support or non-intervention’ (Ibid: 6). 
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such as the cadre or goonda50. Framing mastan in terms of a LAO, and understanding 
them as serving as a means by which others compete to demonstrate their superior 
capability for violence, suggests that they a more modern expression of a phenomenon 
that can be traced back through to the early 20th century Bengal when a distinct and 
new violent and urban figure – the goonda – emerged within public and government 
discourse (Ghosh 1991; Das 1994; Chakrabarty 2000; Sen 2002; Bhattacharya 2004; 
Nandi 2010). Based on historical analysis of police records in Calcutta, Das (1994: 
2880) describes the goonda as involved in a wide range of crimes such as ‘snatching, 
extortion, theft, murder, robbery, dacoities, wagon-breaking, smuggling, gambling 
and blackmarketeering’. Some goonda had been doormen, some sardar (Chakrabarty 
2000; Bhattacharya 2004), and some from the middle class. Certain goonda were 
identified as wealthy individuals (Bhattacharya 2004), from diverse backgrounds, 
even Anglo-Indians and a Chinese man in the case of Calcutta (Das 1994). The goonda 
were identified as a unique form of criminal, though what actually defined them as 
unique was contested (Nandi 2010). It is certainly clear that Calcutta was not 
unfamiliar with organised crime. The 18th century had for example, seen the presence 
of what Banerjee (2003: 2047) calls ‘urban dacoity’, gangs of men numbering into 
their hundreds, hiding in nearby jungles, sometimes including Europeans, who robbed 
the city’s elite. While these urban dacoits had long since been supressed, the goonda 
were seen as distinct for qualities that paralleled those given to dacoits: they combined 
the capability for violence with brazenness, and were therefore particularly dangerous. 
As such they were distinct from the badmash, the ordinary urban criminals. As Nandi 
(2010: 37) writes, ‘goonda meant an archetypal urban criminal, unfettered by social 
mores and given to ferocious violence’51.  
Goonda led ‘goonda gangs’ (Nandi 2010) that were more based on skills than home 
district or caste identities. Indeed, these gangs were particularly associated with 
migrants, and as a space in which poor people from diverse backgrounds could find 
opportunities. These gangs were often labelled as clubs, based from ‘local gymnasia 
and physical training centres’ (Das 1994: 2880), and were in competition with other 
groups for local power. In a similar way to mastan, they are understood as having 
‘dominated life in working-class bustis (slums) and bazaars’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 110). 
They were identified as particularly involved in prostitution, and indeed one 
explanation for the rise of goonda is the opportunities to regulate increased levels of 
prostitution after the influx of American soldiers during World War II (Ghosh 1991: 
4; Das 1994: 2880). A further reason why goonda were understood as having emerged 
                                                 
50 Contrasting mastan with other labels for violent criminals, Ahmed (2004: 100) writes that while 
goonda are professional killers or the cadre are ‘underground party members who own arms’ the mastan 
are ‘unique’. Devine (2007: 21) distinguishes mastan against the shontrash, while Ahmed (2004: 102) 
appears to equate mastan and shontrash. The label shontrash is often translated into English as terrorist, 
but it perhaps has more the connotations of outlaw and gangster than terrorist. For Ahmed (2004: 102) 
the mastan are not only the armed and violent criminals, but also ‘represent an ‘unarmed’ intermediary 
group providing institutions and administration who extorts money through extra-legal operations’.  
51 The extent to which the identification and legislation around goonda was a response to the emergence 
of a new form of criminality has however be questioned. Nandi (2010) argues that it rather reflected 
elite fears around hooliganism, which were by then well established within an urban European context. 
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in this period – and a defining characteristic of their identities – was their close 
connection to politics. As Bhattacharya (2004: 4281) writes, the  
skill of producing violence was a skill that was as much in demand as that of a 
lawyer and expertise in this skill brought the ‘subaltern’ of the city in close 
proximity of the ‘elite’ political and industrial bosses.  
Bhattacharya (2004: 4278) argues that it was partly the involvement of goonda in the 
non-cooperation movement that motivated ‘The Goondas Act’ of 1923 for West 
Bengal, which empowered the police to identify and deport goonda without trial 
(Nandi 2010)52. While these goonda were therefore perceived as in opposition to the 
colonial state, they also often maintained links with lower level administrators and the 
police. This connection to politics appears to have continued and strengthened such 
that goonda later played extremely significant roles as defenders and perpetrators of 
communal violence between Hindus and Muslims (Ghosh 1991; Das 1994). Indeed, 
these ‘links with institutional politics’ (Das 1994: 2878) enabled some goonda to avoid 
prosecution.  
Goonda were also identified as problematic in Dhaka. A letter from the President of 
the Dacca District Scavengers’ Union on the 5th of May 1943 for example describes 
the ‘pro-fascist goondas’ sabotaging activities in Dhaka. Similarly, in a letter from 
1943, the Inspector-General of Police for Bengal laments the lack of a Detective 
Department in Dacca, the main drawback of which he describes is the lack of ‘direct 
touch with the goonda type of criminal’ which he identifies as ‘primarily responsible’ 
for the ‘communal clashes’ seen in the city. Later, just prior to independence, there is 
a reference to ‘Gundas’ attacking the methors (waste workers) in ‘Ganaktuly’ 
preventing them from going to work (Municipal Office, Dacca 1970). What lies 
behind these references is unclear, though it can be assumed that the functions and 
roles of goonda in Dhaka to some degree resembled those of Calcutta.  
What this suggests is that the goonda of Bengal and more recently mastan of Dhaka 
are different expressions of an underlying phenomenon where a capability for violence 
at the lowest levels of urban society becomes instrumental to wider actors, networks 
and coalitions, such as a factory owner needing to control workers or a political party 
demonstrating its strength. Where actors within a ruling coalition become dependent 
on them to maintain and demonstrate a capability for violence, there is therefore a 
sense in which they become part of that ruling coalition, and that they are able to take 
on a far greater degree of power and status within society. They may grow within 
political regimes, but there is some evidence to suggest that - in line with the LAO 
framework – they retain a degree of independence, switching allegiances as they seek 
opportunities (Devine 2007).  
                                                 
52 Equivalent legislation in Bangladesh is the ‘Control of Disorderly and Dangerous Persons (Goondas) 




3.2.2. MASTAN AND THE URBAN POOR 
The party political value of mastan is seen as giving a degree of protection from the 
police and law or the possibility of collusion with them. This, as well as their capability 
for violence, is understood as enabling them to control resources and act as 
intermediaries between poor communities, the state and party politics. The roles this 
includes are diverse. Hence mastan have been identified as running protection rackets, 
appropriating resources such as land, and operating illegal businesses. Devine (2007: 
23) describes mastan as conducting ‘petty theft, operating informal protection rackets 
among local businessmen, highjacking and collecting informal tolls’. Lewis and 
Hossain (2008: 41) write similarly of the ‘informal mustaan culture of extortion that 
characterises local politics’. They have also been described as sheltering thieves, drug 
dealers and gambling, in exchange for money (Khan 2000). Banks (2008: 369) 
describes a further role: this ‘interaction exchanges a vote bank that is mobilized by 
the mastaan in return for improved services or other benefits from elected officials’. 
They have been portrayed as mediating access to services such as water, gas and 
electricity, as well as controlling land, community institutions and employment 
opportunities. More recently it has been argued that the mastan operate as 
representatives for concerned parties in bosti land disputes (Suykens 2015), that they 
are ‘enforcers’ for local leaders (Banks 2016), and also that they use street children in 
their illegal activities (Atkinson-Sheppard 2015) 53 . Interpreted within a LAO 
framework, mediating the access that others have to resources is not only a power that 
these actors enjoy, but fundamental to how they maintain their capability for violence. 
Mastan are acknowledged as ambiguous characters in terms of the values they 
embody, the roles they play, and how they are identified within society (Khan 2000; 
Ahmed 2004; Devine 2007; Hoek 2013; Suykens 2015; Banks 2016). At a moral level, 
they are on the one hand associated with criminality and lawlessness, but on the other 
also seen as ‘honourable heroes’, protecting victims of injustice (Devine 2007: 9). 
They may also portray themselves in this way (Ruud 2014: 316). For Khan (2000) the 
mastan fill a ‘structural hole’, where ‘gusti54 and lineage based neighbourhoods… do 
not exist or are not as strong in the urban bustee context’ (Khan 2000: 233). Hence 
they build norms and maintain ‘informal rights’ (Ibid). Work on popular culture in 
Bangladesh has pointed to this ambiguity well, the slogan of one cinema poster, for a 
film titled Noya Mastan reading ‘he is killer but not terrorist’ (Hoek 2013: 122), 
implying a sense of righteous violence. This ambiguity can even be seen in the 
etymological understandings of the word. Kaur (2005: 174) writes that the term refers 
                                                 
53 Atkinson-Sheppard (2015: 5) has argued that ‘mastaans operate in every slum in Dhaka’. These 
‘groups’ are headed by a mastan who has a ‘right hand man’ and controls street level gangs who mediate 
access to services, run extortion networks and are involved in land grabbing. Though she claims to offer 
the ‘the first robust empirical study of the gangs of Bangladesh’ (Ibid: 2), the article offers no evidence 
to support the claims made, and focuses on accounts from children of how they are included in political 
violence and crime. 
54 Gusti refers to a lineage group. 
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to ‘he who is in a state of mast, or of being wholly absorbed into the love for God or 
his representative’, and at root is then a ‘mystic figure’ within the Sufi tradition 
(Ibid)55. Ahmed (2004: 101) argues that the term is of Turko-Persian origin and sees 
these spiritual connotations as at the heart of why the mastan are so prominent in 
popular imagination, representing someone who is willing to sacrifice themselves for 
a greater good56.  
Consistent with these ambiguities, and also with the colonial portrayals of sardar, 
mastan are understood as playing a role that is inherently both inhibiting and helpful 
in the lives of the urban poor. As Khan (2000: 47) writes, ‘mastaans are both the source 
of uncertainty and as well as offering a relationship for managing insecurity and risk’. 
Because it is the mastan who are understood as having the capability for violence at a 
local level, being subject to violence, facing financial penalties or being denied access 
to resources are potential consequences of opposing them. As Khan (2000: 85) 
described his research in a Dhaka bosti ‘everyone knows the price to be paid for 
resisting or challenging mastaans’: violence. Analysis often gives greater weight to 
the negative dynamics to these relationships. The mastan have been portrayed as part 
of a ‘hostile political economy’ (Wood and Salway 2000; Banks 2012), which is 
‘amongst the biggest obstacles facing the urban poor’ (Banks 2012: 46) and seriously 
inhibits agency (Wood and Salway 2000). The World Bank (2007: 57) similarly 
described mastan as a ‘major obstacle to reaching the poor’. Similar descriptions are 
also found of the wider actors identified in the urban context. Writing of the politically 
affiliated bosti residents, Hossain (2013: 222) argues 
Their interests are quite different from those of the community, and they work 
within a closed system that suits their mutual needs and promotes their 
financial benefits to the detriment of the general inhabitants.  
Alongside these portrayals of mastan as dominating urban spaces however also sits a 
sense that this is not the entire story. At one level there is ambiguity over who precisely 
the mastan are (Devine 2007; Suykens 2015; Banks 2016). In the context of a slum in 
Chittagong Suykens (2015: 496) writes that the ‘line between being a mastaan, a 
jomidar or a community leader was sometimes thin and blurred’. Supporting this 
argument Banks (2016: 13) notes that not all local leaders in Dhaka’s slums are 
mastan. Some authors have described mastan as being gangs (Khan 2000) while others 
more as individuals (Suykens 2015; Banks 2016).  
                                                 
55 My experience in the mazar of Dhaka suggests that the term can still occasionally have religious 
connotations. 
56 19th century English translations from Hindustani however define the term mast as meaning ‘drunk, 
intoxicated, lustful…’ (Shakespeare 1849: 1896). It is this latter definition that is acknowledged in the 
political and economic dictionary of South Asia by Mitra et al (2015). They write that the term mastan 
is a ‘Bengali word originally used to refer to a person who is in a state of intoxication… today used to 
refer to armed individuals who collect ‘rent’ from businessmen, industrialists, construction contractors, 




In a similar vein, not all urban literature has focused on the figure of the mastan to 
conceptualise the nature of intermediation (Hossain 2011b; Hackenbroch and Hossain 
2012; Hackenbroch 2013; Hossain 2013). Though Hossain (2013) and Hackenbroch 
and Hossain (2012) briefly reference the mastan as significant in Dhaka’s bosti it is 
actually the explicitly party political organisation of local power that these studies 
examine. Studying the provision of urban water services, Hossain (2011) describes 
how state services are ‘politicised’, subject to the interests of the ruling party, and how 
people improve their access to this service through party political connections. Party 
politics provides a legitimacy to the informal provision of water, and urban residents 
are heavily dependent on party leaders. Similarly, Hackenbroch and Hossain (2012) 
show how once Awami League affiliated leaders came into power they took control 
over key community structures (such as the salish, bazaar and mosque committee), 
which they used to extract rents from the community. Political connections allowed 
preferential access to government services and a good relationship with the police, 
which was supplemented by ‘tea, cakes, Coca-Cola and money’ (Ibid: 412). 
Hackenbroch (2013) also examines the significance of party political leaders in 
determining access to space for businesses in a bazar. Alongside the mastan, other 
urban studies have similarly highlighted how affiliation or membership within the 
ruling political party enables access to valuable resources such as work, space or 
opportunities (Banks 2008; Suykens 2015).  
Furthermore, elsewhere in Bangladesh, studies have highlighted the rapidly changing 
nature of what has been framed here as order and intermediation. The classic rural 
conceptualisation of these hierarchical relationships was a ‘net’ under which the poor 
were caught (BRAC 1983). More recently, some have however argued that this net 
has loosened, and that a ‘new rural power structure’ has emerged, which 
Under certain circumstances allows ‘room for manoeuvre’ for weaker sections 
of the community to advance their interests, and for government and NGOs to 
open up space for pro-poor change (Lewis and Hossain 2008: 48).  
The importance mastan have been understood as having in the urban context as key 
intermediaries to whom the urban poor relate and as leading violent factions connected 
to the ruling coalition, establishes them as a central actor for further empirical research. 
The significance given to other actors, such as explicitly party political leaders and 
followers (Hossain 2011b; Hackenbroch and Hossain 2012; Suykens 2015; Banks 
2016) and the continued role of the sardar (Khan 2000) however also suggests a 
broader constellation of intermediaries, and forms of organisation, that need to be 
examined in relation to one another and to the urban poor. Furthermore, although 
acknowledged as intermediaries, significant questions remain about how precisely 
these actors have a capability for violence, what forms this takes, and how it interacts 
with the factions noted as significant in macro studies from Bangladesh (Khan 2010a, 
2013) and posited as significant in the framework developed here. Violence is 
acknowledged however not explicitly examined. The bearing this has on people’s lives 




This chapter has applied the framework developed in chapter two to Dhaka, focusing 
on the nature of intermediation in the lives of the urban poor. Literature and historical 
sources suggest that there is a complex array of actors prominent in the lives of the 
urban poor, and that these actors are closely associated with having a capability for 
violence, which they use to control valuable resources, making others dependent upon 
them. Through applying the LAO framework it has been suggested that mastan gangs 
identified as powerful in Dhaka are similar to the goonda highlighted by previous 
generations. The rise of mastan to power in Dhaka through the 1990s can perhaps 
understood in terms of the dynamics of competitive clientelism, and how political 
parties require the capability for violence on the ground to compete. At the same time, 
it has also been suggested that there is a high degree of ambiguity in who mastan are 
and the roles they play in contemporary Bangladesh. Furthermore, the labour leaders 
once seen as powerful and ubiquitous across colonial India have disappeared from 
analyses, along with the dal they were identified as organising. All of this poses 
questions regarding the nature of intermediation in contemporary Dhaka – the actors 
to whom the urban poor look, the roles these actors play in relation to the urban poor 
and how the poor negotiate these relationships.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
Don’t you get bored asking us all these questions?! 
Liton, a labourer at Karwan Bazar 
 
This thesis intends to build an emic account of social order from the perspective of the 
kangali in urban Bangladesh. The data on which arguments are built have been 
accumulated from research and reflections over a year’s ethnographic fieldwork 
between 2014 and 2015, a two week period of research in 2013, two years of insights 
gained at arms length working in the broader context, and through examining archives 
for just under a month. It has built up iteratively over the years: for example months 
of fieldwork interspersed with weeks of writing and reading, mornings spent in 
archives and afternoons researching in Dhaka.  
Descriptions of research methodologies often account well for the methods they use, 
however less well for the experience of research itself (Berreman 2007). In addition 
to explaining methods, data validation and modes of analysis, this chapter offers 
insight into the experience of doing ethnography in Dhaka. In particular it focuses on 
the idea of exploration as an early stage of immersion, and on the dynamics by which 
I as a researcher negotiated my presence and status in my research contexts. When 
read in relation to chapter nine, it will become clear that there is a commonality in the 
dynamics of negotiation between a researcher gaining access to a research context, 
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and the means by which people negotiate access to valuable resources elsewhere. If 
dominant forms of intermediation are premised on a capability for violence, gaining 
access to certain research contexts necessitates grappling with this. Recognising this 
supports an argument for seeing ethnography as political, a negotiated and sometimes 
contentious process in which researchers have to creatively gain and negotiate insights 
into a world in which they are very often initially largely unfamiliar.  
The data used in this thesis comes from multi-site ethnographies across Dhaka City. 
Research focused on Karwan Bazar, a large wholesale fruit and vegetable market at 
the centre of the city. Research was also conducted at three further research sites, a 
park and two pavements (one of which was adjacent to the bazar), to supplement and 
validate findings. These sites are discussed here to the extent necessary to explain the 
methodology, however are more fully introduced in the following chapter. The first 
half of this chapter frames the methodology in relation to wider political 
ethnographies, before describing the early stages of research relating to immersion, 
gatekeepers and choosing a research context. The second half of this chapter starts by 
giving insight into the negotiations in which I had to engage, relating these to literature 
on obligations (Rosen 1984) and the presentation of self in everyday life (Goffman 
1956). This chapter finishes with a discussion of data validation and analysis.   
4.1. THEORY AND EARLY DAYS 
4.1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND APPROACH 
The analytical framework used in this thesis was developed in chapter two. Following 
recent work on political settlements social order in most societies is understood as 
resting on a dispersed set of actors forming a coalition and dominating rivals on the 
basis of their superior capability for violence (North et al 2009; Khan 2010b). Khan 
(2010b) argues that this coalition is formed from actors at different levels of society 
organised at factions. To date this framework has been theorised and examined 
empirically at the macro level, and the intention of this thesis is to use these ideas to 
analyse the lives of the kangali, those considered the most destitute in the urban 
context in Bangladesh. A key conceptual step taken in chapter two was to posit a 
relationship between intermediation (Tilly 1985; Devine 1999; Wood 2010) and the 
capability for violence, suggesting a relationship between relationships of 
intermediation or brokerage and how the ruling coalition is organised.   
This framework opens up seeing the relationships through which people gain access 
to resources they need to pursue their livelihoods and interests in relation to how 
violence is organised. Important questions emerge about what these relationships look 
like and how they are negotiated in people’s lives. Furthermore, if this posited 
relationship does hold true, it suggests that we can look through the lives of people 
who rely on these intermediaries to understand the dynamics of social order from a 
new perspective. Indeed, viewed in this light, existing empirical research from 
Bangladesh does suggest a close relationship between intermediation and violence, 
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through, for example, the mastan gangs which literature suggests are powerful in 
Dhaka.  
The overarching research question given in the introduction to this thesis was ‘how do 
the kangali relate to the social order in urban Bangladesh?’ On the basis of the 
framework developed in chapter two, a number of further sub-questions can now be 
offered. These are: 
1. What forms of intermediation do the kangali in Dhaka city experience? 
2. How do the kangali negotiate this intermediation? 
3. What do the dynamics of these say about the nature of social order in 
Bangladesh?  
 
This thesis utilises the framework developed in chapter two to develop an emic 
account of social order from the perspective of the kangali. Fundamental to how this 
is approached ontologically is the proposition that agency and structure are constantly 
in an act of creation, and as such social order is dynamic and changing in nature 
(Giddens 1984). The intention to build an emic account of social order, necessitates a 
methodological approach which is empirically open to how people themselves give 
meaning to, and understand the dynamics within their own lives. This focus 
corresponds to ethnography, and combined with a focus on intermediation and 
politics, situates this thesis within a broad tradition of ethnographic work from 
sociology and anthropology. Ethnography can be understood as  
social research based on the close-up, on-the-ground observation of people and 
institutions in real time and space, in which the investigator embeds herself 
near (or within) the phenomenon so as to detect how and why agents on the 
scene act, think and feel the way they do (Wacquant 2003: 5, cited in Auyero 
and Joseph 2007: 2)  
Essential to ethnography is the value given to immersion, which is understood as 
embeddedness in people’s everyday lives. Embeddedness requires a strong sense of 
positionality (Sultana 2007), meaning an awareness of how one as a researcher relates 
to the research context on the basis of what are often significant socio-cultural and 
economic differences. Methodologically, ethnography necessitates an iterative 
process of research which is ‘theoretically informed’ (Willis and Trondman 2002: 
396) but also analytically open, so ideas are pieced together, triangulated, questioned, 
tested and re-formulated. This means that it is reflexive and responsive, in a sense 
‘open-ended’ (Maxwell 2009), combining opportunism and benefitting from 
unpredictability. It involves ‘gathering whatever data are available to throw issues on 
the emerging focus of enquiry’ (Atkinson and Hammersley 2007: 3). As Tilly (2006: 
441) puts it, it blends ‘art and science’, where the ‘shrewd observations’ of art are 
combined with the ‘systematic use of accumulated knowledge’.  
The political nature of social order, as examined in chapter two, brings the focus of 
this thesis particularly close to work on political ethnography (Auyero 2001; Arias 
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2006; Baiocchi and Connor 2008; Berenschot 2011). This field, broadly speaking, is 
where ethnography is used to understand political phenomenon, often focusing in on 
the dynamics of brokerage. Contemporary political ethnography is often 
interdisciplinary (Baiocchi and Connor 2008: 149) though can be embedded within 
political science (Schatz 2013), sociology (Auyero 2001) and anthropology 
(Michelutti 2013; Piliavsky 2014). It can also be seen as rooted in a longer history of 
political anthropology, a seminal example of which is Scott’s (1985) work on the 
‘weapons of the weak’. Baiocchi and Connor (2008) delineate different meanings of 
political ethnography. They argue it can mean first, the study of conventionally 
defined political actors, institutions and events; second, the ‘routine encounters’ 
between people and these actors and institutions; and finally, wider phenomenon that 
are of ‘consequence to politics in some way’ (Ibid: 140). Understood through this 
schema, the framework developed in this thesis draws on each of these areas.  
A focus on intermediation also relates this thesis to work on access analysis, which 
emerged in sociology and development studies from the 1970s (Schaffer and Lamb 
1974; Schaffer 1985; Wood 1985; Ribot and Peluso 2003). For Ribot and Peluso 
(2003: 160) access analysis is ‘the process of identifying and mapping the mechanisms 
by which access is gained, maintained, and controlled’. We can add to this the inverse 
- how access is denied, limited and exclusionary. They highlight three steps that can 
be used to guide research and analysis in the field, which were adopted in this 
methodology:   
 Identifying and mapping the flow of the particular benefit of interest 
 Identifying the mechanisms by which different actors involved gain, control, 
and maintain the benefit flow and its distribution and 
 An analysis of the power relations underlying the mechanisms of access 
involved in instances where benefits are derived (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 161). 
Given the deep interconnections between access, power and politics, some form of 
this analysis has arguably underpinned ethnographic work from Bangladesh 
concerned with rural power, peasants and agrarian change (Jahangir 1979; Wood 
1976; Arens and van Beurden 1978; Hartman and Boyce 1983; Jansen 1986). 
Ethnographic approaches have driven much NGO analysis, as exemplified by the 
seminal work by BRAC, ‘the net’ in 1983. A subsequent body of work has built on 
this tradition but with more specific foci, such as gender and class (White 1988), 
agricultural technology (Lewis 1989), access to financial services (McGregor 1991), 
NGOs and mobilisation (Devine 1999), networks and livelihoods (Khan 2000) and 
informal social protection (Davis 2005). Taken together these represent an interesting 
lineage of ethnography from Bangladesh, though as noted in the introduction, this 
ethnographic tradition has now been ‘more or less lost’ (Hossain 2011: 2).  
4.1.2. EXPLORING, RESEARCH SITE AND GATEKEEPERS 
The background to my doctoral fieldwork was having lived and worked in Bangladesh 
on a UK Aid extreme poverty reduction programme between 2010 and 2012. From 
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this I had worked closely on a number of livelihoods focused and NGO led projects in 
both rural and urban areas. In an urban context I had worked often in the city’s bosti, 
primarily in a monitoring and evaluation capacity. I had also worked on an NGO 
project with the city’s so-called “street dwellers” attempting to start a social business, 
which was a complete failure57. I had built on these experiences through consultancy 
as a project reviewer in 2013 with the same programme and also a two week period of 
research as the basis for an MRes dissertation, which focused broadly on the issues 
examined here, though looked at through a different set of concepts and vocabulary58. 
It is within the context of these experiences that my approach to fieldwork should be 
understood.  
After arriving back in Dhaka in mid-February 2014 to undertake fieldwork I was faced 
with an issue that was fundamental to the nature of my proposed research, and the 
backbone to an ethnographic approach: immersion. My previous experience in 
Bangladesh had always been through the prism of an aid programme. My interaction 
in “the field” was mediated through programme and project NGO staff, and insights 
often carefully managed, navigated and sometimes even censored. I had always been 
frustrated by this, but had begrudgingly acknowledged my need for an assistant and 
direct organisational support (in other words, intermediation) to access my research 
context and gain the level of insight I desired. This had all been acknowledged in my 
pre-field work methodology, designed in the midst of an English winter reflecting back 
on a couple of tiring years in the country, and I knew I could produce a PhD on the 
basis of replicating this pattern of interaction. For my research to be ethnographic 
however, I knew I had to challenge my understandings about what was possible in a 
context I already – in many ways – knew. After settling back in for a couple of weeks, 
my freedom as a researcher – as compared to a full time member of staff – seemed to 
open out a new set of possibilities which I had not fully appreciated. I began taking 
Bengali lessons in a language centre not far from my apartment that I shared with my 
(now) wife in an elite neighbourhood, however I felt confined in a class room, too 
curious to stay inside, and too stubborn to want to work with others. In order to manage 
this I developed a schedule – Bangla classes in the morning, and exploring the city in 
the afternoon/evening, a structure I maintained for a couple of months. The Bangla 
classes and exploring became synergistic, lessons driven by my observations not 
textbooks, directed towards my interest in the vocabularies of power, politics and 
marginalisation59.  
Reflecting back, my ‘exploring’ had two purposes: firstly, it was a way of gently 
challenging the patterns of interaction I was familiar with from working in the aid 
                                                 
57 This project was designed to include street dwellers in the distribution chain of a social business 
selling hygienic street food, however operated without a business model and closed when project 
funding stopped.   
58  This two week period of research focused on three locations – Karwan Bazar, Purana 
Paltan/Bangabandu Stadium and Osmani Uddyan Market/Bongo bazar.   
59 This certainly made for more interesting classes, and was amusing for my teachers, though on 
reflection was perhaps detrimental to my understanding of Bengali grammar. 
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industry. Secondly, it was a way of me ‘constructing’ the field (Amit 2000), 
delineating my areas of interest and beginning to form ideas and better sense the scope 
for more directed research. I thus wandered after dark when the streets were mainly 
empty, sat at late night tea stalls and chatted to whoever was about. I saw daily life – 
the labour, the begging, the scavenging, people cooking on makeshift fires between 
the cracks in paving tiles and gutters, people listening to music and watching 
programmes on their phones under mosquito nets, people injecting themselves along 
railway lines, people tending to poultry in cages, or the odd pet rabbit, cat or bird. I 
walked around vibrant mazar, baul singing and telling stories, hundreds of people 
lying asleep on the floor. I walked to the city’s edges, to where the apartment blocks 
turn into sparser single and double storied buildings, where the paddy fields mix with 
small industry, and developer’s signs mark their territory. I walked along the city 
railway lines, receiving catcalls from the so-called “floating” prostitutes, and feigning 
ignorance when petty drug dealers offered me gaza (mariquana) or yabba (a 
methamphetamine produced in Myanmar), to get drawn into conversations. In doing 
this I was vulnerable – the city could be dangerous and I was alone, I could not 
understand everything nor manage people’s impressions of me – and yet, I was often 
just passing through, interaction was time bound and I had little invested in the spaces 
I visited. Exploring therefore helped ease myself into immersion, exposing myself to 
risks, but also in a managed way. I absorbed the city, spent inordinate amounts of time 
in traffic jams, sweating through shirt after shirt as spring and summer melded and 
building up confidence in Bangla. 
An analytical starting point to my research had been an interest in urban spaces, how 
they are inhabited and who by. In particular, I was interested in people living in the 
worse conditions, some of whom I had worked with previously. I wrote early draft 
chapters using terminology and classifications adopted from literature and practice – 
‘street dweller’, ‘pavement dweller’, ‘homeless’ - however being wary of these, I 
wanted to see for myself what they tried to refer to or capture. I also became interested 
in how these people are conceptualised in public discourse, the language and labels 
that are employed to describe them, and the concepts drawn upon. At times I would 
record this systematically, making mental notes or jotting them down on paper or on 
my phone, later creating a small ‘qualitative survey of perceptions’ which consisted 
mostly of answers from CNG wallah (drivers of auto-rickshaws) collected during 
endless traffic jams and with the backdrop of deafening bus and truck horns. As my 
Bangla improved I grappled with translating abstract concepts such as intermediation, 
access and negotiation into people’s everyday lives; for example through the language 
of relationships, leadership, finding work or gaining permission for a business. I 
noticed how along some railway lines and pavements people lived under tarpaulin and 
mosquito nets in clearly delineated spaces, but unlike the more developed and serviced 
bosti I was familiar with. I also started to sense communities among the people living 
in the open, networks and groups. Sensing the dynamism, movement and complexity 
in these spaces, is in the same spirit as Gandhi and Hoek’s (2012: 4) observation, when 
writing of South Asian cities in general, that ‘parks, markets and roadsides have 
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present and potential incarnations: as venues of danger and pleasure, segregation and 
communitas, sincerity and irreverence’. Beginning to discern the meanings of these 
spaces was therefore part of my earlier attempts to delineate and construct “the field”. 
This always involves choices, as Amit (2000: 6) writes, the field ‘has to be laboriously 
constructed, prised apart from all the other possibilities for contextualisation to which 
its constituent relationships and connections could also be referred’ (Amit 2000: 6)60.  
At this stage a serious challenge encountered was the level of attention I received 
everywhere I went, and this is unsurprising for anyone who has been to Bangladesh. 
Dhaka is one of the most densely populated cities in the world. Public space is 
extremely limited, and people socialise on the pavements and roadsides which are 
themselves often crammed with small businesses. It is not nearly as cosmopolitan as 
other South Asian capitals, and bideshi (foreigner) are an object of curiosity outside 
of a few elite neighbourhoods61. Despite Dhaka being a capital city with a population 
of over 15 million, in the vast majority of areas in the city the presence of a bideshi 
can easily draw a crowd in a matter of minutes, particularly if they are female. This 
presented a very significant challenge to this research. My “field” was most often the 
open spaces, the public places and throughways. In only very limited instances was I 
working in clearly demarcated, quiet or private spaces away from the crowds. On 
innumerable occasions in these open spaces I began conversations with someone and 
passers-by simply stopped in their tracks, a foot or so away, looking and listening, 
sometimes eager to make conversation with me, other times amused, and at other times 
simply baffled. This made me, and often whoever I was speaking to, uncomfortable. 
It was also not a problem that went away because, unlike in a village or perhaps even 
a large bosti, here passers-by change and there are new curiosities to satiate.  
By around April 2015, my interests when “exploring” became more systematic, and I 
began to plan how to direct my research into a more in depth and ethnographic 
direction. Immersion in a particular research context is central to ethnography 
(Emerson et al 1995), and critical to this was the question of access. Research is 
fundamentally contingent on access to the resource context, however is often 
neglected in methodological descriptions and analyses (Harrington 2003; Alcadipani 
and Hodgson 2009). The possibility of research is often contingent on the quality of 
gatekeepers (Harrington 2003) and the immediate issue I faced was how to find an 
appropriate gatekeeper. Gatekeeping can be understood as a form of intermediation, 
as conceptualised in this thesis62. Though my phone contacts list had expanded rapidly 
                                                 
60 Locating ‘the field’ was in fact a large part of the research itself, because it involved understanding 
how inhabited urban spaces are positioned, connected and demarcated in relation to wider society.  
61 Unlike in Dhaka’s cousin, Kolkata, there are few ethnic groups from outside of the region that have 
assimilated into the city. The European and “Western” communities of the colonial and immediate post-
colonial period – the British, Armenians, Greeks, Jews – have disappeared, as have almost all the Anglo-
Indians. There are however some priests and missionaries. East Asians in the city have all arrived and 
established businesses in recent decades with the exception of a few Chinese families, who are the 
descendants of an earlier small Chinese community from the British period. 
62 Different of course because I was moving “downwards” hierarchically in terms of perceived status, 
rather than “upwards”.   
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with the details of guards, local leaders, shopkeepers and labourers, I found it difficult 
to navigate this world effectively enough to establish and rely on these contacts as 
gatekeepers. I therefore looked back at employees of NGOs, with whom I had retained 
close relationships. I had maintained a particular connection with the Amrao Manush 
(“we are also human”) project, working with people they term “street dwellers”, led 
by the Irish NGO Concern Worldwide and delivered through three local partners – 
Sajida Foundation, SEEP and Nari Maitree.  
The project has nine centres across the city providing a range of services including 
night shelters to women and children. I therefore visited each of these, speaking to the 
managers, field staff and “beneficiaries” who happened to be around, exploring some 
of the concepts of intermediation. I built profiles of each area – the numbers of 
beneficiaries, demographic and occupational trends, a sense of local hierarchies and 
politics, and the experiences staff had had interacting with these. I took print outs of 
maps of the local areas to sketch these details. I also visited and built relationships 
with a number of other local and international NGOs – more notably visiting small 
Christian run drop in centres near Kamalapur and Sadarghat, and attending various 
meetings led by the Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP), an umbrella advocacy 
organisation on urban issues. These interactions – which were concentrated during this 
stage but continued throughout the fieldwork – helped me begin to collate and 
delineate perceptions, labels, sketch out common hierarchies, and significantly also 



















FIGURE 1: MAP OF KARWAN BAZAR IN DHAKA 
 
 





Having explored many possible research sites across Dhaka I settled on Karwan Bazar 
as the principle location for my ethnographic work63. Prior to 2012 I had been only 
vaguely familiar with the area, having visited the Sajida Foundation centre there for 
work and stumbled across the bazar once by accident, quickly retreating from its 
chaos. In mid-2013 I conducted some interviews there through the same centre and 
from these insights and subsequent desk research I became intrigued by the place. The 
busyness of the place spoke to there being a lot going on, a lot to study. It was told it 
had been the heartland of a legendary gang leader Picchi Hannan in the early 2000s 
and still carried a reputation for violence and crime. Being the major vegetable 
wholesale market in the city, it was also a potentially interesting place to explore 
intermediation in relation to employment, and hence labour relations. Nestled between 
major commercial and media areas, for me it poignantly symbolised the city’s 
inequalities.  
This was not to say that Karwan Bazar was unique compared to other locations; having 
surveyed many possible research locations across Dhaka I felt that all of the sites were 
in some way distinctive. The dynamics at each location represent the political, 
economic and social dynamics of the wider area as well as society in general, and there 
is no prototypical research location (White 1988). In practice the final selection of 
research locations for ethnographic work has to draw closely on more subjective 
criteria. To engage ethnographically is a highly personal experience, and therefore for 
the approach to meet the standards set by it – for it to have authority and credibility – 
a researcher has to feel some form of comfort, confidence or happiness there. Karwan 
Bazar was therefore chosen primarily because it felt like an interesting place, and like 
the ‘right place’. For purely practical reasons I assessed that if I felt this about my 
research location then I would be more likely to do a better job of the research. 
Moreover, alongside the appeal of the location, I had also built a good relationship 
with local NGO staff, and felt confident that they could help facilitate the work and 
provide useful insights in this context. A point not to underestimate was that it was 
also logistically convenient. By CNG at the right time of day (from around 11pm to 
8am) it would take around 10 minutes to travel from my apartment. At the wrong time 
of day it could take up to a couple of hours, as it often did, though that was less than 
other parts of the city. Strangely for such a busy place I also sensed it offered me a 
small degree of anonymity, its sheer busyness meant people were focused on work, 
not the odd foreigner. I was as likely to get hit by a moving rickshaw van or sack of 
carrots as anyone else. 
Importantly, an association with the NGO allowed me to become a familiar face at the 
bazar, and I could free ride on their status as a positive and non-contentious presence. 
Staff always suggested I conducted interviews and that they could facilitate, but I 
always politely declined, wanting to create less formal relationships at that stage. I 
                                                 
63 I include with Karwan Bazar a nearby pavement which is next to Pantho Kunjo park very close to the 
bazar. This was not my primary focus and therefore appears less in the descriptions within this chapter 
and this thesis, however I did visit very regularly.  
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often simply hung out at the centre, observed the rhythms of the day, the services 
provided, and the interaction between staff and “beneficiaries”. I also began 
shadowing the field staff during their daily routine, primarily collecting savings 
instalments, examining who they worked with, how and why. I met a lot of people 
living at Karwan Bazar and a nearby pavement adjacent to Pantho Kunjo park, and 
tried to systematically record and build up my understanding about their lives through 
our conversations. After a while I offered to informally teach English to the few school 
going girls who were staying permanently at the centre, but whose parents lived 
nearby. I would typically do this a couple of times a week, after they got back from 
school in the afternoons.  
I also sensed however that a reliance on the NGO as an intermediary or gatekeeper 
would limit my insight. Organisations have a reputation to maintain and when acting 
as a gatekeeper can perceive research as a threat (Alcadipani and Hodgson 2009). 
Having been completely transparent with staff about my interests, they sometimes 
feigned ignorance, presumably judging the danger that discussing openly such topics 
could present. There was also a genuine gap in knowledge between the NGO’s world 
and the dynamics of daily life at the bazar. There were certain things they clearly did 
not want to know and felt they did not need to know about the dynamics of local life 
(for example political affiliations and relationships), and chose to keep a strategic 
distance from these, as discussed in chapter nine. After a couple of months I therefore 
began to spend time alone at the bazar, building on the relationships with people I had 
been introduced to. In 2013 I had got limited insight into a group of labourers at the 
bazar64, many of whom had grown up between NGO centres, and who transported 
vegetables on flat backed rickshaw vans by night. One day I decided to start up a 
conversation with the group behind a bus where they slept during the day. This 
innocuous step was very significant in my mind, as it represented moving into a social 
environment where we related on their terms and not mine. It was therefore a moment 
of vulnerability, despite the obvious inequalities. I learnt that this group was called the 
jupri (shack) group, and from this moment on it was to this group that I turned, this 
group that I spent hours and days and nights with, drank tea with, smoked cigarettes 
and refused offers of mariquana with jokes. This was where I would learn the most 
and from which the key stories of my PhD emerged from. 
4.2. RESEARCH IN PRACTICE AND ANALYSIS 
4.2.1. NEGOTIATING RESEARCH AND ETHICS IN THE FIELD 
Access in a research context goes beyond gaining access, or ‘entry’, as discussed 
above in relation to gatekeepers. Continued access to a research context, gathering 
data and insight, is contingent on the perceptions that people form of the researcher, 
the relationships that evolve, and how these influence the type of engagement a 
researcher is able to have (Harrington 2003; Kawulich 2011). This is perhaps even 
                                                 
64 A pre-cursor to my doctoral fieldwork was two-week period of fieldwork for a MRes in International 
Development, also at the University of Bath.  
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more so the case in ethnography than other methodologies. This section examines my 
experiences negotiating a place in the research context, and explores the ethical issues 
this raised.  
Berreman (2007: 138) wrote that ‘every ethnographer, when he reaches the field, is 
faced immediately with accounting for himself before the people he proposes to learn 
to know’. As such, a researcher has to engage in what Goffman (1956) termed the ‘arts 
of impression management’, the art of negotiating the perceptions of others. In my 
research context, moving from pleasantries to eventually discussing and witnessing 
the complexities and dynamics of intermediation, including rivalries and conflict, is a 
big step, one that was neither natural nor easy. Having perhaps naively imagined being 
able to build relationships “organically”, I found that in reality the friendships and 
acquaintances I built were contingent on doing the opposite, very purposefully 
nurturing relationships. The major methodological task I faced was trying to build an 
identity that people could relate to, that would cut the right balance between being 
deserved of respect, looked upon kindly, but not looked to as someone who can play 
the semi-salvific role which is often so closely associated with bideshi. An important 
part of this was being situated appropriately in the local ‘moral economy’. 
Relationships bring moral obligations, and these are magnified in contexts of severe 
inequality. To be perceived as moral – and therefore to open the possibility of 
friendships – I had to manage what Rosen (1984) termed the ‘balance of obligations’. 
The distinction between building ‘rapport’ and ‘friendships’ (Glesne 1989), is very 
often complicated in a context like Bangladesh where communication itself can be 
taken as a sign of commitment to a relationship and therefore as a sign of obligation. 
How I negotiated this is discussed in detail below.  
At the outset I knew that perceptions of me would be quick to take hold and difficult 
to alter. I was cautious of being associated with the trapping of Dhakaite and foreign 
elites, particularly as I was always open about living in a wealthy neighbourhood. 
Being in the centre of the city, people were used to seeing bideshi going to nearby 
offices, coming out of the nearby five star hotel, and apparently using local brothels. 
Teaching English at the Sajida Foundation centre, being associated with their field 
staff, and later a further centre for boys at the bazar run by a local NGO Aparajeyo 
Bangladesh provided an immediate justification for my presence at Karwan Bazar. 
Rather than arrive in car or taxi – as it common for elites in Dhaka – I would arrive on 
foot, by CNG or bus. Often I would walk down the railway lines and became familiar 
to a nearby group of young men affiliated under a boro bhai Ziad65, where I would 
stop off along the way, drinking tea in the rail line bosti. Given that my presence in 
the bazar was in itself unusual, I found ways to normalise my interaction there by 
presenting it as part of a daily routine where my focus was not at the bazar itself, but 
                                                 
65 I never got to the bottom of this character and neither he nor his group appear in this thesis. He smoked 
a lot of mariquana, regularly gave me tea and cigarettes, once threatened me with kidnap when high, 
and later had to leave Dhaka for his home village in Noakhali due – so I understand - to the local shops 
he extorted (took informal rents from) being destroyed by a police eviction following a train accident.  
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one of the nearby NGO centres. At the same time I was clear that I was a student 
conducting research, but would sometimes present my research as something 
restricted to formal interviews, or confined to NGO centres, with my presence on the 
street or bazar motivated by learning and being interested. At other times I would be 
completely open about my purpose, and I judged the appropriateness of being 
transparent in the specific context. Initially, having been used to saying I worked on 
an aid programme, I became disheartened with people’s disappointment on hearing 
that I was a student. For many, a businessman or at least an NGO worker would have 
been a much better contact. I quickly realised however that this was to my advantage. 
I was someone who, though not looked down on, was perceived to have not yet entered 
the adult world of economic self-sufficiency and independence, and therefore was not 
associated with being able to offer opportunities to others in the same way, nor certain 
forms of reciprocal relationships.  
I found that despite the clear differences I was in many ways very similar to the 
labourers at Karwan Bazar. I was a young man in my late 20s. Some of the group had 
recently got married and moved away from the bazar to bosti nearby, establishing a 
family life to which they periodically returned. Others in the group were single, living 
a more carefree existence, consuming more drugs for example (compared to those in 
the group with homes and dependents elsewhere). Yet, we were all confronted with 
similar experiences, however different the contexts – establishing ourselves, getting 
married, starting a family. Though it was naturally more difficult to speak to women 
given South Asian and Islamic norms about interaction between genders, I became a 
familiar face at the Sajida Foundation centre, and was to some degree trusted and 
respected by the users of the centre66. Gaining insights from these relationships came 
in part organically from listening to people’s lives, trying to understand their 
perceptions, and observing their interactions. This was a slow process, requiring me 
to learn to listen, be comfortable in silence, and not jump on topics of interest. I tried 
to balance interest with feigned disinterest, and pretended not to be overly concerned 
in the drug deals, descriptions of fights and politics. I also balanced time within my 
research context, with being away, so as not to impose myself too much. Judging the 
appropriate time to ask questions, to probe, is an art that is far more difficult in a 
foreign language. I was often rebuffed - don’t you get bored of always asking 
questions?; We don’t talk about the bad old days; why would we talk about these bad 
things?; It is dangerous to talk about this; why do you need to know?67 In some ways 
I took on the role of a more senior member in the jupri group, discussing how the 
world is, reasserting ethical maxims to teenagers, offering and being offered cigarettes, 
and having the body language and physical interaction in line with this (holding hands, 
                                                 
66 It should also be noted that for the kangali social interaction between men and women if far more 
open than is the norm in Bangladeshi society.  
67 As others have noted (Berreman 2007) it is possible that through long-term ethnographic research 
people are incentivised to divulge less of the truth as they see it because they foresee longer-term threats 
from a researcher’s engagement. A further possibility is that people only divulge information when they 
feel that the researcher already knows the answer (thank you to Joe Devine for this point). To some 
extent both of these dynamics describe my experiences, particularly later on in the research.   
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slaps on the back and shoulders, occasional hugs and play fighting). I became referred 
to as ‘David bhai’ (brother) and was considered part of the group.  
Becoming closer to the group was not a linear process, nor was it one that remained 
stable. The boundaries to my identity, to who I could be, were pushed, and my 
narratives of my intentions were questioned, and as such I had to continuously 
negotiate my presence in the research context (Bondy 2012). I was constantly asked 
variations of “So your father is a big business man? How much money do you have in 
your account? But you must do some work here?” On rarer occasions I would be asked 
questions like “David bhai, why don’t you speak to these prostitutes, do you not like 
sex?” or “So if your wife is away at the moment, you have no reason not to take us to 
the bar down the road!” and the much milder but incessant “just have a puff, you will 
like it, you will be relaxed”. Different rumours would spread – some women insisted 
to others that I was the “owner” of a local NGO for example. A persistent rumour 
among women and teenagers which threatened my image as a helpful and honest 
figure was that I had smoked mariquana with the jupri group68. More tarnishing still 
was a rumour that I had eaten a snake. I was for a time nicknamed David dollar, a 
shontrashi name as one child explained69. Perceptions about me at one point became 
fantastical. One night some government officials (reportedly government social 
welfare ministry staff) came and tried to take children from their parents at Karwan 
Bazar for a new project, and only stopped when member of the jupri group in effect 
fought them off. Despite me being soundly asleep in my flat at the time, Shamim, a 
labourer, recalled to others in the jupri group how he had seen me tell the government 
officials to leave, how I protected the children, how if I had not been there it would 
have been terrible, and how I had done really well in that situation. 
As I grew closer to the jupri group, I began to be seen as having an instrumental value 
that I had to carefully manage. This is similar to, but only in a far lighter way, the 
value Rodgers (2007) was seen as having in relation to the gang he joined in Nicaragua 
during doctoral fieldwork. I began to be called by the group to take a walk through the 
bazar to other areas, the only purpose of which seemed being seen together, greeting 
certain people as we walked. On a couple of occasions I would be taken to “see 
someone”, with arguments ensuing and me left at the side trying to look as comfortable 
as could be. I was considered and used as one of the group, you are with us, I was 
often told. On one occasion the jupri group brought me along to exact minor 
retribution against someone who was trying to charge them too much to use the bazar 
toilets and showers. They took bamboo sticks and hit him around a little, knocked 
down a few tin walls, and made sure I was there, not involved in the fighting, but easily 
seen. The event was a way of demonstrating a capability for violence and a willingness 
to use it, and I was of symbolic value. I did have limits to my involvement though, and 
                                                 
68 Something I always made sure I didn’t do to maintain my status. To diffuse people’s incessant 
suggestions I always explained with a story about having smoked marijuana once and gone into the sky 
and not wanting to walk zig zag, which people seemed to find amusing.  
69 I am still not entirely sure why I was named this, other that the association with money.  
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despite being encouraged by some of the group, I deliberately excluded myself from 
attending political rallies, as I was concerned about being too clearly utilised by the 
group. Negotiating the possibility of being instrumental to violent ends continued 
through the research. In December 2014, I remember getting an innocuous seeming 
call from an elder labourer Liton to see if I was coming that evening to the bazar. I 
was not able to, but arrived the next morning to find that the group had been in a huge 
fight with a faction of the Chattro League (the student wing of the ruling Awami 
League). Some of the group later lamented the fact that I had not been there, reflecting 
how no one would have touched them if I had been.  
There was always talk about who I could be to the group. This was often propagated 
by Liton, who saw me as a vehicle for him personally to do better. He would talk 
openly about how we would start a samiti (a savings group, see chapter eight for the 
significance of this), then an NGO, then a business, and I could be the chairperson. 
When he started his samiti he purposefully left a couple of shares for me to buy into, 
telling people he was waiting for me to sign up. I would often hang out with Liton and 
another labourer Shumon (who had converted to Islam from Hinduism after running 
away from home and living at the bazar). For a few months these would be the guys I 
went to, looked for, drunk the most tea and smoked the most cigarettes with. Shumon, 
a close friend of Liton’s at the time (the only person I trust at Karwan Bazar he once 
told me), would sometimes give off the cuff and public statements for anyone around 
to hear such as a there’s only one Liton and one David in Karwan Bazar!. Half jokes, 
half serious, people would talk about how I could become a local leader, people would 
shout “David Bhai, David Bhai”. Others said that they would have to call me “David 
sardar”. I always laughed these suggestions off, though at times some people would 
approach me seriously and ask about it. I had to be more forceful, reaffirming that I 
was just a student, wanted to work at a university, and had no interest in doing politics 
or business. I would also publically assert how I was a terrible fighter, with smaller 
biceps than them and glasses.  
It is possible that had I played the role of a local leader my research and insight would 
have been greatly enhanced, however it would have equally raised the attention of 
local political leaders, police and threatened my relationship with NGOs. Partly 
because of luck, because of my affiliation with the jupri group, and because of my 
efforts to avoid being used instrumentally, on no occasion did I experience anything 
particularly aggressive or dangerous directed towards me at Karwan Bazar 70 . 
                                                 
70 I was never the target of violence at Karwan Bazar. For a long time outside of the bazar being hit by 
a waterbomb thrown by two mischievous pre-pubescent children in the early hours next to the university 
was the worst thing that had happened to me. Apparently the children made a habit of targeting the 
couple of men living on the pavement that I was chatting with. One version is that I happened to be 
unlucky collateral, the version I think is more likely is that they would get extra respect for having hit 
a bideshi. It was a good shot. Towards the end of my research there was one instance where something 
more serious happened. I had promised to show a later research site (Osmani Uddyan park opposite the 
Dhaka City Corporation South headquarters) to a Bangladeshi friend. When we were chatting over tea 
and cigarettes with a group of sewage workers who lived there, a local political leader of some variety 
arrived high on yabba. He claimed I had disrespected him earlier and would have me arrested, swiftly 
73 
 
Whenever I expressed doubt or fear about coming to the bazar, members of the jupri 
group would reassure me – there won’t be any problem, you are with us, and we are 
the strongest group here. Rhetoric around my possible role however directly 
threatened a leader of the group, Rubel’s status. Liton’s samiti was a direct challenge 
to Rubel, and I therefore became a potential threat to the extent I was perceived as 
supporting Liton. When Rubel’s leadership position became weakened (see chapter 
eight), he became colder towards me, started using the familar pronoun tumi instead 
of the polite apni71 with me as a way of publically reasserting his status in relation to 
me, and I had to make special effort to ensure his ego was sufficiently puffed, and my 
research intentions sufficiently clear, to not see me as a threat. To allow rumours about 
my potential involvement to by nurtured could threaten existing relations and 
compromise the principle of do no harm. This experience relates to an alternative way 
in which I was instrumental to the status of others. Rather than respecting me, 
disrespecting me could be a means by which people improved their own status. An 
insult towards me and heard by others – perhaps using colloquialisms I could not 
understand for example – would denigrate me and demonstrate the power of whoever 
made the comment. The example of Rubel calling me tumi instead of apni was a 
relatively common one. Though in many instances this would be an acceptable and 
even familial designation, used by a local political leader or pretender it could be a 
strategic and relatively subtle way of publically demonstrating their status, and putting 
me in my place.  
A further ethical issue raised by field experiences was the balance between 
‘impression management’ and ‘covert research’. This refers to ‘research which is not 
declared to the research participants or subjects’ (Spicker 2011: 118), and as such is 
often identified as a contentious ethical issue because it appears to conflict with the 
principal of informed consent (Thorne 1980; Scheper-Hughes 2004; O’Reilly 2009; 
Spicker 2011). Classic historical and contemporary ethnographies have used this 
approach to a considerable degree. Whyte, in his study of the structure of an Italian 
slum in Boston, published as Street Corner Society (1943), kept his identity completed 
hidden from almost all research participants. More recently Scheper-Hughes’ (2004: 
45) in her research into the international organs trade, posed as a kidney buyer in 
Istanbul, entered ‘incognito’ into state facilities in Argentina, and purposefully misled 
people about her true research identity. The distinction between covert and overt 
research is often however more ambiguous than in these examples. As Berreman 
                                                 
showing me the business cards of his contacts, including that of a state minister, and referring to me as 
tumi or tui (these ways of addressing me informally were a way of insulting me). Laughing it off, he 
then demanded 1000 taka, and pretended to punch me, stopping an inch before my nose. His presence 
had silenced the WASA labourers we were speaking to and with whom I had conducted research the 
month or so prior. Though I had befriended the local police chief a couple of weeks before I thought it 
wise for the sake of the guys to give in, and my friend gave him a 100, rather than 1000, taka. He left 
by throwing his cigarette at me and then giving me a hug. Since the research, my confidence that as a 
white man I am relatively safe in Dhaka has been shaken with the growth of terrorism targeting 
foreigners. The current climate raises serious questions regarding the practicalities for future 
ethnographic research in Bangladesh. 
71 Tumi and apni are the familiar and formal ways, respectively, of saying you in Bengali.  
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(2007: 147) argues, participant observation ‘inevitably entails some secrecy and some 
dissimulation on the level of interpersonal relations’. A degree of secrecy or omission 
is often required for research, and total honestly could negate the possibility of valid 
research findings (Ibid). In Dhaka for example, other researchers have found it helpful 
to conceal relationships to local NGOs. Khan (2000) kept the fact that he was working 
for a local NGO Proshika hidden in his research environment in a Dhaka bosti because 
the NGO had a contentious relationship with local mastan. It is possible to criticise 
this secrecy, but as Scheper-Hughes (2004: 45) asks ‘what alternative methods of 
investigation exist in tortured circumstances like these?’ In my own experiences I 
would often interact with people who did not know who I was. Those I was close to 
and who appear in this thesis knew I was a PhD researcher, however – as mentioned 
previously - I often left my specific interests vague, as I felt this could threaten and 
bias insights gained. To be direct with my interests around intermediation, violence, 
party politics and criminality would be threatening. Furthermore, being completely 
open about my interests would give other people leverage over me, and could 
potentially shift the balance of obligations in ways that would entangle me in more 
complicated relationships72.   
Managing relationships, the identity on which these were predicated and the 
obligations they entailed, was therefore a continuous, tiring and emotional process. 
Few people in my research context would be content with a relationship that 
maintained friendly but casual over a long period. It should either become useful, reap 
material gains for them, or be maintained through high levels of contact and 
reaffirmation of the friendship. To not do so would be disrespectful and would call the 
relationship into disrepute. As Rakib, a rickshaw van driver who had grown up at 
Karwan Bazar, said to be almost aggressively – what’s the point of keeping a 
relationship with you if you give me nothing and don’t even answer the phone?... you 
are the boro bhai [big brother] and I am the choto bhai [little brother]… Ten minutes 
later we were having a deep conversation about the injustices of a nearby NGO and I 
was speaking to his wife on the phone, with him bragging about learning some 
English. People ranging from minor local political leaders to the labourers would 
constantly try and persuade me to start a business. I recall an interesting dialogue with 
a local chicken dealer who made incessant requests that I link him to NGOs to supply 
their lunchtime chicken. The conversations ended with him saying “ok, so we will not 
do business, but we can do friendship”. My attempts to create a boundary between my 
home life and research was constantly tested, people insistent on wanting to come to 
my house. This was all the more difficult with phones, particularly with Whatsapp, 
Viber and Facebook which people tangential to the group knew how to use. The 
                                                 
72 This notion that relationships in Bangladesh are instrumental to securing and pursuing people’s 
livelihoods and interests is central to this thesis. A value given to friendships is very often that they can 
help advance one’s interests. An undercurrent to relationships is the balance of obligations between 
individuals that are embodied in transactions and exchanges. These are constantly being negotiated, and 
in this context, people understanding very clearly about what I wanted from a relationship would give 
them better leverage to use me to pursue their interests.  
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balance between a ‘home’ and ‘research’ life has been described as ‘schizophrenic’ 
(Hoodfar 1994, cited in Caputo 2000), and this is how it sometimes felt. 
4.2.2. DATA, VALIDITY AND ANALYSIS 
This section explains the data gathered through the research described above, how 
findings were validated and how arguments have been built. It pays particular attention 
to the mechanics of the data collection, the modes of verification and analysis, and 
finally the limits to the methodology adopted. These serve also to highlight scope for 
future research.   
The primary means of data collection stemmed from the day-to-day immersion 
described in the previous section, which I recorded in a daily research diary. 
Throughout my time at Karwan Bazar, I built up profiles of the individuals I had come 
to know, focusing on the concept of intermediation, and therefore the actors to whom 
they looked to pursue their livelihoods and interests. I focused on understanding why 
these actors were deemed important, the varied roles they played, the meanings they 
had to people, and how these relationships changed and were negotiated. The mode of 
analysis often began with a focus on a particular resource, be it, for example, access 
to space, to work or security (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Alongside this, crosscutting 
themes emerged on which I began to reflect analytically, as well as particular events 
that offered insight into the nature of these relationships and their dynamics. 
Documenting these was a process of ‘interpretation and sense-making’ (Emerson et al 
1995: 8). I often recorded my impressions in the field, jotting down notes on my phone 
or recording memos to myself, particularly noting turns of phrase, sentences and 
quotes that had made an impression on me. This was a relatively surreptitious way of 
making notes as I could easily go for a walk and appear as if I was speaking to 
someone, particularly as it was often in English.  
At the end of each day researching, I would record these and reflect more widely in a 
field diary. Writing this was often a long and sometimes laborious process, but also a 
satisfying one, in that I felt progress was being made. I focused on capturing ‘fresh’ 
impressions, rather than producing ‘polished’ notes (Emerson et al 1995: 46). I 
constantly reflected on the context in which my observations had been made, as a way 
of grappling with the deeper meanings and significance certain comments and 
conversations had, as well as trying to disentangle whether my involvement in that 
context had led to a particular idea being expressed, and dissect why and how I was 
interpreting events. The meanings of these sometimes only became apparent later 
through reflection, because when immersed in a context aspects of life that are 
significant can become innocuous because of their familiarity. For example, the 
significance of fictive kinship became so ingrained in how I interacted, that I easily 
forgot to reflect on the meanings denoted by the terms used.  
Significant attention was given to validating the emerging research findings, and this 
was a continuous process that occurred via various methods throughout the research. 
Four methods can in particular be highlighted: first, modes of daily validation; second, 
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comparative analysis across different research contexts; third, formal research with 
research participants, including key informants; and fourth, presentations to and 
discussions with relevant organisations and individuals. In practice the research was 
highly iterative in that arguments and findings presented here have developed slowly 
over the course of a year, with points of data being gathered, verified and nuanced. 
Behind the data presented, for example cases or quotes to support arguments, is 
therefore months of attempts to understand and then verify the dynamics observed and 
described to me. This entailed a range of processes, for example engaging people in 
discussion about a topic from different angles, repeat lines of questioning or 
conversation on different occasions, validating a finding through multiple sources, and 
checking to see whether the analysis I was developing was correct with research 
participants. As cross cutting themes and arguments emerged, new findings, sources, 
events and relationships were put in relation to these. If they did not align, then I 
critically assessed why this was the case, whether my analysis was incorrect, whether 
it offered an important counterpoint, or whether it could reasonably be explained in 
another way, and then I adjusted ideas and continued research and triangulation. Hence 
arguments fell by the wayside as I found new ways to better explain my observations. 
Where disagreements remained I have often noted this in the text in subsequent 
chapters. 
A further means by which data was collected and emerging findings built and 
validated, was through extending research to other contexts. From January to April 
2015 I balanced continued engagement at Karwan Bazar with research in two primary 
further locations. Generalizability is a central concerns with ethnographic methods, 
and often identified as a limitation to the approach (Hammersley 1992). The purpose 
of extending the research was therefore to examine the validity of dynamics and 
relationships identified at the bazar in other contexts, as well as their relevance to 
people with different occupations. While in the bazar I had worked mainly with 
labourers in a vegetable supply/distribution chain, here I studied beggars and sewage 
workers (often referred to as methor or “sweeper”), and to a lesser extent scavengers 
(tokai) and small business people. I worked primarily around the Supreme Court area 
adjacent to Dhaka University and in Osmani Uddyan Park73. I chose these areas for a 
number of reasons: because of the greater occupational diversity as mentioned above; 
the fact that another researcher was concentrating in Kamalapur and I did not want to 
step on her toes; because the geography of these locations meant they were quieter at 
night; and because I had already established relationships with NGOs and people in 
these areas from 2013, as well as previous professional work.  
                                                 
73 I also briefly researched in the nearby Kamalapur station, Bangabandu stadium and the University 
itself. These areas were close to the park and pavement mentioned above, and hence I opportunistically 
visited them on a number of occasions to explore – in basic terms – some of the ideas around 
intermediation explored in this thesis.  
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FIGURE 2: MAP OF KEY RESEARCH SITES IN DHAKA 
 












FIGURE 3: CLOSE UP MAP OF RESEARCH LOCATIONS 
        Source: google maps 
 







Whereas in the bazar and on Pantho Kunjo pavement I had worked uniquely alone 
(with the exception of bringing a friend with me on a couple of occasions) at the 
pavement around the Supreme Court and in Osmani Uddyan park I decided to hire an 
assistant whom I recruited from the university. We worked together for around 20 
days, mainly translating interviews (as described more below), and in some cases 
conducting interviews together. Having not worked with assistant from the beginning 
I found the transition difficult. Elsewhere Cons (2014) has examined the researcher-
assistant relationships in detail in a Bangladeshi context. As he notes, these 
dependencies are ‘conditioned by the peculiarities of the dynamic between specific 
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researchers and specific research assistants’ (Cons 2014: 377). I found that in practice 
greater clarity in understanding was sometimes outweighed by the disadvantages of 
having relationships to my research context mediated so directly. I felt it compromised 
my ability to emotionally connect in the research context, the balance between leading 
and following the conversation was difficult to attain, and that further obligations arose 
from engaging in such a formal way. In practice I then continued working in these 
areas alone, however continued with an assistant in more formal contexts (with 
research participants in NGO centres for example). Similar to in Karwan Bazar, 
around the Supreme Court and Osmani Uddyan Park I tried to ‘hang out’ as much as 
possible, getting a sense of the area, making contacts, and slowly piecing together 
people’s experiences and perceptions about the local social/political landscape74.  
The third means of data validation in the field was through using formal research 
methods with research participants and key informants. I introduced a more structured 
approach to research during the last three months of research. I had been 
disincentivised to conduct more formal research at Karwan Bazar because I perceived 
it as threatening the casual and thus far insightful approach I had relied upon, and also 
because the logistics of doing so were problematic. For the majority of people who did 
not spend time or even pass through an NGO centre, it was very difficult to find a quiet 
space that was comfortable and private. I found no solution to this problem. There 
were a few instances with people living near the Supreme Court where I was able to 
conduct formal work, in one case I found a quiet corner at the back of Curzon Hall, a 
nearby university building. Similarly at Karwan Bazar, there were occasions when the 
bazar was quiet and I could find time behind a bus or car, or sitting at a side of the 
market, to interview members of the jupri group for example. Through the Aparajeyo 
centre I had good relationships with staff, teenagers and young adults who used it. 
Choosing teenagers I already knew well 75 , I conducted fifteen semi-structured 
interviews focused on their experiences of intermediation and perception of events 
witnessed (documented particularly in chapter eight). The relationships I had already 
established with these teenagers enabled me to be more direct, as I often knew who 
they were associated with for example. It was clear however that they were 
nonetheless not always open with me about, for example, stealing, drug dealing and 
more extreme forms of violence76.  
Similarly, I conducted fifteen semi-structured open interviews mainly with women in 
shelters under the Amrao Manush project, focusing on their experiences of 
intermediation, and their perceptions of the hierarchies I had observed relating to 
beggars and sewer workers, given that many partly lived in these areas. The purpose 
                                                 
74 In terms of validation, earlier in November 2015 I had also travelled to Kolkata, India, for a week 
and briefly explored some of these issues on the streets there. Given the brevity of the trip, I only gained 
limited insight into some of the more party political issues relating to intermediation, however findings 
from Dhaka relating to ‘defiled surpluses’ (explored in chapter nine) resonated closely here. 
75 In practice this included most of the children who were of teenager age and who used the centre.  
76 Labourers in the jupri group for example had told me about how some of the boys continued to be 
thieves, which they did not open up about in the context of formal interviews.  
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of these interviews was to explore some of the themes that had emerged through the 
research to date. I conducted the majority of the interviews alone, however all were 
transcribed working with an assistant, enabling me to better appreciate the nuance of 
the expression, the significance of particular words used 77 . In these interviews I 
personally asked each participant if they would like to be involved, was explicit about 
the purpose of my research, and informed them that if they did not want to answer a 
question it was not a problem. In practice, some people did not want to participate, 
some refused to answer questions, and some finished the interviews mid-way for a 
variety of reasons (fear of or unwillingness to talk about the topics and time 
constraints). In some cases, I was able and deemed it appropriate to follow up the topic 
with the participant informally at a later date. An ethical issue encountered here was 
that of confidentiality. I made sure that discussions were held in quiet, private spaces 
and that recordings taken were safely secured. The names of all respondents have been 
anonymised in this thesis, although given the relevance of context to understanding 
the arguments, locations have been given, as should already be clear78.   
In the final two months, alongside the field research above I also had conversations 
and conducted interviews with key informants including local university professors, 
lawyers, a number of NGOs, activists, and journalists – particularly crime reporters - 
from major media outlets including The Daily Star, The Dhaka Tribune and ATN 
Bangla. This helped historically contextualise some of the dynamics and processes I 
was observing and that had been described to me. Finally, overlapping with the 
discussion above, presentations and conversations with relevant organisations and 
individuals provided a means by which I validated key research findings. I returned to 
Dhaka for a month in November-December 2015 and gave two presentations, one at 
Concern Worldwide to staff leading the Amrao Manush programme; and second, to 
staff at the BRAC Institute for Governance and Development (BIGD). These helped 
nuance and supported key arguments developed.  In a further attempt to provide some 
historical contextualisation to the work, and to the dynamics I had observed, I spent 
around three weeks conducting archival research at the Bangladesh National Archives 
in Dhaka and later at the India Office at the British Library, London79. At the British 
Library I used the various digital catalogues (online, archival, India Office Select 
materials and maps) searching through sources listed as connected to ‘Dacca’, from 
which I selected and reviewed those appearing most relevant. In Dhaka, the 
organisation of the archives and lack of digitalisation made the task far more difficult, 
and I relied heavily on the judgement of staff.  
At the point of leaving the field I thus had data from a wide range of sources: a field 
diary from over a year; semi-structured interviews; notes from conversations and 
interviews with key informants; a short ‘qualitative survey of perceptions’; photos and 
                                                 
77 To do this I also used a second assistant who had been my Bangla teacher.  
78 Key historical figures, for example the names of famous gangsters have also not been anonymised.  
79 I also conducted research at The Asiatic Society centres in both Dhaka and Kolkata, as well as the 
National Library of India in Kolkata, though found only limited relevant resources.   
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photocopies of documents found during archival research; NGO and other policy 
documents I had accumulated along the way; and secondary sources from the media, 
particularly relating to the mastan figures I had heard of. After returning from 
Bangladesh, I set about analysing the entire corpus of data. Two tasks were paramount 
in the process of analysis: first, that the data was coherently organised; and second, 
that I built arguments on a fair representation of my data. It is important to 
acknowledge that I began coding my field diary from Bangladesh in early 2015, and 
this analysis served as the basis for focusing the remaining period of research. At this 
stage, rather than coding select portions, I coded all of the data available according to 
people, intermediaries and events, and divided by the different areas in which I 
studied. At this stage I ‘open coded’, in effect highlighting both ‘codes’ and 
‘categories’, as in subjects and ‘fields’ of subjects (Saldana 2009: 9)80. This was 
guided by the overarching framework explored in chapter two, with attention to 
mapping specific resources in relation to the actors deemed important in the research 
contexts, in line with the approach of Ribot and Peluso (2003).  
Approaching my data post-Bangladesh I revisited all of my initial coding, again in 
light of the theoretical framework developed, but with a greater sense of distance from 
my research environment. I recoded my entire data set again according to research 
contexts, people, intermediaries and events, but also with prominent dynamics to these 
relationships and forms of negotiation. Coding and analysis were iterative processes: 
through coding, patterns emerged across sources, which helped form nascent 
arguments and responses to my research questions, and influenced subsequent coding. 
Coding was then a ‘cyclical act’, interacting with analysis (Saldana 2009: 8). 
Significant attention was given to whether arguments that had been developed through 
the fieldwork and early analysis, held true against the complete data set. In practice 
this meant acknowledging or accounting for inconsistencies, demonstrating sufficient 
nuance to relationships or processes, and judging which finding I had been able to 
sufficiently verify through a number of sources, and which finding were insufficiently 
established to merit inclusion or consideration in the thesis. Exceptions to patterns in 
my dataset were of particular note, in that they enabled me to highlight the limits or 
nuance in key dynamics, and in cases further substantiated the patterns they were an 
exception to. The data presented in this thesis, the cases focused upon or quotes, are 
intended to exemplify common findings across my research contexts, and effort has 
been made to emphasise the make clear the extent to which findings can be generalised 
this through the empirical chapters.  
A practical principle when conducting analysis was then a readiness to abandon 
arguments that I liked, but which greater reflection on my data suggested were not 
valid. This is of course an ethical as well as intellectual concern, as it relates to 
                                                 
80 Rather than using qualitative data software, I chose to use Microsoft word with headers and sub-
headers for different fields and subjects. This meant that the same data was often entered into a number 
of sections, however I perceived it as a more straightforward and intuitive approach than using 
qualitative data analysis software (NVivo for example). 
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representation. Izaz, a beggar at the High Court, responded to a question by me about 
hierarchy among beggars, which illustrated the significance of representation: 
Everyone eats from his own earnings. I eat from my own earning. You eat from 
your own earning. Some people spread defamation (bodnam) that beggars 
have to give a lot of money. It’s rubbish (boa kotha). It’s creating a false 
“case”. One guy creating a false case about another. Do you understand? 
People say there’s one beggar who made a 15 storey building. He made that 
building by working. Did he make the building by theft? He made the house by 
working hard. He didn’t make the building by stealing. It’s only defamation, 
they write in the newspapers here and there.  
This quote points to the fact that people who cannot represent themselves to the wider 
world are extremely vulnerable to stereotype and mischaracterisation, as explored 
early in the next chapter. The intention of this thesis has been to honestly and credibly 
portray social order from the perspective of the kangali, however it is important to 
acknowledge there were significant challenges to validating certain findings and 
providing sufficient depth of understanding in specific areas. Difficulties were partly 
due to the sensitivity of specific research topics, and therefore research findings 
pertained to subjects that were inherently harder to access, but also partly due to the 
limitations to the methodology chosen and my ability as a researcher. Surveying the 
thesis to come, there are a number of particular events or dynamics witnessed where 
further validation would be beneficial. In particular, the episodes of violence analysed 
in chapter eight (involving the Awami League, police and bombings on behalf of the 
BNP) were only portrayed to me by labourers within or closely connected to the jupri 
group. I was unable to gain insight into how their rivals, the police or Awami League 
politicians perceived these events. More generally within the jupri group, the precise 
relationships and agreements between the jupri group and the BNP were only 
explained to me in general terms. When working with the beggar leader Habib, further 
insight would have been useful to understand how he maintained his status, and 
whether he had relationships to more senior local actors such as the police for example.  
The inability to understand these dynamics was partly due to the sensitivity of the 
topics and my inability to negotiate access to them, but was also a function of the 
methodology chosen. My focus was on providing an emic account of social order from 
the perspective of the kangali, however to understand many of the wider 
intermediaries and organisations in which they function independent of their 
relationship with the kangali (political parties for example), requires an approach that 
begins with these actors and structures and focuses at this level. Certain research 
findings also pertain to much larger phenomenon within Bangladesh’s political 
settlement and while a certain level of depth can be gathered from the approach taken, 
further research is required at a higher level and with a broader set of actors, to 
understand these in greater detail. This is particularly relevant for what I argue to be 
the decline of mastan gangs from the early 2000s; the increasing power of the Awami 
League witnessed just prior to, during and subsequent to fieldwork; and the systems 
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of toll/extortion collection (chanda), which are ubiquitous across Dhaka. I had planned 
to return to Dhaka six months after completing research in April 2015, with the 
intention of explaining a synthesis of my analysis to people with whom I had 
researched, however was unable to do so due to a deteriorated security situation for 
foreigners in Bangladesh. A further limitation that is important to highlight, is that I 
as a male researcher found it far easier to analyse the dynamics of intermediation in 
the context of men. This was partly a function of the fact that men have a closer 
reliance on the types of intermediaries described in this thesis, by virtue of working in 
sectors were work is organised collectively, however even in instances where this is 
the case for women – sex work for example – I found it difficult to access. These 
limitations all point to areas for future research.  
4.3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the methodology used in this thesis to examine social order 
from the perspective of the kangali in Dhaka city. The focus has been on analysing the 
research experience itself, as well as demonstrating processes of validation for 
findings and arguments made. The descriptions of the research experience suggest that 
the framework of intermediation is relevant also to understanding the dynamics of 
conducting research. In relation particularly to the jupri group, I as a researcher had to 
establish access on a personal basis, the terms of these relationships were continuously 
negotiated, and my role within the group connected to a capability for violence. To the 
extent that ethnography has to grapple with the terms on which social order is based 
as described in chapter two, it can then also be understood as a political process. This 
chapter has also introduced key research sites, people and groups, and these are all 
more comprehensively discussed in the next chapter. 
 
5. KARWAN BAZAR AND THE KANGALI 
 
This chapter introduces the places and people at the centre of this thesis, both of which 
have been briefly discussed in the preceding description of methodology. While urban 
research has gained some momentum in Bangladesh over recent decades, the groups 
of urban poor people studied are often limited to those living in large, well-established 
and partially serviced bosti. This thesis focuses on groups of people who to date have 
been less well examined; in particular those living in the open or in the most basic 
bosti found on some of Dhaka’s pavements, parks, and occasionally by the sides of 
railway lines. These people are often classified in international discourse through 
terms such as ‘squatters’, the ‘homeless’ and ‘street dwellers’. Attention in this chapter 
is given to how these groups of people have been categorised, labelled and studied, as 
this reflects prominent conceptualisations about how they are situated within, and 
therefore relate to, the social order. The public discourse in Bangladesh around these 
people being ‘rootless’ and ‘floating’ is argued to be problematic, a line of argument 
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built through the following chapters and returned to in the conclusion. I choose to use 
the term kangali (destitute, the needy) to refer to these people, as it is the only term I 
encountered that people living in these contexts use to label themselves. This is 
acknowledged as a contentious term and discussed in more detail. Before these areas 
are explored, the primary and secondary research sites focused on in this thesis are 
introduced. Where possible some brief history of these locations is sketched, 
prominent characters introduced, and key socio-economic dynamics discussed from 
the perspective of the kangali. Through introducing the places and people at the focus 
of this thesis, this chapter sets the stage for an analysis of the dynamics of 
intermediation and social order through the microcosm of the kangali living in a bazar, 
on some pavements and in a park.  
5.1. KARWAN BAZAR, SOME PAVEMENTS AND A PARK 
5.1.1. KARWAN BAZAR 
Karwan Bazar is a large wholesale market (arot) at the centre of Dhaka, nestled next 
to the city’s only north-south train line, sitting alongside the heart of Bangladesh’s 
media industry, adjacent to a five star hotel, surrounded by businesses, and around the 
corner from one of Bangladesh’s largest and most upmarket shopping centres. This 
section introduces the bazar, its history, socio-economic hierarchy, and the people at 
the centre of this study.  
Despite the bazar’s prominence today as the country’s largest vegetable wholesale 
market, it rarely appears in either historical records or contemporary analyses from 
Dhaka, and what can be learned about the bazar’s history has to be gleaned from these 
infrequent sources, as well as the recollections of elderly local residents and workers. 
The first reference to the area now called Karwan Bazar comes from descriptions of 
the Khwaja Ambar Mosque, built in 1680 under the instruction of Khwaja Ambar81, 
the chief eunuch of Shaista Khan, the Mughal ruler of Bengal at the time. The mosque 
can still be found on the western side of the bazar, painted in a gaudy green, 
overshadowed by its modern counterpart, and partly hidden behind billboards and 
walls plastered with political posters. In 1776 the renowned colonial geographer James 
Rennell produced a map of Dhaka, highlighting a mosque in this location, with gardens 
of the French and Dutch communities to its northeast and northwest respectively, 
suggesting a rather different setting to what can be found today. An entry on 
‘Banglapedia’82 states that the origins of the bazar’s name come from a ‘Marwari 
merchant’ called Karwan Singh who established a market there in the late 18th 
century83. This claim is unsupported, and in fact the name appears to come from the 
historical presence of a caravanserai, also transliterated from Persian into English as 
‘Karwansara’. As across the Mughal world, caravanserai were most often small 
                                                 
81 Later titled ‘Khidmatgar Khan’ in 1704 after his predecessor (Faruqui 2012: 240). 
82 The online encyclopedia for Bangladesh. 
83 One long standing resident claimed that the name came from the river Karwan, which used to run by 
the bazar.  
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compounds containing an inn, as well as a mosque and bazar, used by travellers for 
security, to rest and restock (Campbell 2011). In Bengali a caravanserai is termed a 
katra. At some point this katra would have therefore have been used similarly to the 
famous boro and choto katra that lie in ruins in old Dhaka84.  
By the early 19th century, the mosque, like much of Dhaka, was in a dilapidated state 
(Taylor 1840)85. We can assume the caravanserai fell into disuse at some point in the 
18th or early 19th century as Taylor (1840: 295) writes that ‘there are no serais in the 
district, and the few persons that travel by land, therefore find board and lodging at… 
Akharas, or at the shops of the Moodees or dealers in grain’. Interestingly however it 
continued to be known by some as a katra, more specifically as bhagtiya katra. 
Bhagtiya means a ‘dancing boy’ in Hindustani (Shakespeare 1834) and Wise (1883: 
352) wrote that many of the ‘nars’, who were boys or girls known for dancing or music 
‘inhabit an old Sarae, or caravansary, called Bhagtiya Katra, built in the seventeenth 
century by an eunuch named Khwajah 'Ambar’. By the late 19th century the term 
‘Karwan’ was being used to refer to the neighbourhood. Wise refers to the Raj-
Mahallia Kumhars, a group of potters coming originally from ‘Raj-mahall’86, who 
lived in 200 houses in Dhaka in ‘Ja'farganj, Sultanganj, Rai Bazar, and Karwan, 
suburbs of Dacca’.  
There is then a significant gap in what can be gleaned from historical sources, and 
what can be learnt from the memories and stories of people from the area. In the early 
20th century, goods were transported into the city principally by canal and river, with 
only a few brought by train (Allen 1912). With the growth of the city northwards, it is 
therefore probable that a more significant bazar emerged on the site as its strategic 
position grew. For decades Karwan Bazar has been Dhaka’s largest vegetable 
wholesale market (arot), attracting buyers, sellers and labour from throughout the 
country. Fifty or so years ago, the market was smaller, containing a few wholesalers 
at the south west side of its current location, adjacent to the then newly paved main 
road Kazi Nazrul Islam Avenue87 which connected the city centre to what used to be 
the city’s airport in Tejgaon. At the time, the rail line that runs alongside its east 
towards Kamalapur, cut through towards the west, before making its way down to 
Gulistan. It was flanked by waterways, and nearby areas such as Panthapath, where 
the large shopping centre Bashundara City stands today, was a water body. The area 
was largely open with no significant buildings except the mosque, surrounded by 
paddy fields and jungle. One labourer I knew who grew up nearby described the 
female ghosts (petni) in the jungle, and having been scared to go to the toilet there.  
                                                 
84 Bradley-Birt (1906: 268) notes how Bara Katra built by Shah Shuja, the son of the man who built the 
Taj Mahal in Agra, was never used for its intended purpose as his palace, and was rather used as a 
caravanserai, ‘a public halting-place where travellers and the poor might find rest and shelter’. 
85 Though even in the early 20th century, the well dug there by Khwaja Ambar, as well as the nearby 
bridge across the canal ‘Iskatau Khal’ were still in use (Allen 1912: 178). 
86 This is probably the town Rajmahal in current day Jharkhand, close to the Bangladeshi border 
87 This is one of the main road’s running north to south in Dhaka. Originally built with funds from 
Queen Elizabeth II as an elderly local resident remembered it. 
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From at least the 1970s the area contained Dhaka’s largest truck stand, sizeable boat 
launch steps (ghat), a wholesale vegetable and fish market, and a hawkers market. As 
is well remembered by some locals, rural hardship led tens of thousands of people to 
pour into Dhaka in search of work following the Liberation War and then famine of 
1974; and there are still labourers at the bazar today who came during this period. A 
long standing resident who grew up in one of the few residential properties in the area, 
described there being over 10,000 people living in the open or in makeshift shelters 
between Karwan Bazar and Tejgaon (just north of the bazar) alone in the late 70s and 
early 80s. The vast majority worked as coolie (the labourers who carry goods on their 
heads, also called minti and sometimes labour). Whereas today goods arrive by truck, 
and are often transported by rickshaw van (flat backed rickshaws), previously almost 
everything came by water, with lines of labourers working in chains transporting 
goods from the boat launch running adjacent to the railway line. As this resident 
described it  
there were hundreds of minti, they would spoil all the roads of Karwan Bazar 
by shitting and pissing everywhere... They came from the villages, and they 
slept on the road-launch steps [rasta ghat]. They would lie on the slopes next 
to the rail lines.  
Some people settled in the area, building more permanent shelters overhanging these 
water bodies themselves, others found somewhere to live in bosti elsewhere in Dhaka, 
while others continued to sleep where they could, often at the side of the road under 
mosquito nets.  
Today people continue to come from all over the country to survive and seek 
opportunities at the bazar. As one labourer put it, you can come from Comilla, 
Mymensing, Barisal, Rangpur88 – you can come from anywhere and stay here. Many 
people migrate temporarily or seasonally to find work, financing rural lives with urban 
money. Some people who live at the bazar have separated from their families, either 
as a child or an adult, and built a life around the bazar, while others have been born at 
or nearby the bazar and grown up there. The bazar has developed from the descriptions 
heard of previous decades. Alongside the thousands of people seeking a living through 
their labour, there are today hundreds of wholesalers filling large tin, brick and some 
two-storey buildings. As well as this, hundreds of small businesses trade on the 
roadsides, and the streets are full of trucks, vans, and the cars of nearby high-end office 
workers. Despite these changes, the bazar and nearby bosti still stand in contrast to the 
wealthy business and media hubs adjacent.  
Life at the bazar focuses around the movement of goods, in particular vegetables and 
fruit, but also meat and fish, and it is often people’s relationship to these goods and 
their movement that defines their status at the bazar. The three most common types of 
labour are: coolie (as described above), the “helper” (those helping unload trucks of 
                                                 
88 These are districts or divisions at different ends of Bangladesh. 
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goods, passing them to the coolie), and the rickshaw van drivers (those taking sacks 
of goods from trucks into the bazar or elsewhere on a flat backed rickshaw). These are 
all known as sramik (labourers, workers). Many younger boys and women who live 
there are scavengers (tokai), some children and teenagers are thieves (chur), a small 
number of women are sex workers (potita) and there is also a small number of beggars 
(bikkuk). It is important to note that wages are perceived as high at the bazar - people 
spoke of rickshaw van drivers earning 2000 taka a day in the past, and even today they 
can earn up to around 1500 taka a day in some cases, though more generally it ranges 
from 300-800 taka89. 
Labourers, beggars, sex workers and scavengers, associate with particular areas of the 
market for living and working. To understand the relationship between people and 
spaces it is useful to start by recognising that, as a labourer called Rakib put it to me, 
day and night are different worlds at Karwan Bazar. By day, the market is busy with 
retailers selling the goods bought from wholesalers the previous night. Coolie work 
primarily alone, taking small jobs for individual customers, often in competition with 
other coolie. By night however labourers primarily operate collectively under the 
leadership of sardar (as discussed in chapter three) and this is when the majority of 
people work. Unlike most areas of Dhaka, and similar to markets worldwide, the bazar 
is busier by night than by day. Kazi Nazrul Islam Avenue often has back-to-back 
traffic until late evening as trucks pour in from the country delivering goods. Specific 
trucks unload at specific areas of the market, with different areas corresponding to 
different groups of labour and wholesalers (arotdar). Labourers then transport goods 
to the relevant wholesalers, before they are repackaged and sold on90. This is known 
locally as a bhag niyom, a ‘system of division’, the basic principle of which from the 
perspective of labourers is: we can’t take their goods, and they can’t take ours. By 
night the coolie are all led by sardar, as are many, but not all, rickshaw van drivers. 
Across the bazar different spaces are associated with particular groups of labour, and 
in practice each area is further sub-divided. Some people distinguish by area, often 
identified with a prominent building, others identify by lane (goli), while others 
identify by group of labour, making distinctions difficult to delineate. Labourers 
roughly distinguish five areas: la vinci (named after the adjacent hotel), wasa (named 
after the large government office by that name), market (directly south of WASA), 
sonargaon (the southern entrance to Karwan Bazar, facing the five star Sonargaon 
hotel) and the rail line (to the north east). 
                                                 
89 Historically Karwan Bazar was the only wholesale market in Dhaka however today there are many 
others which some labourers at the bazar explain have led to their wages depreciating. One labourer at 
Karwan Bazar Liton once told me (exaggerating to some extent in all probability) that before van drivers 
could earn 5000 taka in one day. There was so many goods. Now there is other areas such as Jatrabari, 
Gazipur, the same goods go to different areas now. 
90 The arotdar (wholesalers), or commission agents as they were known in English (and now Bangla) 
from at least the mid 19th century (Lewis 1868: 25), typically take five per cent commission`, and today 
are sometimes lambasted by the labourers as “cheater”. Even 150 years ago ‘bepáris complain[ed] 
bitterly’ amount the arrangement with arotdar (Lewis 1868: 25). Bepari here refers to the middlemen 
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Alongside the labourers weaving their way through the crowds to deliver goods, are 
hundreds of people sleeping after a days work, or awaiting work later that night. With 
the wholesale market and many public areas crammed, those who sleep at night often 
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do so on shop verandas, down quieter lanes, or in the entranceways to businesses and 
government offices. By comparison those who sleep during the day often do so in the 
market, in mess 91  above the market, in corners tucked away, or behind parked 
vehicles92. At night, many coolie sleep slumped in the baskets they use for transporting 
goods, sometimes alongside the main road, and the image has caught on in popular 
imagination of the bazar. As trucks arrive, women, children and labourers begin 
hovering around them. Any loose vegetables that fall out of bags or over the side are 
quickly picked and fed into bags or pouches made with the women’s salwa kameez, 
and meanwhile any spilt chilis are quickly swept up. After a night’s work the women 
and children – and sometimes other members of their family – wash the vegetables, 
often cutting them sideways to demonstrate to potential customers that they are fresh, 
and bunch them up into piles on the street selling for small sums (usually 10 taka93 a 
pile). Some travel north to the nearby fokini bazar (beggars market) under Tejgaon 
flyover, while those at the bazar sell either along the paths between the main markets 
or on the land of wholesalers.  
The experiences of one particular group of labourers at Karwan Bazar are explored in 
this thesis: the rickshaw van drivers associated with the jupri lane (jupri goli) just 
south of WASA, and referred to locally as a group by the term jupri. Jupri means a 
shack or shanty. The group are named such because, according to one of their members 
Abul, before there used to be jute sacks and bamboo pillars and on the top tin made 
shed, that’s why they used to call it jupri. Others said it was because the way in which 
they live at Karwan Bazar looks like a jupri, with mosquito nets forming small 
shelters. They identify clearly with the name and are referred to as such by outsiders. 
More broadly they are identified with WASA, as they work and many live, to the south 
and east side of the building. There are around 70 labourers in the group, with three 
leaders: Rubel, Parvez and “Mission” Azad, about whom more will be learnt in 
subsequent chapters. Labourers within the group who I was particularly close to 
include Nazir, Abul, Liton, Shumon, Shamim, Salam, Rana, Abdul, Rakib, 
Mohammed and Shakib. Unlike other groups of labour at the bazar, most of the group 
(the best of them, as Rubel put it) have grown up at the bazar, moving between the 
various NGO centres in their youth, before getting too old to legitimately stay there, 
and being old enough to be a rickshaw van driver. All of the labourers (and leaders) 
listed above with the exception of Liton, had grown up at the bazar.  
For at least a couple of decades there is a history of NGO run centres for “street 
children” at the bazar, opening and closing in funding cycles, and cohort after cohort 
of children have grown up partly within or between these. There are currently two 
such centres at or adjacent to the bazar – a Sajida Foundation centre sheltering women 
and children at night (teenage boys sometimes sleep there during the day) and an 
Aparajeyo Bangladesh centre to the north, where teenage boys can sleep during the 
                                                 
91 Communal sleeping quarters where people pay 15-20 taka night to sleep on the floor. 
92 With the exception of the mess, or the occasional shop floor, people sleep for free (see chapter nine). 
93 Taka is the Bangladeshi currency.  
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day. The friendships and groups formed here continue as people grow up and into the 
adult world of labour. These networks are essential to survival, as Shumon explained 
it to me: 
You’ve grown up with you mother and father right? They were the ones who 
made sure you stayed well, who fed you. We’re different. We didn’t have our 
mothers or fathers that’s why we all live together here. This is like our family 
As older labourers within the group have grown up, got married and had children, 
many have moved into the larger bosti. Some have retained, re-built, or created greater 
links to villages, while others continue to live at the bazar. Some men have adopted 
the home village of their wives, calling it their bari (birthplace, home)94. The notion 
of a bari (ancestral, often village home) has a fundamental place for people’s identities 
in Bangladesh. It provides a moral and cultural anchoring, and therefore knowing the 
bari of someone is often an important way of categorising and placing them. Though 
the vast majority of urban dwellers live away from their bari, the socio-economic and 
cultural ties that stem from this identity are often critical to finding security and work. 
In fact many groups of labour at Karwan Bazar are associated with particular districts 
of Bangladesh. There is then a close association between being disconnected from 
ones family – and therefore one’s bari - and joining the jupri group. Teenagers and 
young men slowly join their ranks, often in small groups coming from the same cohort, 
or “batch” as it is known locally, at the centres. Of the areas at the bazar, it is through 
this group that those growing up in the centres are most likely to become rickshaw van 
drivers. Teenage boys at the cusp of joining the group occupy different worlds: that of 
the child deemed to be needing support and protection in NGO centres, and that of the 
bazar, where they are learning to survive in a competitive and often violent 
environment. By day they watch cartoons, sleep, play fight under the eyes of staff at 
the Aparajeyo centre, or play cricket in the nearby Sher-E-Bangla Nagar Park, while 
at night they prove themselves, looking and acting like adults: smoking cigarettes, 
getting into fights, building and proving their capacity to operate in an adult world. 
Some of the teenagers heard from in this thesis include Zakir, Akash, Mamun, Sayeed, 
Arif, Golap, Monir, Nijam, Chondon and Salman.  
As the jupri group work at night, many of them sleep intermittently throughout the 
day either to the south of WASA - lying on their rickshaw vans, sleeping on boxes, or 
in small alcoves at the bottom of the building behind the buses and cars that park there 
during office hours - or along the east side of WASA next to the arot and trucks, 
sleeping on boxes under tarpaulin sheeting. While night is for work, much of the day 
is passed in normal routines – chatting, sleeping, smoking mariquana, eating from one 
of the local street carts (Shumon, one of the labourers, owns a cart selling kichuri next 
to WASA). The few men with their wives there or nearby are cooked for, and the 
women use makeshift spaces on the footpath, gutter or parking area to light a fire and 
                                                 
94 This resonates with Indra and Buchignani’s (1997) argument that in response to crises, families in 
rural Bangladesh utilize the kinship ties women within the household can make claims on, in order to 
re-establish access to land. This was known as uthuli in the context they studied.  
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cook. The group often play ludo, and behind the large company buses and parked cars, 
lots of boards can sometimes be seen laid out on the floor, people engrossed in the 
game for hours. Mobile phones provide entertainment, people with touch screens 
(“touch mobile” as it is known locally) buy memory cards from shops (and swap them 
with others) that come ready loaded with films and TV series. Bollywood action films 
are a favourite. More so in the past than in the present, the group also gamble, but 
given it is illegal they are careful not to show cards round much during the day, and 
have found a few obscure corners which are hidden from the main roads at Karwan 
Bazar to play. Sometimes they and others play in the vegetable trucks themselves, 
easily hidden from street level. The bazar itself also provides entertainment, and is a 
hub for travelling entertainers, sexual health medicines, charms, and the occasional 
extorting elephant. 
As a side business the labourers buy mariquana in Dhaka’s largest open drugs market 
Karwan Bazar rail line bosti, which is adjacent to the market, and then sell it to nearby 
professionals. From late-evening until around 8am women (and less so men) huddle 
outside their homes either side of the railway line over large baskets holding mounds 
of mariquana. Hidden from view they sell harder and more expensive drugs such as 
yabba and heroin95. Of the jupri group it is Shumon who is mostly responsible for 
travelling to the rail line, buying the drugs (being careful not to be caught and hence 
extorted by nearby police). They then use scissors to cut up the large buds and 
branches, wrapping up 20 or 30 taka packets in pieces of scrap paper. They sell it 
mostly to people in the media (from ATN Bangla for example), saving people of 
higher status from making the highly conspicuous journey to the railway line. Drugs 
is one reason why Karwan Bazar is infamous, and its reputation has built through 
decades of close association with major crimes, gangs and violence and sex work, as 
will be explored more in subsequent chapters. There is less sex work apparent today 
than in previous decades however. A small portion of this is street based, with some 
of the women sleeping at the Sajida Foundation by day, before beautifying themselves 
at the centre and working at night. There is also a large hotel – a boarding – to the 
north east of the market, used by lots of sex workers, with teenagers from the age of 
around 15 according to labourers in the jupri group.  
5.1.2. SOME PAVEMENTS AND A PARK 
Substantial research was also conducted in a number of secondary locations, as 
described in the previous chapter. Three sites are of particular importance: a pavement 
adjacent to Pantho Kunjo park nearby Karwan Bazar, the pavement outside the 
Supreme Court, and Osmani Uddyan park which is next to the headquarters of Dhaka 
South City Corporation.  
                                                 
95 People also often consume the cough syrup phensedyl. Drugs are reportedly supplied primarily from 
Myanmar and India, and they pour into the market, being dealt and consumed there. According to the 
jupri group the network of vegetable trucks are used to conceal and deliver drugs around the country, 
and I have met rickshaw wallahs who come from elite neighbourhoods to buy drugs before selling it on 
(often to foreigners they tell me) around the elite neighbourhood Gulshan. 
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The pavement outside the Supreme Court holds one of, if not the largest concentration 
of disabled beggars, living together anywhere in the city. A local beggar leader Habib, 
about whom more will be discussed in the next chapter, described the area as being 
like a fakir “junction” (a beggar’s junction). Today hundreds of people – most of 
whom are beggars – sleep on the pavement outside the Supreme Court premises, 
however thousands of people previously lived there when they were allowed to sleep 
in the mazar grounds (which is contained inside the Supreme Court premises). The 
area used to be similar to Mirpur mazar, where music, stories and poetry are recited 
every night, and drugs consumed, however these activities have radically declined, 
particularly since the ‘International Crimes Tribunal’96. It is nonetheless still identified 
as a spiritual place, and one staff member at the mazar described seeing miracles there, 
including a man make a pigeon appear from his bare hands. The mazar – so tradition 
has it – is either based around the tomb of the Mughal governor Islam Khan Chisti, or 
that of a saint buried in 1590. In any case it is therefore likely that people have been 
begging there for hundreds of years. A number of people also described the area as 
being a recruitment ground for film companies to find actors to work as beggars or 
pagol (crazy people) in their films. Kichuri97 is donated to the poor at lunchtime 
through the mazar, though some people complain that the mazar staff appropriate the 
money and best food which has been donated to the mazar. Locally powerful spiritual 
leaders are also seen as excluding locals from the benefits given to the followers of 
their particular strand of Sufism (tarika). In winter, students, business people and local 
associations often donate blankets, and the number of people living in the area 
suddenly swells to claim the donations.  
Most of the beggars in the area are physically disabled and live in small wooden carts 
on wheels, which are pushed by an assistant. Assistants are most often young boys 
who are strong enough to push a cart but not yet teenagers. When a new assistant is 
needed they are collected from either Kamalapur station - another area where many 
kangali live (see Conticini 2005) - or an NGO club in Aram Bagh, both of which are 
to the East of the Supreme Court. Assistants normally receive half of the day’s income 
from begging, though some receive a monthly salary from the beggar. Some of the 
beggars also carry little sticks to discipline their assistants when they misbehave. 
Though they live outside the Supreme Court, they most often beg in other areas. 
According to Habib,  
there is a “map”, where you should go everyday, like on Friday today, it’s 
Supreme Court… Then another day it’s good to go to Shabagh, Press Club, 
Doynek Bangla Circle, Paltan Circle…  
                                                 
96 Despite its name this is in fact a domestic war crimes tribunal established in 2009 to prosecute crimes 
committed during Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War. The understanding I have gathered from people 
living on the pavement, staff in the mazar, and nearby NGO workers, is that the government associate 
crowds of people living on the pavements as potentially harbouring terrorists, and their presence is 
therefore perceived a threat to national security.  
97 A popular Bangladeshi, and South Asian, meal made primarily from rice and lentils. 
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Most beggars have been at the Supreme Court for years if not decades, and have strong 
ties back to their village homes. As Habib described it to me: everyone has their own 
children, they have to send back money. They have parents, everyone has someone. 
Many of the beggars earn relatively high amounts of money, with the disabled beggars 
typically earning more than the non-disabled. For example Mohona, who now runs a 
small cigarette business, but used to live on the pavement and beg at the Supreme 
Court described her experience at the time: I would earn 500, 600, 700, up to 1000 a 
day. All in 2 or 1 taka notes. This livelihood is however precarious. Izaz, who is 
paralysed from the waist down and lives on the eastern side of the pavement described 
the adverse impact of recent evictions of street businesses: 
A lot of those shop owners gave me 5 taka, 10 taka. Now, none of them are 
here anymore. All of these have been destroyed. There used to be a lot of shops 
in Mogh bazar. Malibag rail gate. But there aren’t anymore. If I went to the 
rail gate I would make 40 or 50 taka even before crossing the rail. Now, they 
don’t even let a crow sit there. How can I do business there? They say “digital 
Bangladesh”, but are there no beggars here?98 
Just east of the University and the Supreme Court, and next to Dhaka South City 
Corporation, is Osmani Uddyan Park. As well as being known as a public park, it is 
also known - as the English language newspaper The Daily Star (2008) put it - for 
vagabonds, floating people, addicts, beggars and prostitutes. The article also notes 
seeing a ‘scantily clad demented person’99. People of different occupations shelter in 
the park at night, as they do in many nearby areas, including the golap shah mazar at 
the adjacent intersection, and further along at Bangabandu stadium. The NGO Nari 
Maitree run a nearby shelter under the Amrao Manush programme, which works 
particularly with women and children from the area. Within the park, the most 
prominent group are the moyla (waste, drain, sewer) workers, under the leadership of 
a sardar Jewel, about whom more will be explained in chapter seven. Their numbers 
vary between around 30 and 50, fluctuating with the season and work availability 
(when there’s more rain, we have more work, Jewel put it to me simply). Most of the 
men have only worked there for about 4-5 years with the exception of an older member 
Neymar, nicknamed after the great Argentine footballer100, who has been there for 
twenty years. The group work on a contract basis for WASA, and are particularly busy 
in the rainy season when the drains require greater maintenance. Not all the members 
                                                 
98 It is interesting to note that Izaz here is referring to begging as a business. “Digital Bangladesh” is a 
government campaign to promote the ICT sector in the country, and is being referenced here ironically. 
99 The park is also known as being the home of the famous Bibi Mariam, one of the two cannons that 
had defended Dhaka in the Mughal period. One local story, which was apparently reported in 
newspapers though I heard from local people, also suggests a more gruesome past. The story goes that 
there used to be man living in the wooded area of the park around 15 years ago. He had long scraggily 
hair and very long nails, and people were scared to even walk in front of him. He was found to have 
abducted children from a nearby slum, hidden them among the trees where he killed them and ate their 
livers. The story goes that he had previously worked in the mortuary at Dhaka Medical College before 
becoming a beggar, and when found, was beaten to death in front of the City Corporation building. 
100 The group play a lot of football in the park, and Neymar, the older member, is particularly skilled. 
94 
 
of the group support family elsewhere, and those that do are able – so they describe – 
to send back around 100 taka a day when they have work.   
In the case of the three research sites thus far described – Karwan Bazar, the pavement 
next to the Supreme Court and Osmani Uddyan park – access to come and sleep there 
is generally open. As I widely heard – anyone can stay here it’s not a problem. This 
is similar to many other areas across Dhaka, including major transport terminals, 
religious sites and outside sport stadiums. The final research site - the pavement 
adjacent to Pantho Kunjo park – is however different. On this pavement, like others 
across Dhaka, settlements are more than simply a mosquito net, but include plastic 
tarpaulin, small items of furniture and cooking utensils. These sites are often referred 
to locally as bosti, even if they are far less established and permanent shelters than 
seen in the larger slums of the city. Pantho Kunjo is across the roundabout southwest 
from Karwan Bazar. This is labelled as Sonargaon Road on Figure 3, and is historically 
where the train line passed through. Previously there was a more permanent bosti 
established on the site. By contrast with the previous research sites discussed, the 
pavement next to Pantho Kunjo park - like many other pavements across the city - is 
only accessible to people who are already connected to the communities who live 
there. This was often expressed to me in these terms: unknown people can’t come here, 
we won’t accept them, we won’t let them stay. Having visited many such bosti on the 
pavements in Dhaka, in almost every case the footpath is clearly demarcated into home 
districts, such that people can say easily point to where a certain district’s area stops 
and starts. Most often the people living there are from areas in the north of the country 
such as Jamalpur, Rangpur (particularly Lalmonihat), Bogra, Mymensing, and to a 
lesser extent Dinajpur and Sherpur. Koehlmoos et al (2009) found that 34 and 23 per 
cent of male and female ‘street dwellers’ respectively, lived where they did because 
‘others of same area of origin [are] staying in cluster area’. In the case of the pavement 
next to Panto Kunjo park, there are two communities from which people come – 
Jamalpur and Rangpur. It is inclusion in these networks that enables access to such 
spaces. Those living there often described hearing about the place in their village, 
hearing you did not need to pay rent, knowing someone from nearby, and deciding to 
make the journey. In these cases, the communities have built up slowly over the years. 
Parveen, who has lived at Pantho Kunjo for around 15 years, described the situation 
there 
People from the village came here first. They stayed 6-7 months then came 
back and told others. They took others to Dhaka, then these people came back 
and took others, that’s how it slowly slowly grew here. 
Today the people living there do a variety of work. Many are scavengers, and keep 
their goods piled along the side of the pavement, waiting to sell in bulk for a higher 
price. Some of the men work as day labourers or in transport, while many women 
work as housemaids in nearby middle class apartments. Despite collectively not 
allowing others to come and sleep there, there is no clear sense of a leader in the bosti, 
and this is particularly because none of the work is organised collectively. A locally 
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powerful figure often identified however is Jahangir, described locally as a reformed 
mastan, a low level Awami League leader, and a former bhangari dokan (recycled 
goods shop) owner. 
5.2. THE KANGALI: URBAN DISCOURSE AND DEBATES 
5.2.1. BEING ‘ROOTLESS’, ‘FLOATING’ AND ‘KANGALI’ 
The people discussed in the previous section are rarely studied, with barely a handful 
of published academic papers even relating to them from Bangladesh. They are 
however the subject of strong characterisations in government discourses and public 
imagination. Attention to these is important as they represent dominant understandings 
about how these people are included within, and relate to, the social order. More 
generally, a focus on labelling is important, as it ‘refers to a relationship of power in 
that the labels of some are more easily imposed on people and situations than those of 
others’ (Wood 1985: 347). Labels are thus always embedded within wider 
relationships and inequalities of power, and prominent labels represent dominant ideas 
about how the world can or should be understood. The ubiquity and necessity for labels 
can lead to complacency about the understandings they are predicated upon and the 
values they promote. As Moncrieffe (2007: 1) argues, processes of labelling 
‘continues wantonly, without contemplation of the politics involved and the potential 
adverse outcomes’.  
In the context of urban Bangladesh a distinction is often made in both English and 
Bengali, between people living in the slum (bosti) or on the road/street (rasta/pot). It 
is common then to contrast ‘slum dwellers’ (bosti-bashi) on one hand, and ‘street-
dwellers’ or ‘pavement-dwellers’ (Begum 1997) on the other101. In practice the urban 
poor can easily become equated with those people living in the bosti and research has 
overwhelmingly focused on such people. A recent review of ‘urban poverty in 
Bangladesh’ for example focuses entirely on the bosti-bashi (Banks 2012). This seems 
problematic in that it ignores those who are ‘urban’ and ‘poor’ but live outside the 
bosti. As Rahman (2011: 4) argues, urban poverty research in Bangladesh tends ‘to 
have a narrow focus on slums’. Referring to those outside the bosti, the World Bank 
(2007: 2) states that ‘further analysis is recommended on this subgroup among the 
poor’.  
The distinction between the slum and street is not however as clear-cut as it can appear. 
The census of the urban poor conducted by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) 
on and after the 24th of April 2014 (which I observed at and near Karwan Bazar) 
categorised some people as living in potho-bosti (street slums). Those living adjacent 
to Pantho Kunjo park were for example categorised as such, and this resonates with 
the fact that people living there, and locals living nearby, often refer to this as a bosti, 
                                                 
101 These are sometimes referred to as bosti-bashi (slum dwellers) and potho-bashi (street dwellers), 
particularly within NGO circles. 
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despite it not looking like the bosti often studied by urban researchers102 . Urban 
researchers in Bangladesh have arguably delineated ‘the slum’ to refer to a particular 
type of bosti, namely those which are comparatively developed in terms of physical 
and social infrastructure (or undeveloped compared to homes built from concrete and 
bricks). A bosti may refer to a brick built building, serviced with gas, electricity and 
water, but it can also apply to a string of tarpaulin shelters along a pavement, in a park 
or adjacent to a railway line. Children are often referred to as potho-shishu (street 
children), and far less frequently adults referred to as rasta lok (road men) or rasta 
manush (road people), while at the same time living in a bosti.  
In everyday discourse it is common for people associated with these spaces, to be 
defined through reference to particular occupations. For example they may be referred 
to as tokai103 (ragpicker or scavenger) or as bikkuk (beggar). These labels are often 
applied in a generalised manner, as if all people living in such spaces do such work. 
These low-end occupations are inherently associated with open public spaces, and the 
significance of this is not difficult to appreciate. These spaces are where rubbish is 
casually thrown, where dogs live, where men urinate, and where the drains and sewage 
systems overflow. There is no (or very little) privacy and hence people cannot 
maintain norms regarding purdah 104 , and there is therefore a perceived lack of 
respectability. The association between moyla (dirt) and occupation is deep-rooted, 
related to a long history of low caste Hindus and Muslims servicing waste and more 
broadly defiled services as discussed in chapter three. The association with low status 
occupations is also an indication that these people are materially poor, and the 
expression tader kichu nai (they have nothing) is often expressed.   
The association between people and these open and public spaces is widely understood 
in Bangladesh as an indication of a detachment from society. This is contained in a 
range of labels that portray these people as floating, or drifting, cut off from their 
homes. More educated people often use the term bashoman to refer to people living in 
these circumstances. This term comes from the word basho meaning floating, and 
therefore translates as ‘floating person’. This term is central to the Government of 
                                                 
102 In the case of the Panto Kunjo pavement, many people refer to it as having become a bosti. What 
specifically qualifies it in people’s minds differs. Some mention the fact that it has become so dirty, 
with the tokai collecting their goods to be recycled on a weekly basis, leaving them in the gutter piled 
up in bags, or the fact that their waste spreads into the park creating a dirty environment. Others indicate 
that is the permanence of such people’s presence there that qualifies it as a bosti. The fact that some 
people have been there for almost twenty years, and the fact that they are so ingrained in the 
environment and local economy, that even when they are evicted, they simply return later that day or a 
few days later. Indeed the association between a bosti and the materials with which the shelter is made 
(tin, for example) may be less about the materials, and more about what they symbolise – a permanence, 
some weak form of right to reside in that place. A final characteristic is simply the quantity of people 
living there. Whereas twenty years or so ago it was identified as only having fifteen or so families, there 
are now over two hundred people, such that they are spread all along the footpath. 
103 Note that while tokai is widely used it is sometimes disliked and considered insulting by children 
and adults who are scavengers. They prefer specifying that they scavenge paper (kagos tokai), or bottles 
(bottle tokai) etc. 




Bangladesh’s categorisation of urban poverty, which is contrasted against the term 
bosti-bashi (slum dweller)105. This image also comes from the practices of religious-
cultural groups common in Bangladesh, particularly Sufi Muslim aesthetics referred 
to sometimes as fakir, as well as the Baul, who traditionally move around the country, 
sometimes playing music, reciting stories or poetry and can be found particularly at 
mazar. The term zazabag – meaning vagabond or gypsy - may be used to indicate 
drifting or wandering, moving from area to area. Similarly, the term tokai stems from 
a verb meaning ‘to look for’, and the image of tokai – particularly children and women 
- searching the city with bags collecting recyclable goods, or of the beggars at 
junctions moving from car to car, symbolise this disconnect. This idea of floating can 
even be expressed at the street level. I once heard the groups of young tokai who move 
around the university area referred to as the rohingha group106 by someone who stays 
outside the Supreme Court, though they were not ethnically rohingha.  
Underlying this notion of wandering or drifting are perceptions about people’s 
relational condition, and deeply intertwined with this, their moral status. In the case of 
children and the elderly there is a common refrain that they “have no-one” (keu nai), 
and more generally they “have no home” (bari nai). Underlying this is their 
identification with being “rootless”. This is captured by the term chinomul. Chino 
indicates torn or separated while mul indicates root, and the term therefore means “up 
rooted” or “rootless”. The term was once used as the name of an NGO centre for 
children in Dhaka, and the notion of being “rootless” is also used in India (Patel 1990: 
10). The key narrative is thus that people’s roots in their bari have been broken and 
hence they live a life at the urban margins. A dominant perception within society and 
institutionalised within government discourse is then of a drifting class, disconnected 
from a key social-moral base underpinning society. These are exemplified into this 
description from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2014: 3) ‘[the] floating 
population constitutes the mobile and vagrant category of rootless people’, or as a 
popular English language newspaper described the community I researched with at 
Pantho Kunjo: the rootless people are flooding in the capital to eke out an existence… 
a floating family struggles to accommodate to its makeshift stay… (Dhaka Tribune 
2013).  
Alongside these narratives however interestingly sits a sense that many are happy with 
this way of life. One person expressed it to me like this:  
                                                 
105 Elsewhere the government use the language of ‘vagrants’ and ‘shelterless people’, as in the 2011 
‘Vagrants and Shelterless People’s Act’ (BRAC et al. 2011). Note that the potho-bosti discussed 
previously are categorised under the bosti-bashi.   
106 The rohingha in North West Myanmar are seen as being without a home, moving from place to 
place, and many are refugees in Bangladesh.  
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You know these people are actually doing well? I will tell you why. They have 
no tension. One day they sleep here, another day there. They don’t worry about 
the past or the future, or about what they will eat tomorrow107 
People are perceived as having chosen this way of life, as enjoying the freedom to go 
where they want, to take drugs and have “free sex”, as it is often expressed. The 
common sight of children being mischievous and playing on the streets for example, 
seems to represent their freedom from the constraints of society108. An undertone to 
this characterisation is the sense that people do not have the discipline to live in the 
correct way. People would describe the freedom to take drugs, have sex and generally 
behave in ways that would be more constrained in a family or community context in 
large bosti or villages. Taken together the labels commonly associated with these 
people and spaces portray a dirty and defiled space, inhabited by people who are 
materially destitute, who lack respectability and social value, are disconnected from 
mainstream society, who float between spaces, and are torn from their roots in an 
ancestral home. The distinction between people living in slums or on the streets has 
been argued to be problematic, and as will be demonstrated through the course of the 
following chapters many of the assumptions underlying labels such as bashoman or 
chinomul do not accurately portray the dominant dynamics to these people’s 
livelihoods.  
For the sake of simplicity however a label of some sort has to be adopted. The only 
term I have encountered that the people described use to refer to themselves is kangali, 
and this is also the case for Bengalis living in similar circumstances in Kolkata109. 
Kangali means an extreme form of poverty, akin to destitution, and stems from the 
word kangal, meaning to be in need of. As well as ‘destitute’, the word could also 
therefore be translated into English as ‘the needy’. The term can be used pejoratively, 
and when used to identify others, can have negative and offensive connotations. 
Conticini (2005: 72) described how some children in his research site took offence at 
the term, as it can imply ‘the condition of being depraved’. At the same time however, 
my experience of the term suggests that it is often drawn upon as a way of denoting a 
unity, a shared condition, a status that people have taken on (and can be used even by 
those with comparatively better off economic positions110). Kangali is often used to 
                                                 
107 Similar opinions were expressed about prostitutes in Dhaka in the early 20th century. Allen (1912: 
60) wrote ‘it is doubtful whether prostitutes as a whole are really discontented with their lot. The life of 
an orthodox and respectable Indian woman is hedged round by innumerable restrictions which must be 
exceedingly irksome to the more adventurous spirits among them, and there seem grounds for supposing 
that those who have once been placed outside the pale enjoy the wider interests and greater variety of 
their lives. They at any rate show little inclination to abandon it. Drink and disease are, however, 
unfortunately prevalent among them’. 
108 Indeed, a famous Bangladeshi artist, Rafiqun Nabi, imagines the tokai as astute critics of mainstream 
society in his newspaper caricatures. 
109 I specify Bengalis, because many people living in these contexts in Kolkata are from Bihar, and I am 
unsure about the terminology they use.  
110 People may on one occasion identify themselves and their immediate others as kangali, but in 
another instance define themselves against the kangali, or point to others as kangali. Look at us all here, 
we are sitting here, sleeping at the bazar, we are kangali! I remember being told by Salam, a labourer 
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indicate a helplessness; and in the context of eviction drives by the police and city 
corporation officials for example, I often heard: we are kangali, where can we go?! It 
can also be evocative and poetic (a famous Bangladeshi singer is called Kangalini 
Sufia) and therefore has complex meanings. The term kangali captures an almost 
visceral quality to life in these contexts and is chosen in this thesis as the most 
authentic way of referring to these people. Its use in this thesis is not however intended 
to homogenise the lives and experiences of the people it refers to. I was reminded of 
the importance of recognising heterogeneity by Masud who I met around the Supreme 
Court, a middle aged man who scavenges and sleeps at the nearby Kakrail mosque. 
He told me: 
People aren’t all the same. Some are heroin addicts, some take other drugs, 
some inject, some steal, some are hawkers, some scavenge paper, some 
scavenge bottles, some work, some eat kichuri, some look for blankets, some 
just spend the whole day eating charity, some don’t wash, some don’t pray. 
There are different types of people! 
In summary, it is then acknowledged that the term kangali is contentious, that it is not 
a neat analytical category, but is adopted here as the most authentic way of referring 
to these people, and is used in the spirit of the sentiment above.  
5.2.2. URBAN RESEARCH AND THE KANGALI 
Existing research on the kangali from Bangladesh is primarily quantitative in nature, 
and commonly uses the notion of a ‘street dweller’ to refer to adults and ‘street 
children’ to refer to children (Begum 1999; Conticini 2005; Conticini and Hulme 
2007; Koehlmoos et al 2009; Patwary et al. 2012; Atkinson-Sheppard 2015; BRAC 
2016). Begum (1997: 37) identified ‘street dwellers’ as the people who ‘spend their 
nights in public shelters like railway platforms, bus terminuses, launch ghats, shopping 
arcades, staircases of commercial buildings, footpaths or any other available sleeping 
space’. The topics focused on by these studies include health (Koehlmoos et al. 2009), 
migration (Begum 1999), migration and livelihoods in relation to street children 
(Conticini and Hulme 2007), and the condition of youth scavengers (Patwary et al. 
2011). Collectively this work challenges some of the characterisations portrayed in the 
sub-section above. Conticini’s work from the early 2000s with street children 
represents the only significant qualitative study in this field, and was based on 
ethnographic methods. One key argument emerging from this is that social factors 
related to household instability and violence are far more important than material 
poverty for understanding child migration. Conticini has also pointed to the dynamic 
nature of the livelihoods of street children, with more complex and higher set of assets 
and incomes than often perceived (Conticini 2005). The significance of violence is 
further developed by Patwary et al (2011) who interviewed young men (aged 20-25) 
engaged in medical scavenging about their experiences and the processes by which 
                                                 
at Karwan Bazar. Later on Salam identified those people involved in extreme forms of political violence 
as the rasta-kangali-oshohi (road-destitute-helpless), pointing over to the main road.  
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they came into scavenging. These authors found that a minority of respondents 
suffered serious caste discrimination; while many others had suffered sexual abuse 
and insecure family situations. The authors highlight problems of drug addiction (also 
highlighted by Koehlmoos et al. 2009) and the importance of social networks for 
survival, though do not examine their dynamics in any detail.  
Three surveys of ‘street dweller’s in Dhaka have collected detailed quantitative data 
(Begum 1997; Koehlmoos et al. 2009; BRAC 2011). Begum (1997) used a stratified 
proportionate random sampling procedure with 2761 individuals, focusing on 
migration and a small number of livelihood characteristics. Koehlmoos et al. (2009) 
used a purposive sampling method with 896 individuals (50 per cent men/women) and 
focuses primarily on health. Finally BRAC (2011) used a snowball sampling method 
with 2264 individuals and focused more generally on livelihoods. These studies differ 
significantly not only in the methods used, but also the specific questions and criteria 
used. This makes comparative analysis difficult; however a brief summary of what 
these studies found can be offered. It appears that women living in these circumstances 
experience more acute forms of poverty and vulnerability than men. BRAC (2011: 45) 
found that that 45 per cent of ‘street dwellers’ in Dhaka are women, and this is 
significantly higher than the 22.4 per cent found by Begum (1997), based on data from 
1991. This finding is particularly significant when contrasted regionally: in Delhi for 
example only 15 per cent are women (UNDP 2010: 35). BRAC found that almost 60 
per cent of women living in these conditions were unmarried, widowed, divorced or 
abandoned (though Koehlmoos et al (2009) found that only 39 per cent of women had 
these characteristics). Furthermore, BRAC found that the proportion of men who had 
lived on the streets for over 10 years was 17.9 per cent, while for women this was 30.1 
per cent. There is also some data that indicates women suffer significantly more 
physical abuse than men. For Koehlmoos et al (2009) 83 per cent of women reported 
having been assaulted while living on the street, and for men this figure was 29 per 
cent. 
Together, this data could suggest that there is a concentration of women who are 
abandoned and who may also be associated with the streets for a longer period. 
Alongside this however, as noted in the previous section, Koehlmoos et al (2009) also 
found that when asked why they lived on the ‘street’ (including transport teminals, 
parks etc.) 33 per cent of women answered that they were comfortable staying in a 
street dweller ‘cluster’, while 34 per cent reported that it was because others from their 
area of origin lived there. The sense of people living with others from their home 
district, and of people having lived in such spaces for long periods 111 , radically 
challenge the idea that people are “floating”, but rather suggests that people are 
embedded in particular spaces. Furthermore, though physically separate from their 
home village, for some people at least there is still a connection to their bari through 
the communities in which they live in Dhaka. Qualitative work from Conticini (2005) 
                                                 
111 BRAC’s (2011) survey found that 16.6% of men, and 23.3% of women had lived in their location 
for between 5-10 years, while 17.9% of men and 30.1% of women had lived there for over 10 years. 
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Conticini and Hulme (2007) and also Ghafur (2001), which fed into cross country 
work by Tipple and Speak (2006), suggests that the relationships that these people 
maintain with rural homes can be far greater than the language of being torn from ones 
roots implies. These findings resonate with the descriptions from the first half of this 
chapter.  
The picture being built from existing studies on the kangali in Dhaka is therefore one 
that already questions popular perceptions about these people, and suggests nuances 
and complexities to their livelihoods. While this literature is of background relevance, 
it does not offer significant insight into the core areas of interest within this thesis. 
Two pieces of research published during the course of this thesis are of far greater 
relevance (Atkinson-Sheppard 2015; BRAC 2016). Both of these studies examine the 
political economy of street children in Dhaka, offering account from children of how 
they are involved in political violence and crime. BRAC (2016) describe how political 
leaders and activists termed boro bhai (big brother) involve children in political 
violence, forcing them or incentivising them through money or drugs, to fulfil tasks 
such as carrying bombs or throwing molatov cocktails. Strikingly, of the 69 children 
involved in the BRAC study, 10 children had been approached for such activities in 
the three months preceding the research. Atkinson-Sheppard (2015) substantiates this, 
but also suggests wider roles that such street children are involved in, including land-
grabbing in slums, collecting extortion money, selling drugs and contract killing. 
Though focused solely on children, these studies suggest the kangali have a close 
connection to a social order premised on dispersed capability for violence, and 
characterised in Bangladesh by party political competition.  
5.3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced the people and places at the centre of this thesis. While 
studies on the ‘urban poor’ in Bangladesh often focus on well-established and partially 
serviced bosti, this thesis examines the lives of people living in the open or in the most 
basic bosti. These people are subject to strong characterisations in public discourse, 
and are perceived as floating and rootless, disconnected from wider society. 
Internationally they are labelled ‘squatters’ or ‘street dwellers’, however the Bengali 
term kangali is adopted here as the most authentic term used in the contexts described. 
These people typically work as labourers, scavengers, beggars, and a small number 
are sex workers. A group particularly focused upon in subsequent chapters are called 
jupri, a group of market labourers who have grown up at Karwan Bazar, where they 
continue to live and work. Using the theoretical framework developed in chapter two, 
and examined through literature and historical sources from Bangladesh in chapter 
three, the following chapters examine the dynamics of intermediation and social order 
through the microcosm of people living in Karwan Bazar, on some pavements and in 




6. THE CHANGING FACE OF URBAN ORDER 
 
Karwan Bazar used to run under the godfather but now everything runs under 
politics 
Rubel, jupri group boro bhai 
While the kangali may be portrayed as disconnected from Bangladeshi society, as 
rootless or wandering, this thesis argues that they are in fact closely integrated into the 
social order. This and subsequent chapters argue that the kangali often depend on a 
complex web of powerful actors to access the resources that they need to pursue their 
livelihoods and interests. These relationships contribute to maintaining the capability 
for violence of the lowest levels of the ruling coalition and thereby are part of the 
dynamics by which social order is maintained. Unlike in large bosti, access to space 
for living is not in general mediated financially. Furthermore, the majority of kangali 
do not depend on centralised services such as water, gas or electricity. Where the 
kangali are closely dependent on other actors for resources is in terms of personal 
security, employment and the right to do business. Day to day life is therefore often 
premised on maintaining, building and negotiating these relationships.  
Descriptions of the need for such dependencies are common, and expressed in diverse 
ways. Marium, who used to live on Panto Kunjo pavement, the bosti as she described 
it, but now works as a cleaner at an NGO shelter where she also stays, described the 
situation to me: 
If you are living on the streets who will give you work? You have no address, 
you have no identity [porichoy nai], you are homeless [basto-hara]. You can 
work, but who will provide you work? Let’s talk about me, if I’m starving for 
two days, I didn’t eat anything, where will I go? If someone gave me work, I 
would go, but who will give it to me? You have to be very self-driven to go to 
find your own work, because you are hungry. I can say to someone, I will wash 
your pots, you can give me 5 taka and I will eat rice, but only if I am known to 
them, if I’m not known, then how will I ask? 
Marium’s sister Monwara, who still lives by the side of Pantho Kunjo pavement, 
expressed another need - there’s no “security” here on the streets. We don’t have 
guards like in the buildings. Naseema, a middle aged woman who interestingly 
described herself as a kangali, but is also an Awami League Hawkers leader near 
Osmani Uddyan park, told me that if you want to live on the streets you have to have 
someone… He might be a boyfriend or a husband, it doesn’t matter. The relationships 
identified and the vocabulary through which people express these needs differ. More 
abstractly, it may be spoken of as having “backing” from senior people, or being under 
someone. To find work you might need a “reference”. However more directly it may 
be described as having someone, having a boro bhai (big brother), having an “uncle”, 
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having a relationship with a leader. Aziz, an NGO field worker with boys at Karwan 
Bazar, described the situation like this: 
You need to keep a good relationship with the boro bhai to keep safe or to get 
work. If you don’t, then you can’t sleep on the streets, you might be tortured. 
But then the boro bhai themselves might also torture you or steal your money 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand key forms of intermediation common in 
the lives of the kangali. Findings provide evidence for the theorised relationship 
between intermediation, the ‘ruling coalition’ and the capability for violence. This 
enables subsequent chapters to delve deeper into the forms of intermediation that the 
kangali depend upon, and examine how the kangali negotiate their lives and status’ 
within this order.   
Across the research sites a relatively consistent picture was built of key actors to whom 
the kangali looked to maintain access to the resources they need to pursue their 
livelihoods and interests. The actors identified however challenge common 
understandings of intermediation in urban Bangladesh. Chapter three explored how 
mastan gangs have been identified as prevalent and powerful intermediaries in the 
lives of the urban poor. Using the case study of an infamous gangster at Karwan Bazar, 
as well as supporting evidence from secondary locations in Dhaka, the first half of this 
chapter argues that mastan gangs have declined significantly since the early 2000s. 
Many of the roles associated with these actors however continue, but now under an 
explicitly party political guise, controlled by wings and associated bodies of the ruling 
Awami League. This argument suggests that the capability for violence is now more 
greatly concentrated and institutionalised within political parties, a process that has in 
fact led to a significant decrease in physical violence in the lives of the kangali.  
The second half of this chapter argues that today the kangali relate to a complex web 
of intermediaries dominated by the ruling Awami League and the police. These actors 
are closely associated with the capability for violence, and can be seen as constituting 
the lowest level rungs of the ‘ruling coalition’ as conceptualised in chapter two112. The 
kangali are obliged to adhere to the interests of these actors, and this is enforced 
through the threat and use of violence. At the same time, the kangali are a valuable 
source of labour for political purposes, as well as money through chanda (toll, 
extortion). Labour leaders are a critical intermediary in the lives of the kangali who 
often position those working underneath them in relation to party politics and the 
ruling coalition. Examining this web of actors and the terms of these relationships 
helps frame an examination of labour leaders in the next chapter.  
 
                                                 
112 It should be noted that establishing how these actors relate to one another as well as this wider 
coalition is beyond the remit of this thesis, however that they do so, can be taken as given from what 
we know about Bangladeshi politics, as well as the perceptions of the kangali. 
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6.1. THE DECLINE OF MASTAN GANGS 
Prior to conducting research at Karwan Bazar I had been warned by former colleagues 
and friends that it was a violent, dangerous place, certainly not somewhere to go at 
night. After a couple of months of researching there I however began reflecting on 
people’s warnings. Aside from the odd fight and jostling for work, I had seen little 
evidence of significant violence, and started to suspect I had been duped by some 
upper class hysteria. And so I asked people, such as the labourers in the jupri group, 
what the bazar used to be like. Responses were clear and theatrical. You wouldn’t have 
been able to come here back then, many people told me. You would have been robbed 
as soon as you arrived, this nice phone, gone, your “money bag”, gone, a member of 
the group Nazir explained. Words were often accompanied by gestures. Bang bang 
bang pistols firing, the whistle of bombs being thrown overhead, the guttural noise of 
a knife meeting flesh.  
Through these conversations I learnt that from roughly the late 1980s until the early 
2000s gangsters had dominated Dhaka. These are referenced through terms such as 
mastan, the shontrash, the “top terror”, the godfather, who were portrayed in films, 
infamous throughout the country, evoking fear and glamour, reminiscent of the mafia 
in the West. Names rung out and became almost mythologised by the public. But 
across Dhaka today if you ask people about these figures, about how or where they 
operate, you will most likely hear one of the following, all of which I was often told: 
the mastan are from the past, they have no importance now; they have been killed; 
they have fled to India; they are in prison; they have become beggars. Within Dhaka, 
Karwan Bazar is perceived by many as having been the nerve centre of these gangsters, 
and within Karwan Bazar one name stood above the rest: Picchi Hannan113. It is 
through understanding the rise and fall of this famous gangster that the main arguments 
of this section will be told. 
6.1.1. PICCHI HANNAN AND THE ERA OF MASTAN 
Picchi Hannan was from a village in Chandpur district, to the south east of Dhaka114. 
He came to the city after failing class seven at school when he must have been in his 
early teens, and joined his father and brothers who were already established and 
working at Karwan Bazar. As one informant described it, he first lived on the road at 
Karwan Bazar, at that time everyone lived on the road! Through the 1970s and 80s 
the city saw a mass influx of migrants, often settling wherever they could, on 
pavements, banks of canals or adjacent to the railway line. Hannan found work in the 
nearby Central Storage Depots (CSD) godown, a government warehouse just northeast 
                                                 
113 Picchi is a colloquial way of saying ‘short’ and can be used to refer to young children.  
114 Descriptions here are made firstly on the basis of interviews and discussions with people who knew 
Picchi Hannan personally at Karwan Bazar. This includes someone who described himself as having 
been his karam board and gambling partner in youth, as well as established business owners, labourers, 
and former members of his gang. Secondly, analysis is based on a number of secondary sources, pieced 
together primarily from references in the media. Undoubtedly with a figure of his stature, myth often 
overtakes reality. Furthermore this account should only be considered a sketch, partial and incomplete, 
and as therefore a call to further research.  
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of the bazar. There he worked as a coolie for a couple of years, though left apparently 
because the work was too irregular. His father was a rice seller, a retailer rather than a 
wholesaler, who sold on the roadside at the bazar. Retailers open primarily during the 
day and wholesalers at night, so Picchi Hannan used to hang his mosquito net up next 
to the bags of rice and sleep there, guarding his father’s small business. Other sources 
inaccurately cite his roots as a tokai, but truthfully point to his humble past. He was 
then very much like the labourers you find today, a poor young man sleeping at the 
market.  
By the mid 80s Hannan had got married, apparently a “love marriage”115, and began 
working as a security guard for a daily wage. He also became known as a good fighter, 
he was a good “cadre”, he had the guts to fight (ghushi tushi shahoj), a friend in his 
youth explained. When called to fight in the area he would go. Around this time the 
nature of urban power was changing in ways that set the stage for Hannan’s rise 
through the 1990s and early 2000s. As discussed in chapter three, under President 
Ershad the capability for violence of a wider set of actors were drawn upon in order to 
retain control over society (Khan 2010a). At Karwan Bazar this was seen with new 
levels of political organisation at the street level, new makeshift political clubs, no 
more than tin shacks emerged (as many are today), where people met, discussed 
politics, had adda (gossip), and where food and relief were also distributed. More 
specifically, one informant described President Ershad attempting to galvinise support 
for his Jatiyo Party in the run up to the 1986 election by doubling worker’s wages if 
they joined his party116. Descriptions of life at the bazar at this time indicate a new 
degree of political involvements by the urban poor, and in particular labourers.  
At the same time, it is at this period that informants identified gangs as taking on a 
greater significance at the lowest levels of urban life117. Though there is evidence of 
the presence of goonda in Dhaka’s history is undoubted, the scale of mastani during 
the 1990s suggests a new level of organisation. Across Dhaka mastan gangs controlled 
territory under clear leaders. To varying degrees they were sheltered politically, and 
grew within political regimes, yet were also opportunistic and could switch allegiances 
(Devine 2007). It is the leaders and members of these gangs that are commonly 
referred to through terms such as shontrash, mastan or godfather. Picchi Hannan came 
under the shelter of the Jatiyo party, and during Ershad’s rule he went from being a 
good person, a labourer (mojur), a poor man, as an informant described him, to 
fighting his way to be a “chief” of a “unit”, ruling a “side” or “portion” of Karwan 
Bazar. But at this stage he was still only a low level player in a sea of mastan. As has 
also been documented elsewhere (Ahmed 2004), Picchi Hannan rose up the ranks 
through his relationship with Sweden Aslam who was the top shontrash in the area. 
Some say they met in prison in the mid 90s, and he capitalised on Aslam’s re-arrest in 
                                                 
115 The term “love marriage” is often used in Bengali to refer to when a couple have married after 
falling in love as opposed to the marriage being arranged by family.  
116 I have been unfortunately unable to verify this, and it should be the subject of further research.  
117 While there are some brief references to the emergence of the mastan in the late 1980s, there is no 
detail, and this should be the subject of future research.   
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1997, effectively taking over control from him. What is clear is that by the late 1990s 
he had emerged as the premier godfather in the area. His territory was seen by some 
as focusing around the bazar, while people from the area see him as having been the 
premier mastan across the city. Abul, a labourer who grew up at the bazar, described 
him to me as having been the king of Dhaka118.  
Having risen to power Picchi Hannan was simultaneously connected to politics and 
government, while also being a wanted man. He used to have to move from shelter to 
shelter to avoid capture by the police, and people recall seeing him surrounded by his 
bodyguards, describing him as small, hence his name picchi, and fat because he never 
did manual work. He had a reputation for spending his time doing drugs and with 
women. Though wanted, he was also sheltered politically, as one informant who was 
a friend of his during their youth described 
When Jatiyo Party was in power, he was doing Jatiyo party. When BNP were 
in power, he did BNP. When Dr. Ali119 came to power he started working for 
him. He worked for whichever party was in power. 
Part of these relationships involved sending labour to political rallies and meetings, 
though the dynamics of these connections were undoubtedly more complicated. 
Despite these affiliations he is not perceived by people who were within his gang and 
knew him personally, as having had an explicitly party political identity, and the quote 
above suggests a high degree of independence. In fact, some of the lower level wings 
of the political parties were his rivals. Recognising this is central to understanding the 
subsequent shifts in power explored in the next section. The same informant describes 
events following the 1996 general election victory for the Awami League 
A lot of members of Jubo League at Karwan Bazar were killed. At that time 
they were powerful. So he killed most of them. Jubo League’s Ward Secretary 
Khaleque, killed. Jubo League’s President Hanif, killed. Jubo League’s next 
secretary Delu, killed. Jubo Dal members were also killed. He killed Jubo 
Dal’s secretary, but he killed more of the League than the Dal. He would kill 
whoever wanted to do extortion using political power. He wanted to do the 
extortion on his own.  
Despite being politically affiliated Picchi Hannan and similar figures are not 
perceived by those who knew them as principally having had power on the basis of 
their status within political institutions or party political connections, but rather on the 
basis of the gang they could mobilise beneath them. At his height Hannan is described 
by many as having controlled a network of over 2000 people structured hierarchically 
                                                 
118 This is not to suggest that he was, but emphasises how powerful he was perceived to be, particularly 
by the labourers at Karwan Bazar.  
119 The name here is anonymised but refers to a former local Awami League MP and a current high 
profile businessman.  
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with clearly delineated roles120. He reportedly had five bodyguards. Each bodyguard 
was himself in charge of a hundred or hundreds of men. Among the rank and file 
members of the gang, some were armed, others were informers, and some were in the 
reserve force, ready to be called when needed. Some were drug dealers on the rail line 
mentioned in the previous chapter, selling mostly phensedyl, the drug of choice across 
the north of the sub-continent at the time. Nazir, now a labourer in the jupri group, 
used to be one of twenty phensedyl sellers under Hannan. He grew up at Karwan Bazar 
after running away from a madrassa as a child. He explained his involvement to me: 
I used to sell phensoldyl on the rail line, there used to be a spot for drugs there. 
All the robbers and thieves used to come to the point to buy from us. I used to 
work under him [Picchi Hannan] so it wasn’t risky for him but just for me. 
When I worked under him I did all sorts of work like stealing, hijacking, 
beating people, even shooting people and throwing bombs. In the morning 
there used to be bombings and shootings, you might even see dead bodies when 
he was here… Then I was put in prison for three years.  
Labourers would describe Nazir and others as having been a rongbaj (gangster). For 
leaders like Picchi Hannan the kangali represented a labour force, and for the kangali, 
the mastan networks were a job market. Young kangali boys often live without their 
parents, without their families, on the basis of relationships and networks they have 
developed since coming to Dhaka. Children living without families were attracted to 
the offer of money, hope of glamour and respect. Even today you see how young boys 
and teenagers adopt styles associated with the godfather and mastan: chains, bracelets, 
rings, partly cropped haircuts (though this is also inspired by the popular footballer 
Neymar). Working under a mastan – being a rongbaj (gangster), be it collecting 
chanda, being an informer, a lookout, a shooter, a drug dealer - represented a 
significant opportunity. All offered a route to a better more glamorous life. Rashid, an 
NGO field worker who worked with street children at Karwan Bazar for a number of 
years, told me how lots of big mastan have come through the centres. This connection 
has also been recognised in Kolkata; writing of the colonial period Ghosh (1991: 5-6) 
notes how ‘rootless’ people (chinomul) living on the side of the road joined the goonda 
underworld. 
Gangs of the size of Hannan’s were organised factionally, and his gang therefore 
consisted of a number of smaller groups. Labourers described to me how Karwan 
Bazar itself was divided between separate choto (small) godfather, each controlling 
particular areas and businesses in the bazar. These were described as correlating 
broadly to the way in which the bazar is now divided between areas of labour and 
                                                 
120 There is an interesting parallel to criminals from an earlier era, which also demonstrates the long-
standing links between the ruling coalition and organised crime. Referring to the 18th century Taylor 
(1840: 276) wrote of the gangs of armed dacoits who roamed East Bengal, robbing and murdering – 
‘they formed organized bands, frequently amounting to 1,500 men in number, and headed by daring 




supply of goods. Groups of labourers were integrated into these gangs and in fact many 
of the earliest mastan were labour leaders121, as a long-term resident of the bazar 
described  
The first big mastan in Karwan Bazar was a butcher called Piare Mahzan, of 
Koshipotti [butchers place], he united all the butchers… Then there was the 
truck drivers. Hundreds of truck drivers united with their helpers and started 
doing mastani… There was Kancham, a coolie sardar, he was a big mastan, 
he was Picchi Hannan opposition [potipoko].  
Hannan became extraordinary wealthy through creating monopolies at the market, 
dealing in drugs, prostitution and arms, kidnapping and extortion, protection 
racketeering, and taking slices of government contracts122. But rather than taking 
money from the poor, he was seen as taking money from the rich. The moral ambiguity 
of mastan described previously is also evident here. He was for example described as 
a terrible person, but also as having had a lot of affection (dorot) for poor people, 
building hospitals and mosques. Despite this, everyone was scared of his name as a 
jupri labourer Abul described123. At Karwan Bazar he operated a vast network of toll 
collecting/protection racketeering (chanda) from businesses in the area, and Ahmed 
(2004: 104) cites his income from this source alone as being over one million taka a 
month, though if anything this seems a conservative estimate. Locals explained how 
the vegetable wholesalers would be regularly kidnapped. Hannan would send 15 to 20 
of his men to capture someone, take them to a private place and start torturing them. 
They would have to pay 50,000 even 1 or 2 lakh124 taka to be set free. Similarly, if 
someone was constructing a building they would have to give 5, 10, 15 lakh to his 
group or the workers would be beaten and construction forced to shut. One role of the 
informers was to monitor who was doing well, and who would be targeted next. At 
Karwan Bazar he also enforced monopolies on certain goods to maximise his income, 
as a childhood friend of his described: 
When Picchi Hannan was in power, only two businessmen could sell Indian 
tomatoes here, and no-one else. If someone else tried to sell them, Picchi 
Hannan’s people would kidnap them… When tomatoes were imported from 
India for 40 taka per KG they would be sold for 55 taka per KG, making 15 
taka profit. If everyone could sell them, they would sell for 42 taka per KG, 
because 2 taka profit would be enough. But people weren’t allowed to. Only 
Picchi Hannan’s people could sell tomatoes. That “murgi milon”125 made 
                                                 
121 This therefore nuances Khan’s (2000) portrayal of sardar as underneath mastan, demonstrating how 
these forms of organization intertwined, in line descriptions from Kolkata of how sardar could become 
goonda.   
122 He apparently constructed Babul Tower, which he named after a friend, and stands today to the north 
of the bazar.  
123 There are echoes here of a ‘social bandit’ (Hobsbawm 1959). 
124 A lakh is one hundred thousand. 
125 Murgi milon (chicken milon) was a famous mastan of the time, killed in 2000 by a rival, reportedly 
tokai sagar (scavenger sagar) of another gangster kala jahangir’s group (black Jahangir).  
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crores of taka by selling tomatoes. They gave a portion of the profit to Picchi 
Hannan. When chicken was 80 taka a KG, only Picchi Hannan’s people would 
sell them. This is how they controlled business.  
This period of Dhaka’s history is associated with extreme forms of day-to-day 
violence and insecurity, as has been evidenced in some of the descriptions above, and 
was clear from research across the city, not only at Karwan Bazar. Rubel, who we 
have heard of already, explained how ordinary people could just be standing around 
chatting and then a bomb would hit them, one losing a leg, another a hand. The clearest 
source of violence was inter-gang rivalry. Nazir explained why this was the case 
Before there were lots of groupings, I used to work for one big brother, you 
used to work for another, so if you kill one big brother then you will get 
contract money from the boss, and your boss will be able to take over that 
group.  
Throughout Dhaka areas were associated with the name of a mastan group, often 
prefixed with a defining characteristic – for example black, small, scavenger, destitute, 
chicken, Bihari, Sweden, BBC - as also seen from the references so far. Across Dhaka 
people recall the names of the previous mastan who were dominant in that area. Near 
Osmani Uddyan park I came across the name Kangali Zakir (destitute Zakir), who a 
journalist described as being little more than a choto mastan! He was a “snatcher”, a 
“hijacker”. He had 5 or 7 people under him. He killed a Sergeant/sub-inspector who 
tried to capture him, and then he became famous. Though famous beyond his station, 
he maintained a “group” or a dal, as it was described by women who knew him 
personally. With his group he used to collect chanda locally and hijack people in 
wealthy areas, cutting their throats, as one of the women described it. Despite being a 
mastan his behaviour was good, and local people used to call him “uncle”, and boro 
bhai. Though he (at least was perceived) to earn one lakh a day through theft and 
chanda, he had a group to maintain, used to drink and gamble. Naseema, who lived 
near him, explained 
He lived beside the “dustbin”. He moved up slowly slowly slowly. His mother 
was a beggar and one of his sisters is blind and still begs. Another of his 
sister’s sells chocolate. 
In the case of Picchi Hannan it was the threat of rivals at a higher level than the likes 
of kangali Zakir that were the primary source of violence, as his childhood friend 
described: 
There was the Ali group, Saidul group, Roton Asiq group, Selim group… this 
side Sweden Aslam, this side Picchi Hannan, that side Prokash-Bikash group 
in Mirpur, Asif in Puran Dhaka, Imon group in Dhanmondi, another group in 
Mohakali… There was a competition to show off who was the most powerful. 
If they weren’t pushed back, they would take control.  
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A further reason for high levels of violence was factional conflict within Hannan’s 
group. As the same informant described it, under him there were lots of people who 
wanted to be Picchi Hannan. Mohammed, a labourer in the jupri group, described the 
situation in the late 90s and early 2000s 
There used to be lots of fighting between the jupri and other groups. We used 
to be on two sides running against each and fighting. The trucks used to be left 
at the side not even unloaded! We would fight, then sleep, then the whistle 
would come and we would run and fight again 
When describing the situation, Parvez, a leader of the group, said the situation used to 
be bad, we fought because of “mafia”. The history of this period is one people often 
do not want to talk about it, they do not like to think about. Some people get angry 
when they are reminded of what they used to do and who they used to be. Some of the 
children and young adults working at the bazar today are the relatives, sons or 
daughters, of the mastan of this previous generation. Monir, a young labourer at the 
bazar who stays at the Aparajeyo centre and often styles his hair into a mohawk 
emulating Neymar, was the son of Babul, a locally famous mastan under Picchi 
Hannan. A younger rickshaw van driver Sayeed described him: As Karwan Bazar 
people were scared of the name Hannan, like this they were also scared of the name 
Babul, because he used to capture people and beat them. And sometimes kill them.  
Despite his power, wealth and fame, a few years later in the early 2000s Picchi Hannan 
was in the custody of Bangladesh’s elite force the newly formed Rapid Action 
Batallion (RAB) and later allegedly executed by them. Understanding this and the 
subsequent transition in power is critical for understanding the nature of the ruling 
coalition and social order in Dhaka today. 
6.1.2. RAB AND THE FURTHER RISE OF PARTY POLITICS  
The days of there being these big brothers are finished, many have died, many are 
drug addicts, many are beggars and many just steal from beggars. 
Naseema, a low-level Hawkers League leader 
In 2001 the BNP returned to power with a public commitment to bring an end to the 
high levels of violence and crime seen in Dhaka and throughout Bangladesh. Powerful 
urban gangs that were identified as central to this, and the government offered rewards 
for information leading to the capture of “23 top terror”, including Picchi Hannan. In 
late 2002 this mission got a name, ‘Operation Clean Heart’ and was driven by the mass 
deployment of the military. As a result, many top mastan fled to India, often sheltering 
in Kolkata, as was the case for Hannan who even earned a reference in the BBC (2002). 
Despite around 10,000 people being arrested, crime and violence continued, the 
mastan resumed their business (Human Rights Watch 2006), and the mission appeared 
to have failed. This effort was however given a major boost with the formation of the 
Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in 2004. RAB is an elite force formed from the police 
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and army, designed to fight terrorism and high-level crime. Often called a “death 
squad” in international media, they initially received training from the British, and 
became infamous internationally for extrajudicial killings, euphemistically termed 
crossfire in Bangla (The Guardian 2010a; 2010b)126. When people at Karwan Bazar 
and Dhaka in general respond that the mastan have been killed, it is usually followed 
by RAB killed them. 
Having returned to Bangladesh after years spent in hiding, Picchi Hannan was almost 
apprehended on the 25th of June 2004. Bangladesh’s The Daily Star reported that RAB 
had attempted to arrest Hannan and some members of his gang in Uttara, north Dhaka. 
The account describes the ‘notorious’ Hannan and his gang shooting their way through 
a ‘40-member strong Rab team’ before getting away in a car under gunfire and with 
one tyre burst (The Daily Star 2004a). Such events have since fed public imagination, 
strengthening him as a heroic figure, someone who was able to take RAB on. It appears 
from reports that he was however arrested the next day while receiving treatment for 
bullet wounds in Savar, north of Dhaka (The Daily Star 2004b).127 Having been taken 
into custody, Picchi Hannan was allegedly killed by RAB on the 6th of August128. In 
a pattern that became a trademark, RAB reported that they had taken Hannan with 
them to arrest some of his accomplices and he had died in an ensuing gun battle 
(Human Rights Watch 2006: 26). This pattern has become known as crossfire. This 
represented the first high profile success for RAB and reportedly sent a serious 
message of intent to other such figures (Ibid).  
The subsequent role of RAB arresting or killing many of the mastan was not confined 
to the figureheads, but also took out those lower in the hierarchy. After the death of 
Hannan, Babul, for example, was shot in the feet by RAB. Though not killed, he was 
permanently disabled in what appears to be a common but lower form of punishment 
meted out by RAB. The once powerful Babul became known as lengra Babul (crippled 
Babul). He became an addict, slept at the bazar and recently died of an overdose. It is 
this sense of mastan fading away that was described by the low-level Hawkers League 
leader at the beginning of this section. Similarly, immediately following Hannan’s 
death Sahib Ali, one of his bodyguards, took control of his network at Karwan Bazar, 
before himself also allegedly being killed by RAB129.  
                                                 
126 As Human Rights Watch (2006) note however, crossfire is not only the domain of RAB, with the 
police significantly involved in such killings.  
127 A letter to the editor of The Daily Star (dated July 26th 2004) asks ‘Picchi Hannan reportedly offered 
a little gift of Tk 50 lakh to RAB officials. Who are the other men who enjoyed the gifts of Picchi 
Hannan in the past?’ (The Daily Star 2004c).  
128 In leaked classified cables from the US Embassy in Dhaka from 2005, the death of Picchi Hannan 
is referenced, stating ‘opposition figures alleged that Hannan and victims with BNP links were killed 
to protect BNP “godfathers”’ (US Embassy cable 2005).  
129 Descriptions also suggest that the public played a role in the downfall of mastan. A young labourer 
Mamun described seeing the public beating of a former “godfather” from Karwan Bazar: They beat him 
with a five-kilo weight. They started hitting his head again and again, and on his feet and every joint. 
The public beat him... His name was Ditton. He was set on fire. After all of this, he didn’t die!... You 
can’t believe how severely he was beaten. But it’s strange, every time he could still stand up and run 
away. He would run away, be caught and then again be beaten. Even after being set on fire he didn’t 
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Over the coming years RAB and the police radically changed the fabric of urban 
society in Bangladesh, killing or arresting many other mastan, and forcing others to 
flee to India as fugitives. Some mastan however managed to move into party politics, 
becoming leaders of the various wings to the ruling party. Some are identified in 
Karwan Bazar as having become vegetable wholesalers. Those lower level rongbaj 
who were not killed or imprisoned became small business owners or labourers. Nazir, 
who we heard from earlier, explained the significance of this:  
when I was in jail RAB arrested my boss and shot him, all of his gang scattered 
and went in different directions to save their lives, and so the group ended. It’s 
because of this that it’s completely different to before.  
This sense that the situation today is completely different to before, and that these 
gangsters are from a past era, was a common one. In Karwan Bazar and secondary 
research sites a peculiar transition in power has occurred, with many of the roles 
associated with these gangs very clearly continuing. Hence you will often hear there 
are no mastan here now, but there are evidently murky, dangerous, often armed, 
figures running any given locality. Rather than being mastan gangs, the key figures 
identified as powerful today are almost always explicitly party political. In Karwan 
Bazar for example the party wings that had been rivals to Picchi Hannan, that had 
been sidelined or subservient, have become dominant. Nozrul, a young vegetable 
wholesaler, explained this transition in power: 
There used to be many shontrash here. They used to extort people, take money 
from them. These killers were shontrash, but they weren’t involved in politics. 
Now these types of offences have been reduced but what has happened? Now 
the people on the government’s side are doing the same thing! Haven’t you 
seen them? Now all day they stick posters on the walls, they are all thieves. 
They have captured this place and after capturing it take money from people 
on the street. Isn’t it torture? 
One journalist described this change to me in terms of there being no non-political 
criminals now. It is the wings of the ruling party that have taken control, for example 
the jubo league (youth league), chattro league (students league) and Sramik league 
(workers league), and this was a common finding across Dhaka. It is they who are now 
pre-eminent in ensuring local security (or insecurity), who are regulating businesses, 
calling people to political meetings, collecting chanda and generally taking their cut. 
A newspaper report from 2009, documented this transition in Karwan Bazar, citing a 
vegetable wholesaler  
                                                 
die. He’s like a coy fish [a fish that can survive outside of water for a long time, and apparently even 
climb trees]… There’s nothing like these godfather now. The phenomenon of mastan being beaten, 
sometimes to death, by the public is one I heard of on a number of occasions in Dhaka. This 
phenomenon has some resonance with Hossain’s (2010) notion of ‘rude accountability’, albeit in a more 




After the death of Picchi Hannan, other extortionists had also gone into hiding 
and we were running our business smoothly. But soon after the formation of 
[the] new government, various groups introducing themselves as the leaders 
and activists of Chattra League, Jubo League and Sechhashebak League 
[volunteers league] have started visiting our business places and demanding 
tolls. Even these groups have been locked in clashes among themselves over 
establishing supremacy in the area. We are very much concerned and worried 
over such illegal toll collection from us by the associate bodies of ruling 
Awami League (The Bangladesh Today 2009) 
The notion of the decline in mastan is also supported by Hossain’s (2012) finding that 
in his studied area mastan were challenged around 2003 by local residents with the 
backing of some police and political leaders to retake control of the bosti bazar. The 
bazar has since been in the hands of ‘ruling political party supporters, but their 
activities are not that different to those of the previous mastaan group’ (Ibid: 213). At 
Osmani Uddyan park, the chanda networks run by the once powerful kangali Zakir 
and his gang are nor firmly under the control of the Jubo League and Sramik League. 
The rise of gangsters during the 1990s in Bangladesh was described in chapter three 
as representing the ‘criminalisation of politics’ (Sobhan 2004). What this more recent 
transition since the early 2000s seems to indicate is, to turn the phrase around, rather 
the further ‘party politicisation of criminality’. Understood within the LAO 
framework, the decline of gangsters in these contexts along with their replacement by 
party political actors suggests that the forms through which a capability for violence 
can be organised and successfully included into a ruling coalition have changed. 
It is important to note however that though mastan groups or gangs are not seen as 
dominant in Dhaka today, they have not been entirely killed off. I heard of previous 
gangs still operating in some minimal form in the slums of Mirpur for example, and 
this resonates with recent research (Atkinson-Sheppard 2016). Furthermore, the term 
mastan is still occasionally used, and at Karwan Bazar today it has two main meanings: 
it can be first used to refer to low level hijackers, some only just in their teens, who 
rob people coming from the train at nearby Tejgaon station, or perhaps cut through a 
CNG roof to take a mobile phone. This is similar to how people are described doing 
mastani (mastani kora) (Devine 2007). Second, mastan will occasionally be used to 
refer to armed fighters, sometimes also termed “killer”, who may be called to be 
involved in a fight, but who is not seen as having the control and power of the mastan 
from a previous era, and can in fact refer to party political actors130. 
Interestingly, the decline of mastan gangs has led to a significant decrease in day-to-
day violence, and this was a constitent finding across all research contexts. In the 
period of mastan gang rule, there was extreme inter-gang conflict, widespread 
hijacking and robberies, and high-risk employment opportunites for the kangali. 
                                                 
130 It should also be noted also that there are reports of once powerful mastan, for example Sweden 
Aslam, still in some capacity operating from behind the scenes, directing activities from inside prisons 
(Dhaka Tribune 2014).  
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Although there is still factional conflict, levels of violence and robberies have 
dramatically decreased. At Karwan Bazar this was clear from the experiences of larger 
businessmen as well as labourers. Though party political actors have power to extort 
businesses in open spaces, wholesalers described generally being protected from such 
extortion, and unlike before it is highly unlikely that they will be kidnapped and held 
to ransom. Elsewhere in Dhaka, a sewage worker living in Osmani Uddyan park 
expressed the transition like this: 
There’s a huge difference between then and now. 10 or 12 years ago we 
couldn’t sleep with that much money. The hijackers would come and beat us 
to take all our money. They would come with pistols and bombs and we 
wouldn’t dare to talk to them because we were afraid. But now we aren’t 
tortured like this. When the Awami League came into power these things 
stopped. There used to be hijackers inside this place from 6pm to the azam. 
They were here the whole night. After this government came they put one 
truckload of police here all night, and another truck on that corner, and 
another in front of Nagar Bhaban, and another in front of the High Court. Now 
they have put border guards on the streets.  
Only tentative answers can be offered to the question of why this transition has led to 
a decrease in overt violence, and this will be explored more in the conclusion. 
Furthermore, these arguments are not intended to suggest that these contexts are no 
longer violent. Indeed, the second half of this chapter argues that the capability for 
violence of the Awami League is in some senses greater than that of mastan gangs, 
due to the closer connection to the police and apparatus of the state. As will be 
explored in chapter eight, there are still extremely violent forms of competition as 
factions attempt to enter into the ruling coalition, challenge their control over 
resources, or form a new coalition. The following section examines the intermediaries 
prevalent in the lives of the kangali today and offers insight into the nature of the 
relationships the kangali have with them.  
6.2. INTERMEDIARIES AND THE RULING COALITION 
David brother, do you know who the biggest shontrash in Bangladesh is? Them! The 
Awami League! 
Shumon, a jupri labourer, watching an Awami League meeting at Karwan Bazar 
 
The first half of this chapter argued that mastan gangs are no longer dominant in the 
lives of the kangali in Dhaka city, however that many of the roles once associated with 
these gangs continue under an explicitly party political guise, controlled by actors 
more closely integrated within the ruling political party. The remainder of this chapter 
deepens an understanding of who these actors are and how the kangali relate to them. 
The key argument developed is that access to personal security, employment and the 
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right to do business is often contingent on relationships with a set of actors oriented 
around the ruling political party and apparatus of the state, particularly the police. 
These actors are associated with a capability for violence, and - from the perspective 
of the kangali - are perceived as operating in coordination with one another, with low-
level Awami League politicians particularly able to control and draw upon the 
capability for violence of the police. These findings substantiate the posited 
relationship between a capability for violence and intermediation. A premise of this 
analysis is that social order stems from a ruling coalition maintaining a dominant 
capability for violence over rivals (North et al 2009), and that this coalition weaves 
down to the grass roots through factions (Khan 2010a). Although this overarching 
framework cannot be validated through understanding the lives of the kangali, 
evidence of the relationship between intermediation and a capability for violence 
provides indirect corroboration of this framework, and justifies the theorised 
relationship between violence and intermediation developed in chapter two. If the 
ruling coalition is dominated by party political actors (Khan 2010a) then evidence 
from the lives of the kangali suggests that the lowest rungs are dominated by the 
constitutent and affiliated bodies of the Awami League, as well as the police, who 
control Dhaka on a territorial basis.   
Across the research contexts, a consistent tapestry of actors emerge within and around 
these actors, as illustrated at the top half of figure seven131. This includes police and 
RAB informers, political leaders and followers including toll collectors known as 
linemen. The relationship between the kangali and these actors are oriented around 
two key processes: first, the extraction of financial benefits in exchange for access to 
resources such as personal security, work or the right to do business; second, party 
political actors also rely on the kangali to demonstrate their own capability for 
violence, and they are particularly used as a resource for more extreme forms of 
violence. The interests of these actors are enforced through violence, sometimes 
utilising or threatening to utilise, the police or courts. This is not however to suggest 
that these relationships cannot have more complicated dynamics – and descriptions of 
these will be given – but to emphasise that the kangali are often perceived as of little 
value other than as a source of violence or money. 
Alongside these party political actors and the police sit a range of actors who have a 
more ambiguous status in relation to the ruling coalition. NGOs operate to a limited 
extent as intermediaries in the lives of the kangali. They do not have a direct capability 
for violence, and rarely confront the interests of ruling party actors where they have 
conflicting interests; and the way in which they operate to some extent aligns with the 
interests of actors within this coalition. Guards and sweepers do have a direct 
capability for violence, which they occasionally utilise to extract chanda, however 
                                                 
131 Figure 3 distinguishes between kangali, organized labour and businesses in open spaces. All three 
categories describe the kangali, however the latter two categories are intended to describe arrangements 
and relationships specific to people in these areas of work.  
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they do not feature prominently in the research contexts132. Finally – and perhaps more 
ambiguously – organised labour often have a very clear capability for violence, they 
control resources (contracts for work for example) and have often very close 
relationships to political parties. Organised labour has a complex relationship to actors 
within the ruling coalition, and are often a means through which political parties 
develop and demonstrate a capability for violence. The rest of this chapter therefore 
helps frame what the social order looks like at this level of society, while the next 
chapter offers a more detailed account and cases of labour leaders as a prominent 














                                                 
132 It should be acknowledged that there are further forms of intermediation present in the lives of the 
kangali, such as the village networks that often bring people to particular street-slums in Dhaka city, 
friendship groups and religious networks around mazar. In general however these operate in an 
environment dominated by the forms of intermediation focused upon here, hence the focus of this and 
subsequent chapters.  
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6.2.1. CONTROLLING THE STREETS 
For the kangali to operate a business on the pavement, to be secure or to seek 
opportunities, relationships with important and powerful actors are often necessary133. 
The lower levels of urban life in Dhaka city are principally controlled by a coalition 
of actors centred around the Awami League and the police. A primary means by which 
the Awami League have a presence at this level of society are through their affiliated 
and member organisations, including the Chattro League (a student organisation 
working under the Awami League), Jubo League (the youth wing of the Awami 
League) and Sramik League (a federation of trade unions tied to the Awami League). 
These are organised by, and spread across, Dhaka’s 93 wards (across Dhaka North and 
South City Corporations). Leaders with formal designation of ward level Awami 
League organisations (for example the presidents and secretaries) are often referred to 
through the terms “leader”, neta (leader) or more often and colloquially boro bhai (big 
brother). Similar to the term dada in India, boro bhai can have strong and explicitly 
political connotations134. At the same time, the term boro bhai is used more generally 
in Bangladeshi society to indicate hierarchy, respect and dependencies. People without 
designation underneath Awami League leaders may also be referred to in this way, as 
are labour leaders and as were the mastan of a former era. Zakir, a young labourer at 
Karwan Bazar, explained the transition in boro bhai at Karwan Bazar 
Previously the Karwan Bazar boys were powerful, but now they don’t have 
that much power. There were lots of boro bhai, but now there aren’t any. 
There’s been lots of change. There aren’t boro bhai like before. They’ve left to 
do different work like garments, they’ve changed their lives. Now the people 
who have the power are the ones who are in the political party, they are the 
boro bhai now. 
Asking the kangali across Dhaka who the boro bhai, neta or “leader” are in any 
particular area will most often lead to the identification of a leader in a wing of the 
Awami League. At Karwan Bazar Ahmed bhai, Palash bhai, Maola bhai (Golam 
Maula Chowdhury Mala 135 ) from the Tejgaon Awami League are all commonly 
identified as key figures.  
Political leaders are supported by followers who are commonly termed cadre. Similar 
to its use in English, cadre has connotations of a standing army or a force. Cadre are 
                                                 
133 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, labour leaders are critical intermediaries but have 
been purposefully excluded from the descriptions here and are the subject of the next chapter. This 
chapter helps frame the environment in which labour leaders operate, and also helps understand the 
lives of the kangali who do not work through labour leaders. 
134 A recent headline in The Daily Star (2015), asked simply ‘who is the big bro?’ in response to claims 
that the killing of an Italian man had been directed by a mid-ranking BNP leader. 
135 The same Maula that allegedly ordered the Chattro League to throw bricks at Khaleda Zia’s convoy 
when she campaigned at Karwan Bazar for the Dhaka City North Corporation mayoral election later in 
April 2015 (NewsBangladesh 2015). 
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sometimes derogatorily referred to as chamcha, indicating a “yes man”, someone who 
sucks up to a leader, always agreeing and praising him (for they are mostly men). An 
Awami League leader and his followers function as a faction, and exist in hierarchical 
relations with the wider political infrastructure (Suykens 2016). The political authority 
above the local level bodies of the Awami League is perceived as the Member of 
Parliament136. While it is common for different Awami League bodies to be active in 
the same ward, they often have unequal power and control, such that in particular areas 
of Dhaka certain Awami League bodies are more powerful than others. In practice 
these organisations have complex relationships to one another as well as the central 
Awami League. As is widely documented in the media, they are often in rivalry with 
one another for authority and resources, resulting in violent factional conflict (Ibid).  
A predominant way in which the kangali interact with these figures is through paying 
money as a form of tolls or protection/extortion payment for the ability to run a 
business. Day to day this is the domain of the cadre and in particular, the followers of 
political leaders called “linemen” who collect what is locally known as chanda. 
Chanda has a very prominent place in Bangladeshi public consciousness. It is best 
understood as somewhere between a fee, a toll, extortion and protection money, and 
as distinct from bara (rent); in some contexts chanda can mean membership or 
subscription money. It is also ubiquitous. Salam, a labourer in the jupri group told me 
wherever you will go in Bangladesh you will find chanda, and according to Neymar, 
the sewer worker, this has been going since the British period! Chanda can be seen as 
an important and deep rooted means through which the lower level rungs of the ruling 
coalition gain resources.  
In Dhaka, as elsewhere in the world, economic activity on public land is regulated in 
qualitatively different ways. Some comes under the auspices of DCC and other 
government authorities and is formally regulated with leases, contracts and rents. 
Much however – the footpaths, streets, parts of the bazars, parking lots and parks for 
example – is managed by party political actors, the police, and to a lesser extent 
sweepers, guards and DCC. An immense number of businesses operate from here, 
selling everything from tea, mobile phones, old coins, sexual health medicines and t-
shirts. A small percentage of these are run by the kangali. Chanda is levied primarily 
on the basis of access to space and a right to do business. Payments can be made in 
the process of establishing a business, as well as in maintaining a continued “right” to 
run it. The linemen are well publicised by media and a flurry of articles lambasts their 
activities annually at Eid as they ramp up demands. They are often referred to doing 
chandabaji colloquially. Shamim described the chanda system at Karwan Bazar to 
me: 
Everyday money is extorted in the market. Crores of taka… here everywhere 
in the market people are taking money. If today you are the member of Awami 
                                                 
136 The web of actors prevalent at this level are undoubtedly more complicated, however I am presenting 
the web as it is perceived and presented by the kangali.  
120 
 
League, you have power, which you can use to earn free easy money. 
Tomorrow if BNP are in power then their members are in power, they make 
money and you sit back. Here every day 500 taka for a shop is being paid. I 
may send my men, maybe four of them, telling them "go and pick up the 
payments" so they will move around the area taking the money from all the 
shops. The money picked is sent to higher ranking people who are stronger in 
the area, like political members – the MP of the area... Once it goes up the 
chain, each person keeps a cut and part is given to the police. It’s a vertical 
chain with links to politics. 
In a previous era, chanda was a key source of revenue for Picchi Hannan and similar 
gangsters, and a point of conflict with the wings of the Awami League and BNP. 
Today, Karwan Bazar is meticulously divided into different areas or line (hence 
“linemen”), controlled by different wings of the Awami League. To the west of the 
bazar near WASA the Jubo League is in control, to the north near Ershad building it 
is the Sramik League who also partly control the (lucrative) rail line where the drug 
businesses operate, and towards the south with the fish market it is the Shetchashebak 
League (volunteers league) who also control further south towards the Sonargaon 
hotel. Linemen and the cadre are all identified as earning significant amounts of 
money, able to save up lakh of taka, and therefore they can be looked at with jealousy 
and resentment by those beneath them such as the labourers in the jupri group. 
Whatever money they take, they are always understood as taking a cut before passing 
it to their seniors. The sense of chanda being given up the political ranks is a common 
one. It is often claimed that these are the MPs men, or this money will go right up to 
the Minister137 . The tall linemen Rajib who collects near WASA for example is 
thought by the jupri labourers to have saved up personally around 15-20 lakh taka. 
Shumon described him as a rongbaj (criminal, gang member), and as having moved 
up the political ranks by being very nice to senior people, becoming a low level leader 
of Shetcha Shebak League (volunteers league) before moving to the Jubo League138.  
Elsewhere in Dhaka political power is similarly territorialised. Hence while at the 
university it is the Chattro league who have strength, to the east near Osmani Uddyan 
park it is the Jubo League, and I found further east towards Gulistan park it was the 
Sramik League139 . The configuration of local power across Dhaka city is highly 
                                                 
137 It should be acknowledged that this analysis is based on experiences at the lowest level of this system 
– the exchanges between kangali and the linemen. Where the money goes afterwards can only be 
inferred from the perceptions of those running the businesses. 
138 It is these neta, their cadre and linemen, who fit to stereotypes of the mastan. Often wearing their 
nice shirts and sunglasses, riding on new motorbikes. A further label given to some of the cadre (but 
not the leaders) is rongbaj, meaning gangster or criminal, and there is continuity in terminology from 
the era of mastan.  
139 It was interesting to note that in a very few instances near the University and Osmani Uddyan park, 
shop keepers described BNP actors still occasionally collecting chanda, but often only doing so when 
Awami League people would not see them. Neymar described the chanda network at Osmani Uddyan 
park as such: the BNP guy is bad, he comes secretly to the linemen on Monday, and the linemen gives 
him 100 taka. During research in 2013, I also heard descriptions from teenagers at Karwan Bazar about 
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complex, and shifts in terms of the relationship between party political actors and the 
police, the balance of power and negotiations between them. In some areas you find 
the police and no Awami League controlling the chanda, or visa versa. Lineman are 
sometimes portrayed as directly under political leaders, sometimes as freer agents who 
are in-between the political leaders and the police, and sometimes as directly under 
the police140. Sometimes police take chanda directly, sometimes they use linemen, and 
sometimes even the kangali are used to collect chanda. Sometimes people have to pay 
both a lineman and a chamcha, implying different chains. Other actors including DCC 
staff and even sweepers also take chanda. Government salaried sweepers are assigned 
particular streets, and businesses on public space are often required to pay five or ten 
taka per day to them. 
Many of the women and children living at Karwan Bazar scavenge/steal vegetables at 
night, which they sell in the early hours or morning. Some sell on the land of arotdar, 
paying them a fee or rent of between 30-50 taka a day. Those on the main paths have 
to pay chanda at a rate of around 50 taka, with 10 taka going to the sweepers, 20 taka 
going to the police and a further 20 taka going to political leaders. Nearby in Fokini 
Bazar (beggars market) beneath the Tejgaon flyover, similar sellers pay 10 taka to the 
thana (police station), 10 taka to the local Awami League club (which has a building 
facing the bazar beneath the flyover), and 5 taka to the sweepers. More generally, 
payments vary from 30-70 taka daily for smaller shops, and 50 to hundreds of taka for 
larger ones141. In addition to these payments, police and political leaders often help 
themselves to cigarettes, tea, snacks, and thereby eat into, or eat up, the owner’s profit 
for the day. Not everyone is required to pay however. A general distinction is that 
businesses which have a “station” or are “fixed” as it often put, do have to pay, whereas 
street hawkers moving around do not. As Anika, who occasionally sells bottled water 
on the streets near Osmani Uddyan Park told me, the holder is tied on my neck, so 
wherever I go this is where I can do business. It’s not like I am fixed so have to give a 
fixed amount of money. 
The involvement of police and political actors in local economic affairs goes beyond 
taking from shops. Chanda is ubiquitous in Dhaka City. At the lowest levels these 
actors collect payments from drug businesses, rickshaw wallah and labour leaders. 
During my fieldwork Ansar (a government security force) started to levy a 10 taka fee 
for people sleeping on the streets to the south of Karwan Bazar. Tangential to my focus 
                                                 
being under the leadership of boro bhai who were students from the Dhaka University wing of the 
Chattro Dal (the BNP student body), however in 2014-2015 these links appeared to have disappeared.  
140 There is an inherent ambiguity in the identities of some of these actors. Mamun described to me 
ordinary people collecting the chanda, then they give it to the “leader”, the tolish and “police”. Tolish 
here is a word that is intended to resemble the sound of police, indicating people who resemble the 
police, but are not. 
141 In terms of payments to the police, typically this is divided between paying the police on duty, and 
paying the thana (police station). If, for example, there are during the course of a business day four 
police on duty in your area, that may be four ten taka payments, in addition to a weekly payment to the 
local thana. In other areas, payments are centralised but understood to go to senior officers at the thana 
and fari (a sub unit of police station), as well as duty police. 
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I also heard about the bepari – those coming to sell their goods – are required to pay 
50 taka for entry into the east side of Karwan Bazar (near WASA) to the Jubo League. 
The respective bodies of the Awami League take a commission from many of the 
labourers for each sack of vegetables they transport from a truck to the wholesaler. 
Rickshaw vans for transporting long distances (single vans) as opposed to unloading 
(double vans) are required to pay Ansar 10 taka for leaving Karwan Bazar. The 
distinction between chanda and informal toll is ambiguous. Many shops have to pay 
a weekly tax to DCC, and more generally (beyond the world of kangali), cars arriving 
at the bazar are required to pay an informal toll to DCC for parking (20 taka for non-
government vehicles, 10 taka for government vehicles per day)142.  
Chanda and ghush (bribes) are one of the main reasons the jupri group are great 
advocates of the sentiment that the police are Bangladesh’s number one shontrash143. 
Far from any ideals about justice and law enforcement, the police are perceived as a 
continuous and day-to-day nuisance. As Shumon put it to me simply – police means 
bribes, with bribes there is no problem, without bribes there will be no love. Closely 
connected to the police are a further important figure of authority at Karwan Bazar, 
known as the former (informer). As a young labourer Akash told me, there are many. 
Imran former. Shamim former. Tuunda [meaning crippled, without limbs] former, 
Sajid, Kalu… He’s so black that’s why he’s called Kalu. Mamun described them – 
they have a good connection with the authorities and secretly pass lots of information 
to them. I met Shamim on a number of occasions, he was described to me as a previous 
mastan from Mirpur turned former, whose disability (a crippled arm) came from 
having been beaten by the rail line drug dealers (they were too disturbed paying him 
money all the time so they beat him, said Mamun). Whenever I met him he was always 
extremely high on phensedyl, which he got for free from the rail line bosti, and I was 
suspicious why he insisted on taking my phone number almost as soon as we shook 
hands. I learnt that while Shamim was the police informer, Sajid was the RAB 
informer. Mamun continued: 
There are informer not just for drugs, but if there are other crimes like group 
fighting, or people bringing knives or pistols. It’s his job to inform the 
authorities. If he sees any things like these are happening then he will call the 
DB [detective branch] and then the police will come.  
Everyone wants to keep in the former’s good books. Shamim is a powerful man 
because all the police listen to him, Liton told me. Rickshaw van drivers kept a good 
relationship with him, often taking drugs together, but were also regularly extorted by 
                                                 
142 On the West side of Karwan Bazar, a man in his early 30s Nazdi does this job. He got the work 
through a boro bhai and though not on the DCC payroll, takes a cut of the money he gets from the 
collections. 
143 I found other people elsewhere in Dhaka more sympathetic to their situation. A sewage worker at 
Osmani Uddyan park for example explained to me: There’s a reason why the Bangladeshi police torture 
people this much. How much does a Bangladeshi constable make? What’s the government salary? 
“Fish”! 7500 taka. But to stay in a good room you need at least 10,000 taka. He needs 10,000 for a 
room rent, and he’s making 7500 taka for his salary. If he doesn’t steal what else can he do? 
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him. The former benefit from receiving payment from the police in exchange for 
information, but also collect chanda from businesses in much the same way as the 
linemen. He earns from both sides, as Mamun put it. He has a contract (chukti) with 
the rail line drug dealers for example. The former play on their position, Mamun 
continued, they never show the real criminals, because they benefit from them. When 
the police come on patrol, he tells everyone to stay hidden, instead showing the police 
other people who they put on the vans, beat, extort and then set free. 
Unlike many of the mastan from a previous era who are able to shift with the political 
currents, under competitive clientelism there are very clear time horizons for the 
political boro bhai - neta of today. At Karwan Bazar I often tried to understand the 
jupri group’s and young labourers’ perceptions about the attractiveness of being a 
lineman, a cadre. Some – as will become clearer later – had real aspirations, while 
others were far more sceptical. I suggested to Mamun that collecting chanda could be 
a good way to get money, he said 
How?! Your party will fall and then people will start beating you. Now it’s 
Awami League, but if BNP comes, the person taking the money right now won’t 
be there. He’ll hide. If your party isn’t ruling, then the public will beat you. 
They will break your feet and hands.  
Referring to the political leaders at Karwan Bazar mentioned above – Ahmed, Palash, 
Maola – Zakir said that once BNP come into power, they will pull up their lunghi and 
run away! Otherwise they will all be shot. Cadre have been known to be publically 
beaten, even to death. Shamim spoke of some leaders sitting down and others standing 
up as the parties alternate. Leaders are positioned differently, some may be able to 
simply sit down and maintain a low profile, while others have to flee. Mamun went on 
to nuance his position, explaining that  
Those who are supporting BNP won’t express it. If I’m your friend and I do 
BNP, but you are doing Awami, so right now your party is sitting in the chair 
not mine, then you will take care of me. So when my party is sitting in the chair, 
I will support you. 
The capability for violence of the party political actors discussed in this section is time 
bound with the stability of the wider coalition in which they operate. How people are 
situated in relation to the opposition may differ – some leaders have to flee, while 
others can perhaps sit down, and rely on their contacts with the opposition to see them 
through their rivals’ time in power. It should be noted that through the course of 
writing this thesis and during fieldwork, the political climate in Bangladesh has 
changed significantly, with far less hope for BNP activitists and political leaders to 
regain control or power. How this latest political development will alter what has been 
described here cannot be answered, however is a question further reflected on in the 




6.2.2. VIOLENCE AND ITS THREAT 
Relationships with actors analysed in the previous section are often described by the 
kangali in violent terms. The often stark imbalance in the capability for violence that 
these actors have in relation to the kangali mean that they can enforce their interests 
through the use or threat of violence. At the same time, for party political actors, the 
kangali are often looked to as a way in which they can maintain their own status as 
having a capability for violence as well as that of the coalition in which they operate, 
and are therefore used for violence purposes. The inter-dependencies that these 
relationships have can therefore be complex. In practice the ways in which these actors 
use their capability for violence differs, and while there is a systemic vulnerability to 
abuse and exploitation, these figures can also protect the kangali.  
In the cases of the linemen, former or police, paying the chanda can bring a degree of 
protection against other actors threatening a business144. A leader who is powerful 
enough to collect the chanda has an interest in businesses operating and continuing to 
pay. In only very few instances is the burden of chanda so great that it threatens the 
existence of a business, though in some cases it impinges significantly on people’s 
livelihood. As Mamun put it think, if you set up a shop next to the road, you are 
earning money, you earn 20 taka, so you have to pay 2 taka, so you still have 18 taka, 
so there’s no problem for you. In principle an informal right gained in paying chanda, 
offers a degree of protection from smaller actors who could threaten a business, and 
the right of being forewarned when a mobile court145 will take place, helping them 
protect their assets from being smashed up in an eviction. In practice many people do 
not receive such protection.  
For small business people and labourers more generally (as will be explored in the 
next chapter), accessing work/the right to do business often also necessitates 
participation in the activities of political parties. This may simply mean participation 
in political rallies and meetings, but can also mean fighting off challengers or rival 
factions, and more extreme forms of violence such as throwing molatov cocktails or 
attacking public vehicles. The ruling party – and to a lesser degree the opposition - 
mobilise people in this way through a mixture of financial incentives and the threat of 
violence. Opposition to the interests of political leaders and their followers - by not 
paying chanda or not attending political meetings for example – is often met with 
violence146, and this violence is sometimes inflicted through party leaders drawing on 
                                                 
144 The relationship between low-level business people and these lineman are more complicated than 
the dynamics I encountered and present here. The media has reported for example cases in the court 
between different hawkers organisations and these lineman, who have been publically named.  
145 A mobile court is a means by which the government conduct petty legal cases outside of a court. I 
observed many of these in relation to people living or operating businesses in public places. In practice 
they are often described by those affected as simply a means of certain actors getting chanda, before 
arrangements return back to normal.  
146 Though political leaders are particularly feared other actors also have the capability for violence. 
Even the government sweepers can evict small business people. Rifat who scavenges vegetables and 
sells them on the street at Karwan Bazar reported: If I don’t pay the sweepers then no-one will support 
me. Why would they? They would suffer. The sweepers have their groups, they have many people, so if 
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the apparatus of the state (through their close connections to the police for example). 
A broad difference between how power is exercised by the party political actors 
described here, by contrast with the gangsters of a previous era, is the greater ability 
to rely on the support of the apparatus of the state. Such connections constitute part of 
such actors’ ‘holding power’ (Khan 2010b), their ability to engage in conflict. There 
is then a sense in which the threat of violence is more convincing, representing greater 
power in Lukes’ third dimension, the ability to influence others actions without 
resorting to direct force.  
Rajak, who runs a mobile phone business and sleeps outside Bangabandu stadium 
described the Awami League cadre he pays chanda to, if for some reason I don't show 
up to their event, they would maybe beat me up or have the police frame me for a crime 
I haven't committed. Consistently, and across all my research sites, the question of 
what would happen were you not to pay the chanda were met with gestures of violence 
such as raising a hand preparing a slap. They will kick you in the stomach, the sewage 
moyla workers told me. People are therefore extremely fearful of political leaders. 
Anika told me in an interview referring to some new local Awami League cadre near 
Osmani Uddyan park: Bhai, If I talk about them I will be beaten147. This can be true 
for anyone, not just the kangali, as Shishir, who runs a tea stall at the university 
described it: 
The political people give me pressure… both Awami people and BNP… they 
say I have to either pay them money or come to their meetings... both parties 
do it… they could smash up my shop. Yesterday I had to go, I couldn’t run 
my business the whole day.   
Political actors leverage the interests of the kangali to their advantage – examples 
people recounted to me include the threat of abducting a child, the threat of not being 
allowed to sleep in a certain area, the threat of a police case, the threat of being beaten, 
the threat of withdrawing protection from the police for a drug business, the threat of 
not being able to work in a bazar and the threat of not being able to run a business on 
a pavement.  
As well as forcing the kangali to participate in political events or violence through the 
threat of violence, these political actors also offer opportunities. Examples of this in 
the context of labour groups will be explored in the next chapter. In terms of more 
extreme forms of violence such as bombing buses, throwing molatov cocktails and 
even killing people, boys and teenagers are particularly looked to. Labourers would 
often identify kangali who are drug addicted and do not live in any particular areas as 
                                                 
you don’t pay they will come the next day and throw us out of the area, they would throw away our 
goods and destroy them. 
147 People are often respectful to the faces of these leaders and their followers before rebuking them for 
being evil and corrupt behind their backs. Anika expressed how unclean and immoral they are: if you 
go to their house, they have cats sleeping in their rice… if his father is having a biri [a cheap local 
cigarette], he’s having benson [an expensive cigarette].  
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being recruited for such work (though the reality is more complex as will be seen in 
chapter eight148). Rana, a van driver at Karwan Bazar, explained: 
It’s not people like you or me who throw these bombs. Why? I want to develop 
myself. I don’t want to throw a bomb. I don’t need to be listed in a police diary 
and go to jail, I have a family, I have a child. But if someone’s sleeping in the 
corner, the rasta-kangali-oshohi [road-destitute-helpless], they will go to them, 
ask them if they want to work, and start convincing them. There will be a 
“contract” of 10 to 20 thousand taka, and they will give 7, 8, 9 “cocktail”. For 
him, he has no future. If you have a really bad situation, you don’t have money, 
you can’t eat three times a day, and then someone comes and asks you “will 
you work?” then of course you will say yes. Their hunger is their greatest 
desire. Maybe he will hit a car, or maybe a “meeting-missil”, and instead he 
will get 20,000 or 50,000 taka. Or maybe he will give you a gun and 1 lakh, 
saying you should take it, it will be helpful for you. You’re thinking now you’re 
starving, but if you get 1 lakh it will be good luck. You just kill someone to get 
the money. He’s a kangali. He needs money, and after throwing the bomb, if a 
person dies or a dog dies, it’s not his business 
The police similarly regulate and enforce their interests through violence. In the lives 
of the kangali it is relatively common for police to threaten arrest or transportation to 
a rehabilitation centre, and leverage everyday activities like taking drugs, or gambling. 
The jupri group used to have an arrangement whereby they would pay the police 100 
taka a day to ignore their gambling. When the group decided collectively to stop 
playing (because they were all losing too much money and not being able to eat for 
the rest of the day), they stopped giving. But when police subsequently came and asked 
them why they were not playing, the police said well, you are all sitting here together 
so I will say you are playing, so give me 100 taka! under the threat of arrest, as Liton 
described it.  
The threat of violence also means that political leaders can pursue their interests in 
other ways. Women – particularly those without a male “guardian” – can be targeted 
by both political actors and the police, for sexual violence. Key transport terminals in 
Dhaka, Sadarghat and Gulistan for example, are focal points for women being picked 
up by political leaders and their associates. The ghat neta (boat launch leaders) at 
Sardarghat, a highly politicised position, are locally notorious for spotting the 
beautiful women, perhaps feeding them for a day or two, but also allegedly raping 
them. At Osmani Uddyan park this is also common, as Anika described it 
                                                 
148 The case developed in chapter eight gives an example of where participation in extreme forms of 
political violence is forced onto children through a labour leader, suggesting that the degree to which 
children have the choice of whether to participate depends. There is a deeper question regarding the 
extent to which the language of choice is in any case appropriate when discussing such situations in the 
context of childhood.   
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This always happens. It happens in front of my own eyes. A lot of girls come 
here… a helpless [oshohi] girl comes here, she’s new, she has no-one. The 
neta will kidnap her or they’ll send a chamcha. They will feed her all day and 
then take her at night. In front of them we can’t protect her, because if we try 
then they will beat us. We don’t say anything. If I let a girl sit next to me, and 
then these people come and have sex with her in front of me, what can I say? 
If I don’t accept it they will beat me and my husband. 
In the face of the threat and use of violence, third parties such as NGOs have some, 
albeit limited, capacity to protect. Shayla, a woman living at the nearby NGO centre, 
described the importance of NGO shelters to single women:  
If we live on the rasta, there are dogs and foxes, bad people, they will disturb 
us, if we don’t go with them they will beat us. They will tease us [pinch our 
cheeks - galey tan debo], they will make us addicted to drugs, we are staying 
well here. We don’t do drugs. No-one teases us, there’s no “scope”. 
But throughout Dhaka NGOs also described not being able to directly confront the 
interests of local political actors. Through their inability to act, they are submissive to 
the interests of the ruling coalition: we can’t say anything to these people, they will 
cause problems. If we said something, they could kill us. We have to stay cold… I was 
told by an NGO worker at Karwan Bazar. In relation to the ghat neta at sardarghat an 
NGO centre manager described a similar situation: 
What can we do? Nothing. If we try and say something we won’t be able to run 
the centre. The ghat neta have so much power. They could tell everyone that 
tomorrow they should not come here and the centre would be empty. One day 
a new girl came through the ghat and to the centre, she was staying here but 
two of the neta’s men came to the centre and took her away. We couldn’t do 
anything. 
A gross imbalance in the capability for violence in a context where there are not laws 
protecting the kangali on the basis of some form of rights, creates a severe 
vulnerability to exploitation and abuse. The experiences people have of course depend 
on – amongst other factors - the incentives and characters of the people they have 
relationships with. Alongside stories of abusive police and political leaders, there are 
therefore those of helpful and supportive ones, and it is important to appreciate that 
the capability for violence of the actors described are also utilised to protect and defend 
the kangali. Anika explained growing up near Osmani Uddyan Park  
When we were children we used to stay at a recycled goods shop owned by 
Nozrul Bhai, he was a big leader when BNP were in power. We used to keep 
our money with him. When there were programmes, he would call us “hey, do 
you want to go to the programme?” If we wanted to go we went, but we didn’t 
have any good clothes, so he would buy us clothes from the market… No-one 
could say anything to us because no-one was above Nozrul Bhai. He wasn’t 
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married. He saw us like his children and little sisters. Right now he is like our 
father, back then he was like our father.  
Similarly, Jahangir is a local low level Awami League leader at Pantha Kunjo park 
(next to Karwan Bazar) without any designation. He used to be a very bad man, a low 
level mastan as he was often described, carrying a pistol and collecting chanda. But 
now he’s also an advocate of the kangali, someone who is seen as protecting them. He 
often spoke to me of being inspired by the Quantum Method, a new age group 
encouraging meditation and yoga. He is a likeable character, who is both shrewd and 
funny. Marium lived there for many years with her abusive drug-dealing husband. She 
described Jahangir  
Jahangir bhai helps everyone. Suppose at midnight, isn’t there lots of bad 
women, they come in the night and they do many things because of their 
hunger. The reason is that they have no husband, mother, father, now they 
have to do something to survive. They have to do bad things. They used to stay 
the whole night on the street, when it is winter, the police use to beat them, 
people use to beat them, used to kick them, and they will spend the whole night 
like this. This way they will earn 500 or 1000 taka. Then the police will shout, 
saying “you, stand up! Where are you from? Where do you live? What do you 
do?” Then they reply that “we are poor women, we do what we have to do”. 
They will say that they have earned 1000 or 1200 taka by prostitution. Then 
the police say “show me your money!” and grab it. So the women go to 
Jahangir crying, saying “Jahangir bhai, I am bad but I have not done 
something bad with him. Why has he done this to me? He took all my money 
by force”. Then he says to them “come in the afternoon and you will get your 
money, you will get justice”. Then she will be quiet. Jahangir will say, “is it a 
sin that she has done this? Should you take her money? What she had done, 
she has done because she is hungry” And then he will beat the person and take 
back the money. That bad woman will pray to allah for him, because she knows 
he is good… The only bad thing about him is that he smokes ganja 
In summary then, the kangali can be understood as often dependent on party political 
actors associated with the ruling party for work, security or opportunities. The logic 
of these relationships is that they provide access to resources at a price. Sometimes 
this is only financial, and may even bring a degree of protection, however it is often 
more complex, involving risky obligations and participation in party political 
activities. These relationships are premised on an unequal capability for violence, and 
in providing money or labour, serve to promote the interests of the ruling coalition. 
The actual impact of them on the kangali is however experience idiosyncratically, and 
while there are patterns or trends in the likely dynamics to the relationships, these are 





This chapter has argued that the kangali often depend on intermediaries to gain access 
to resources. These intermediaries are closely associated with a capability for violence 
however the form these actors take has changed markedly since the early 2000s. Most 
of the mastan gangs such as that led by the infamous Picchi Hannan, and identified as 
significant by urban literature from Bangladesh, have broken up, in large part due to a 
concerted effort by the government and the role of RAB and the police. This has led 
to a significant decrease in violence in the lives of the kangali. Many of the activities 
associated with these gangs continue, but are now directly organised under the ruling 
party political actors, such as the constituent and affiliated bodies of the Awami 
League. There are a complex array of actors organised around the Awami League and 
apparatus of the state such as cadre, linemen and former. Access to work or the right 
to do business gained through political actors is often contingent on political 
participation, as well as regular payments. Men are particularly obliged to participate 
politically. People adhere to the interests of these actors because their authority is 
premised on a clear and present capability for violence, which though not always used, 
can be convincingly threatened, and can draw upon the apparatus of the state. Not all 
actors who mediate access to resources are associated with violence – NGOs for 
example play important roles – however they face serious limits if their interest 
conflict with those of the actors described above. If social order is premised on a ruling 
coalition, the party political actors and the police described form some of the lowest 
level rungs of this. Underneath these actors however sit labour leaders, a pervasive 
and contextually powerful actor who often position the kangali in relation to the social 
order described, and have complex relationships to this ruling coalition. These actors 
are the subject of the next chapter.  
7. LABOUR LEADERS, POLITICS AND FACTIONS  
 
If you want to be part of the jupri group, you have to fight 
Abdul, a jupri labourer at Karwan Bazar 
 
Labour leaders are a ubiquitous and powerful intermediary to whom the kangali - and 
urban poor more broadly - look to find work, security and opportunities. I met and 
heard about labour leaders wherever I researched. From the young labourers at the 
Inland Container Depot (ICD) who live at Kamalapur train station, to the drain 
workers living at Osmani Uddyan park and around Bangabandu stadium, to the coolie 
and rickshaw van drivers transporting vegetables at Karwan Bazar. All are organised 
under a labour leader, often straightforwardly called a sardar, sometimes called a boro 
bhai. The term labour leader is used here in an intentionally broad way. Similar to 
these sardar, the female leaders of street based sex workers are often described as 
doing sardari, otherwise termed dalal (middleman, or middlewoman in this case) or, 
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to the workers themselves, ma (mother). The disabled beggars outside the Supreme 
Court were previously led by two powerful sardar and continue to have a samiti 
(savings group, association), headed by a shrewd “cashier”. Even with the vegetable 
thieves and tokai I occasionally sensed a similar structure, with some of the younger 
generation closely associated with a recycled goods shop owner or local boro bhai. 
Though these leaders are clearly different characters and referred to in diverse ways, 
it is important to acknowledge a commonality in their roles. As has already been noted, 
despite their historical importance in colonial India, labour leaders have received little 
academic attention in Bangladesh (Bertocci 1970; Wood 1994; Khan 2000).  
 
The key argument developed in this chapter is that studying the roles of labour leaders 
is important for understanding how the lower levels of political parties maintain their 
capability for violence, and critical for understanding how many of the kangali 
negotiate their place within the social order of urban Bangladesh. Some groups of 
labour operate factionally within the political hierarchy, they have clear hierarchies, 
are in competition with similar groups for territory and status and look upwards for 
political opportunities and support. The Awami League bodies described in the 
previous section look down to these factions as a source of support and to bolster and 
maintain their status. The capability for violence is often a critical characteristic of a 
labour group, particularly for those with political ambitions or in highly competitive 
environments. It is therefore also a quality looked for in labourers by such leaders. 
This chapter begins by mapping out the structural role and key characteristics of labour 
leaders within the wider social order. It then substantiates these arguments and 
explores these in detail in relation to the jupri group at Karwan Bazar, and gives 
examples of labour leaders in the context of sex workers, thieves, waste workers and 
beggars. These leaders are argued to play complex and contentious roles in the lives 
of the kangali.  
 
7.1. 21ST CENTURY JOBBERS  
7.1.1. LABOUR AND POLITICAL FACTIONS 
Chapter three described labour leaders as critical intermediaries in colonial India. They 
were institutionalised within large-scale agriculture and industry to control workers 
and played multifaceted roles in the lives of labourers, roles that were often deemed 
immoral or exploitative within wider society. The history of labour leaders more 
generally within South Asia is tied to the systems of trade and caste groups, and from 
at least the early 19th century in Dhaka (and probably before), such groups had very 
clear leadership structures. The capability for violence of labour leaders was a key 
characteristic upon which their authority rested (Chakrabarty 1983; de Haan 1997; 
Chakrabarty 2000; Sen 2002; Bhattacharya 2004). Beyond the leader-labourers 
relationship, they are also identified as having used this capability to organise working 
class protests in colonial India (Chakrabarty 1983: 124), and in Kolkata there are 
descriptions of sardar becoming powerful goonda (Bhattacharya 2004), though the 
extent to which the capability for violence between sardar and goonda was similar is 
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disputed (de Haan 1997; Chakrabarty 2000). During the era of mastan in Dhaka there 
was a close relationship between organised labour and gangsters. In the context of 
Karwan Bazar the previous chapter described how leaders for truck drivers, butchers 
or coolie at times united the labour underneath them, becoming feared and powerful 
mastan. 
Today labour leaders continue to play important roles in the urban social order of 
Bangladesh, roles that have been largely unrecognised in urban research to date. A 
premise of the framework used in this thesis – and that resembles the social order as 
seen from the perspective of the kangali – is that social order in Bangladesh rests on a 
ruling coalition which weaves its way down to the lowest hierarchical levels of urban 
life in the bazars, streets, parks, transport terminals and so on. It was argued in the 
previous chapter that the capability for violence is closely associated with figures 
within the ruling Awami League, and that these are organised through different bodies 
such as the Jubo League, Chattro League and Sramik League. Whereas a decade or so 
ago in Karwan Bazar labourers looked up to a social order dominated by mastan gangs, 
today they look up to party political leaders. Labour leaders represent a point at which 
the kangali and the ruling coalition these political actors represent, intersect. In the 
contexts studied, groups of organised labour have very complex relationships with 
political actors, including elements of competition, interdependency and exploitation.   
The party political bodies described above look to groups of organised labour to 
demonstrate their own capability for violence. This was often described by labourers 
in the jupri group as these party political actors having a need for labourers to 
demonstrate their strength. Understood within the competitive clientelist framework, 
this represents a need for a party political faction to demonstrate that they have a 
superior capability for violence than rivals, thereby demonstrating to others, including 
their superiors, that they can maintain a legitimate place within the ruling coalition. 
Though political leaders are feared and powerful individuals, they and their cadre are 
often only a relatively small group in relation to the size of organised labourers. At 
Karwan Bazar for example, though political leaders are seen as extremely powerful 
those in their immediate circles are not identified – at least by the labourers I knew – 
as a large group. The capability for violence that political leaders have is seen by the 
kangali as coming in part from their close connection to the apparatus of the state (the 
police for example) by virtue of their political status, in part from having weapons 
(guns for example), but also by their ability to mobilise sufficient numbers of people 
towards violence, where and when it is needed. The forms this takes are diverse, as 
will be described later in this chapter and the next, but includes demonstrating support 
through political meetings or rallies, hartal or anti-hartal activities, or even more 
targeted in killings and bombings for example. Groups of organised labour are a 
resource on which these political actors need to draw to maintain their own status and 
promote the interests of the coalition in which they operate; and labour leaders are 
often the means through which they do so.  
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Labour leaders and the labourers they represent meanwhile also require political 
connections in order to gain and maintain their status and territory. Some labour 
leaders look up to political leaders for opportunities, whether it is to increase the work 
they have access to or receive money for participation in political activities. 
Furthermore, some labour leaders and their followers look up with jealousy at the 
power of those in the political party, and actively design to become political leaders 
or linemen. As a result labour leaders and political leaders have complex 
interdependencies. Money and protection can flow either way and the balance of 
power between these actors varies. Political leaders often look at organised labour and 
the value chains in which they operate as a source of chanda. Furthermore, the extent 
to which labourers have a choice in participating in such activities differ. Some groups 
of labourers are employed on an event by event basis and therefore flexible to operate 
with different political actors, while others are tied to a specific body of the Awami 
League through formal registration, and membership within that body. As will become 
clear, labour leaders do not always look to political leaders who are in power for 
opportunities, and may bet on a rival faction within the ruling party or even an 
opposition party leader to better further their interests. Labour leaders and groups can 
therefore be a threat to the power of the existing ruling coalition. 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the value chains in which groups of labour 
operate are ones from which party political actors often seek resources, and therefore 
the distribution of work is inherently political in that it affects the ruling coalition and 
the basis on which social order rests. Groups of labour operate in conflict with other 
groups for work and territory, and this competition is often violent, utilising the 
political connections that groups have or can build. Because of these two facts, labour 
groups of this sort can be described as operating as factions (Nicholas 1965). Their 
complex interdependencies with the ruling coalition suggests that these labour groups 
should be conceptualised as the lowest form that factions take within the urban 
context, integrated within, or in competition to, the ruling coalition. The need to 
compete violently for work, and to appeal to party political actors on the basis of a 
capability for violence, translates down into the relationship between labour leaders 
and the labourers. The task of a labour leader is therefore often to ensure the unity and 
coherence of the group to operate in conflict with others. In practical terms, the 
viability of a labour faction is contingent on dynamics such as respect, fear, mutual 
support, and in the context examined spoken of in terms of love149 and whether they 
“adore” each other. A social structure critical to the dynamics of these labour groups, 
was the role of a samiti (savings group, association), as is explored in more detail 
below. The structures of these differ – some require continual investment and deposits 
are returned after a fixed period, while others are more flexible, and deposits can be 
withdrawn as and when. Figure 4 below builds on figure 3 from the previous chapter, 
providing a more detailed overview of how labourers, labour leaders and political 
                                                 
149 Labourers often spoke of whether there was bhalobasha (love) between them and the boro bhai or 
sardar. Love in this context can be understood as meaning being cared for and looked after.  
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figures relate. It is important to appreciate that the elements of these relationships 
prominent in the experience of any particular group differ. Hence some groups are 
more reliant on political figures for authority and visa versa, some given chanda and 
others do not, all a product of the relative balance of power, incentives and 
negotiations that take place. The following sections substantiate and illustrate these 
arguments through empirical cases. 
 




7.1.2. MARKET LABOURERS AND LEADERS: THE JUPRI GROUP 
 
At Karwan Bazar sardar, or hodar as they are known colloquially, are locally powerful 
actors organising the movement of vegetables, situated between the wholesaler, and 
the arrival and departure of trucks from and to rural areas. They typically organise a 
range of labour, including the coolie (those carrying goods in baskets on their heads), 
the helper (those facilitating this, unloading or loading by hand), and the rickshaw 
baan (van) drivers (those carrying goods on flat backed rickshaw vans). As with the 
coolie, many rickshaw van drivers operate at night under the control of a sardar, a 
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senior and powerful figure who often rents people under him their rickshaw vans, 
maintains links with the wholesaler and truck drivers regarding the arrival of goods to 
be unloaded, determines who can and cannot work under him, and subsequently pays 
his workers. They may have their name suffixed with the term, hence the name of the 
most proximate and powerful sardar to the jupri group – “Dulal sardar”. Dulal is now 
elderly. He described to me having worked at Karwan Bazar for over forty years and 
having forty rickshaw van drivers under him. Sardar typically receive daily rents from 
the vans that they own and rent to drivers (approximately 80-100 taka a day), along 
with a significant cut of the fee charged for the group to unload or reload the goods. 
The rough division is often understood by those in jupri as followed: from a fee of 
20,000 for unloading and distributing goods in one night, the sardar would allocate 
10,000 taka to the coolie, 5000 taka to the rickshaw van drivers, and take 5,000 for 
himself150. People estimate that Dulal sardar earns about 1.5 lakh taka a month.  
 
The jupri group have a complicated relationship to Dulal sardar. Though he is the 
sardar for their lane (goli), they explicitly identify as not being under his control. This 
would often be expressed bluntly as in we don’t have a sardar, we have a serial. A 
serial refers to a system for organising the way in which the van drivers unload goods 
from the trucks.151 If you visit Karwan Bazar at night you will see rickshaw van drivers 
racing after trucks as they arrive. These vans have neither chains nor brakes, and so 
people are masters of running along van first (not bike first), dodging obstacles, 
hopping on and sliding along, competing to get to the truck first. Whoever touches the 
back bumper of the truck while it is motion and is able to remain in that prime position 
until it is stopped, gets the first lot of goods to deliver to the wholesaler, typically a 
larger proportion (and thereby earn most money). In practice this means that people 
end up smashing their vans against each other to get nearest to the truck, people can 
be easily injured and it often results in arguments and fights. Operating under a sardar, 
or using a serial, are both ways to avoid this. Under a sardar those able to unload are 
limited, the work is organised, and wages standardised. A serial is a nightly lottery 
within a limited group, organised most often by pieces of scrunched up paper being 
drawn from a hat, people thereby being allocated their turn randomly. The serial are 
associated with certain areas (bhag), and hence the jupri have the serial associated 
with their lane, for trucks that are not under the sardar152.  
 
Despite this rhetoric of not having a sardar, as my research continued it became 
apparent that they were much more intimately connected to the logic of a sardar 
system than they presented it. Alongside the feeling that we are all brothers, we have 
no leader, the jupri group have very clear leaders, who are seen as boro bhai. Sayeed, 
                                                 
150 In addition to this because the sardar control the account, monitor and record the movements of 
goods, they have ways of taking further cuts from the fees.  
151 More broadly a serial can refer to a group savings system.  
152 In other areas there are a mixture of serial and sardar. In practice, the system is cheated. As Salman 
said - there’s a serial, but whoever runs the fastest, they get the money. The serial doesn’t work. Liton 
complained that every night there’s fighting. Not everyone is honest. Even though there is the serial 
people lie, they pretend they are in the serial when they aren’t really. So then people fight. 
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a younger van driver in the group, described these boro bhai: Parvez bhai is top. Then 
Rubel. Then “mission Azad”. These three characters grew up together in the old 
Aparajeyo centre for boys, having moved there from the chinomul centre. They were 
from the same “batch”, as Rubel put it. Nazir, who we heard from in the previous 
section, described their role 
Rubel and Parvez are in control. They don’t work. They don’t stay here, but if 
there is any work it is under their control. Parvez and Rubel are our brothers. 
It is their responsibility. Everyone is with them. They are in charge otherwise 
there will be disorder, there will be arguments, do you understand? 
Rubel has a beard and is short and fat, as a younger van driver Akash put it. He dresses 
and acts as a mullah, with his Panjabi, and constant use of overtly religious language. 
He owns six rickshaw vans, which he rents out on a daily basis to others in the 
group153 , but more importantly he has responsibility for controlling some of the 
contracts for unloading trucks and linking them to the wholesalers. He is thought by 
some to be earning 3000-4000 taka a night154.  
The jupri group operate as a faction in that they are in conflict with other groups for 
work, have a clear leadership, are looked to as a group of labour available for party 
political violence, and their status is contingent on their position in relation to the 
political hierarchy. Their capability for direct physical violence is a key means by 
which the jupri group maintain their control over work and seek opportunities. Both 
leaders and followers in the group have this capability. The third of these boro bhai, 
“mission Azad” is called the “fireman” by Rubel (said while indicating a pistol) and 
is a very powerful man (indicating stabbing motions) who served twelve years in 
Dhaka Central Jail for crimes committed during the period of Picchi Hannan. It is 
particularly Azad and Parvez who specialise in violence. As Sayeed described it  
Rubel Bhai never wants to create violence [ganjam]. That’s why everyone goes 
to Parvez, because Rubel doesn’t like problems and doesn’t want to get 
involved. Rubel bhai says “I eat my own food, I don’t want to get involved in 
bad things, but if you need any suggestions I will give you some good advice”. 
                                                 
153 Particularly where there are not sardar, it is people who own vans who are looked to. You need to 
have a good relationship with a boro bhai (in this case simply someone who owns a van) in order to be 
rented one and therefore in order to work.   
154 Though they do not self-identify as having a sardar, it is worth reflecting on how in fact the group 
could operate without someone taking this structural role. A logic for having a sardar is to reduce the 
transaction costs of moving goods for the wholesaler. The sardar manages the contract, organises the 
labourers, and ensures the efficiency of the process. Without a leader of some sort, the wholesaler would 
have to deal with 10s of van drivers, which would be too inefficient. For some of the contracts on which 
jupri work, it is then Rubel who controls these. The primary difference seems to be that he is identified 
as one of them, though senior, he shares the same roots, has grown up in the same way, and therefore 
retains a common identity. 
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That’s why everyone goes to Parvez bhai because he used to go everywhere 
for fighting. I have observed Rubel, he always doing good things155  
In the case of all these boro bhai, the group go to them for advice and support on a 
daily basis. They ask for small loans, require their leadership if there are tension or 
fights. The names of these leaders carry respect; I once overhead Rubel say to a 
labourer – if there is a problem, just give my name, indicating the authority which their 
name and position commands. The obligations that followers have to these boro bhai 
range from being instructed in daily life (for example doing small favours for the boro 
bhai such as delivering tea and cigarettes, as is customary in any hierarchy in 
Bangladesh) to the willingness to fight. The relationships between these leaders and 
the labourers are complicated, often spoken of in terms of love, and whether they 
“adore” each other as mentioned in the previous section. A defining characteristic of 
the jupri group is that most of them have grown up together from childhood at the 
bazar, separate from their families156. Most used to be petty thieves at one point, and 
moved together through the various NGO centres as they opened and closed with the 
donor funding cycles.  
To be part of the jupri group you need to be a good fighter. As has already been 
indicated, some of the older members of the group (those aged around 28 upwards at 
the time of research) came through the ranks of previous gangsters such as Picchi 
Hannan. When they were out of earshot, the group would explain to me how notorious 
certain labourers I knew were, how they had been a powerful and dangerous rongbaj 
(criminal, gangster), carrying a pistol and shooting people. Being able to fight is a 
significant determiner of respect, and one measure I was judged by when becoming 
involved with the group157. Teenagers and young men growing up at Karwan Bazar 
and wishing to work within the group have to demonstrate their loyalty, their physical 
strength and “daring” (the English word is sometimes used) to older group members 
deliberating on their inclusion within the jupri group. Collectively, the group brag 
about fighting, about beating people up, about how scared they made someone, about 
how strong they are as individuals. These bragging rights are an essential part of the 
group’s identity. They are renowned as the best fighters at the bazar I was often told. 
I was safe because I was with them, no-one would dare say anything. If they fight, 
then their enemies will run away to Bandarban158, as one member put it159.  
                                                 
155 Rubel was however far more involved in organising violence than this quote suggests, as will become 
clear in the next chapter.  
156 It is common for other groups of labourers at Karwan Bazar to be based on home district/village 
networks.  
157 I would constantly affirm how I could never fight because I wear glasses, while others would 
compare their biceps to mine, testing whether I could get out of grips or whether I could pick them up.  
158 Bandarban is a remote hilly district in the South-East of Bangladesh.  
159 As an example of the group’s bravado, When watching an Awami League meeting at Karwan Bazar 
with Liton once he told me: we’re not the ones scared of them. Those leaders are scared of us. If 
anyone’s going to be throwing bombs it’s us! 
137 
 
Beyond work and physical security, a critical role that labour leaders such as Rubel 
and Parvez play is running a samiti. Samiti is a Hindi-Bengali word for an association, 
a society, an organisation. In Bangladesh there are established samiti for all sorts of 
causes, from Buddhists to women, and looking back into history the Anushilan samiti 
was a famous anti-British revolutionary group. One primary function that samiti have 
in these contexts is for savings and credit, and in NGO language are varieties of a 
rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) or accumulating savings and credit 
association (ASCA)160. From the perspective of the person running the samiti, often 
called the “cashier”, a primary purpose of the samiti to accumulate capital, which can 
be lent out at a profit or used for other investments. From the perspective of the user 
it is considered a convenient way of saving money, and a means of obtaining credit. 
At Karwan Bazar within the jupri group it was Parvez who ran the samiti. He would 
take 10 taka a day from 70 drivers. Nearby sardar were also identified as running 
samiti, and workers would always do the samiti of their sardar or boro bhai. 
The boro bhai in the jupri group also play a key role in determining the political status 
and strategy of the group. Despite the Awami League being in power, the group – at 
the time of research – had explicitly affiliated themselves to the BNP. When I first met 
Rubel behind some parked buses, sitting on one of his rickshaw vans, he gave me a 
short speech on Islam, before provoking me asking we are all BNP here. Do you have 
a problem with that?! I later learnt this connection had come primarily from Parvez 
and Azad who affiliated the group with local BNP leaders in early 2014. The group’s 
affiliation was widely known at the bazar. When I asked Rubel about the significance 
of this affiliation for the group he asked me rhetorically - will the small brothers 
support Awami League when their big brothers do BNP? No, if they do the big 
brothers will get angry and pressure them to do the same. The younger members in 
the group often knew very little about these higher connections. I once asked Sayeed 
(a younger rickshaw van driver) who was above Parvez, he said: I don’t know brother 
because we can’t ask him who’s above him. If I ask him he will beat me. 
Party affiliation is not about votes, none of the members can vote at or nearby Karwan 
Bazar. Underlying this affiliation was the calculation that the BNP would eventually 
get into power and that by demonstrating their support now they would be able to reap 
the rewards later. Political power could enable them to increase their control over work 
(in terms of contracts for unloading and distributing vegetables for example), as well 
as wider aspirations about leveraging this political power to control line and the 
chanda networks. In the period of BNP – Awami League conflict immediately 
                                                 
160 The difference then between ROSCA and ASCA is fundamental to academic categorisation of these 
groups, and the basic distinction lies in how savings and loans are distributed (Bouman 1995, 
Rutherford 2009). In the case of rotating groups, members of the group are each in turn distributed the 
money deposited. For all members except the last this represents a loan against future savings. The 
existence of a ROSCA is time bound according to the size of the group and regularity of deposits. By 
contrast, in the case of ASCA this capital accumulates, often serving as a pool from which members 
can take loans if needed. ASCA most often also have clear time horizon, perhaps one year, after which 
deposits are returned (Rutherford 2009). ASCA tend to have far more variables than ROSCAs and 
require more sophisticated forms of management (Ibid).  
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preceding and during my fieldwork, a younger jupri member Sayeed described to me 
how Parvez was paid around 30,000 taka per occasion to lead the jupri labourers into 
fights and skirmishes. But the jupri group’s political affiliations are more complex 
than this description suggests. I once asked Liton about the significance of the group’s 
BNP affiliation. He said 
Some men, like Rubel, Parvez, they only do BNP. They send people only to 
BNP. If they go to another, then they will ask “you do BNP, so why have you 
come to Awami League?” and then they will beat them. 
During the time I spent with the jupri group, it was relatively common for the group’s 
labourers – though not Rubel, Parvez and Azad - to participate in political meetings. 
This happened most significantly during attempts by the BNP or jamaat-e-islami to 
call hartal (strikes) and meetings in opposition to the government. But rather than 
participating in BNP meetings, members of the jupri group (with the exception of 
Parvez, Rubel and Azad) would participate with wings of the Awami League. Liton 
explained their participation to me on one occasion:  
Sometimes we do krishok [farmers], sometimes jubo [youth], sometimes 
chattro [student]161, whoever comes and gives us money. Sometimes we’ll 
even do BNP. It’s no problem, we can go to whichever meeting because we 
haven’t signed with any. We haven’t got registration with any. 
The occasions I witnessed involved senior members of the local Leagues passing 
through Karwan Bazar rounding up the troops. On one occasion I recall the Krishok 
League secretary from nearby Tejgaon pass by the east side of WASA where a group 
from jupri were sitting. Walking along in his oversized suit and clipboard he was 
greeted by cheers from the group, he immediately gave 100 taka to the group for tea, 
and then said he needed twenty people for a meeting at Farmgate. Each person would 
receive 100 taka. I resisted calls from the group to come along, and the group left (after 
having tea) cheering the name of a local politician. On a number of occasions I asked 
the jupri group why they participated in political meetings and the answer most often 
came down to money – they give us 200 taka to go, we can fill our stomachs, why 
wouldn’t we go?! Abdul put it once162. But alongside this economic incentive, sits 
more complicated reasons resonating with descriptions from the previous chapter, as 
Rubel explained: 
Those who are involved with the BNP, they go to the Awami meetings if they 
are invited. It’s like a tangle (patch), it’s complex for us. If today I am with 
Awami and I invite you to go to a meeting and you refuse, then I will inform 
the police and they will come to catch you. That’s why we go. We have to go 
to save ourselves. 
                                                 
161 All referring to League (Awami League) rather than Dal (BNP).  
162 Most often these political events were during the day. Because these labourers work at night there 
were not financial opportunity costs for attending.  
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Alongside the need to demonstrate a degree of support and adhere to the interests of 
Awami League politicians, the group’s capability for violence also gave them a degree 
of protection from these actors. While other groups of labourers had to pay local 
linemen chanda when unloading vegetables, which was often 5 taka per sack, the jupri 
group were exempt. Liton put their status like this: we’re a big goonda. We have 70 
members. We’re good at fighting. They won’t take chanda from us. If they try we will 
fight them. As Mamun – a young labourer outside of the group – reflected similarly, if 
the political people try and collect money from them, they will be beaten.  
From the perspective of the labourers, working in the jupri group therefore represents 
opportunities. It offers a structure within which people can earn a living, find support, 
protection, guidance, and a system for saving money in the form of a samiti. Working 
under the boro bhai provides a political status and opportunities, however these come 
with high risks attached. To work in the jupri group you are required to fight. As I 
overheard Rubel telling a choto bhai once, either you will beat him or you will leave 
Karwan Bazar, now you choose. You risk being beaten, arrested or even killed; you 
may risk the livelihood and respect of your family and community163. 
7.1.3. THIEVES, WASTE WORKERS, BEGGARS AND SEX WORKERS 
 
At Karwan Bazar labour leader among the kangali can also be found in the case of sex 
workers and young thieves. Rimi is a sex workers’ sardari who sleeps just to the south 
of the jupri lane, near to the Prothom Alo office. Her workers refer to her as ma, and 
she is perceived as a very powerful woman, as a local NGO worker described her. 
Women at a nearby centre describe her as connected to all sorts of local organisations 
and actors – the truck drivers samiti, the bosti malik (slum owner), the bazar malik 
(bazar owner). It is not only through her extensive knowledge of customers that she is 
able to establish herself, but through the connections that provide her with security. 
Female sex workers are highly vulnerable and therefore choose to operate under her 
not only to be linked with clients, but for protection. She gives them shelter, as a local 
woman described it to me, and in return takes a portion of their profit. More generally 
across Dhaka it is common for dalal (most often women) to seek out potential 
prostitutes living on the streets and connect them with customers, taking a portion of 
the payment.  
 
As described in the introduction to this thesis, a similar labour structure can be found 
among the young vegetable thieves/scavengers. Many of the younger teenage boys 
who live at the bazar and in nearby NGO centres are thieves, mainly of vegetables, but 
                                                 
163 At the same time it should also be recognised that labourers sometimes move between sardar, 
rickshaw van owners and areas for example. Jibon once told me if you don’t go to the [political] meeting 
then the boro bhai will get angry. You won’t be able to keep a good relationship with him. I asked him 
what’s the problem with that? He replied, it’s not always a problem because I can find another boro 
bhai, there are so many. But everyone needs a boro bhai, they won’t rent you a van otherwise so you 
can’t work here. 
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sometimes of mobile phones164. Most of the jupri labourers I knew were themselves 
once thieves and this appears to be a common trajectory for young men who grew up 
at the bazar. Arif, who now works in a glass shop in the nearby rail line bosti, described 
moving to an NGO “club” at Karwan Bazar, realising that all the children used to steal 
at night at Karwan Bazar. The boundary here between thieves and scavenger is 
blurred, as many of the children and women not only pick up loose vegetables and 
chillies as they tumble from the trucks, but actively steal them. As Liton once put it to 
me: thieves and tokai are the same. For the most part people pay little attention and it 
is an accepted part of market life. Many previous and current scavengers/thieves 
described to me operating in small groups, led by a nearby boro bhai. They would all 
operate together for protection, keeping an eye out for police, shop owners, and 
vegetables that could be picked off. Sayeed described their tactics 
 
If you see a van going with a full sack of vegetables then we used to run behind 
it with a sharp blade, and then hold our bags behind it and the vegetables used 
to fall down until the bag was full. 
Working through the night they sell their goods in 10 taka portions on the side of the 
bazar, perhaps paying a local security guard 10 taka for the privilege. Others even used 
to supply people’s houses, always under cutting the market rate. A journalist who grew 
up near the bazar described to me the churi sardar (leader of thieves) of a previous 
generation called Anda, meaning egg, because he and those under him particularly 
stole eggs. He was described as a strong man and no-one could beat him in a fight, but 
he also had a big heart. If he heard you hadn’t eaten, he would go down the road and 
steal a chicken for you. Then he would sell it and feed you rice... He couldn’t stand 
seeing people’s misery. Labourers in the jupri group described having had a boro bhai 
when being a market thief. Some operated under the era of Picchi Hannan, and 
described their boro bhai who would protect them if they were caught and people 
wanted to beat them. There was always an older brother giving us support, Golap 
described him, 
He’s not here now. He used to stay in Begunbari. His name is Ibrahim Kholil. 
He used to do phensodyll business on Begun bari, Hatijheel… I used to have 
this boro bhai when I was a thief. If we were caught by anyone, by the police, 
then he used to come. If we didn’t work then the boro bhai used to give us some 
money, and when we earned money we paid him. If we earned 500 taka then 
we used to give 200 to him... He didn’t have any links with the political people. 
In secondary research sites labour leaders are also a prevalent and important 
intermediary on whom the kangali depend. A key figure at Osmani Uddyan park is 
Jewel, who is the sardar of waste (moyla) workers living there. These workers are 
                                                 
164 A teenage thief called Faysal who I met a couple of times apparently once held up a whole truck of 
sari and some of the teenagers including “all rounder” as he was known after the Bangladeshi cricketer 




employed on a contract basis by WASA and when there is work, each of his workers 
(of which there are around 30) give him 30 taka of the 300-380 taka they receive a 
day165. From their earnings, the labourers described it as common for them to deposit 
100 taka daily in the samiti, which Jewel and his wife manage166. At and nearby 
Osmani Uddyan are various wings of the Awami League, most prominent of which are 
the Jubo League. The moyla workers described collectively having a mutual 
agreement with them, a system, where there’s no trouble, no fighting. Key elements 
of this relationship are mutual support and chanda. Jewel and the labourers look to the 
Jubo League to settle problems. As the workers described to me, if police come here 
and cause trouble, then they come and say “sir, don’t harass them, these are good 
boys, they live from working”, and so the police will leave us alone. Jewel is critical 
in this process, though was quite coy with his descriptions of the relationship. 
Referring to the Jubo League, he said 
 
They are good with us. They shelter us. The boro bhai from nearby areas come 
when we call them for help. We are good with them, they come here and we 
give them ganja, sometimes give them water. These kinds of things. We have 
been here a long time.  
Despite Jewel’s description of their relationship, it was reported to me that on one 
occasion last year the Jubo League chamcha beat him all night over a disagreement. 
Not only does Jewel maintain a relationship by supplying ganja to them, but he also 
provides payments. The workers described to me having to pay the Jubo League 
10,000 taka a year from their samiti fund in order to stay at the park167. Lucky, a young 
woman who stays in a nearby NGO centre, told me whenever there’s work he has to 
pay them. He will have to give 300, 400, 500..., though Anika thought the figure was 
more like 2000 taka, and that they come once a month. Whatever amount they ask for, 
it has to be given, she added. These local women who have lived in the park for 
decades described the consequences if he did not pay chanda to them: They will beat 
(mar) and oppress (otachar) him. They will come at night and take him to a quiet lane 
and beat him with gazari sticks168. The political chamcha also make demands on the 
moyla workers to do bad things as they described it, saying “do this, or I will tell the 
boro bhai”. Anika said that if they do not go to the political demonstrations  
They will be fined (joriman). They will say – you come here and do work in 
our place, now I have something I need done, I need 10 people to work, and I 
                                                 
165 The total contracted rate for a labourer is 400 taka a day. Between the contractor (WASA) and Jewel, 
the WASA permanent staff called the “cleaner” allegedly take 50 taka from each labourer’s rate.  
166 These samiti are ubiquitous. I was even told some of the tokai and chocolate selling kangali have 
samiti.  
167 I learnt from the labourers that another feature of this relationship is that they store the local Jubo 
League’s badminton equipment in the park for them and set it up when they want to play.  
168 A gazari tree is seen as particularly strong and its branches are commonly used as weapons, however 
gazari stick is also a common way of referring to any stick that people use as weapons.  
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called you and you don’t listen to me, so you will be beaten. I’m your boro 
bhai here. 
A final group from the secondary research sites who have a form of labour leader are 
the disabled beggars living on the pavement adjacent to the Bangladesh Supreme 
Court. These beggars are led by a samiti leader, an almost entirely paralysed beggar 
called Anwar169. Anwar is the samiti “cashier”, though he denied his role and even 
the existence of the samiti to me continuously over a couple of months170. Like many 
of the lengra (cripples) as they are known, he moves in a four wheeled cart which is 
pushed by a young boy with whom he shares his daily takings from begging. The 
Supreme Court has a history of beggar samiti, shongoton (association), or group, as I 
have heard them referred to. Previously, there was a bastohara (homeless) group, and 
a different group for the disabled beggars, run by Nur Islam and Nuzrul Islam, who 
were the “leader”, the “chairman”, also termed the sardar. Anwar described giving 
them ten taka chanda a day, while others spoke of giving roughly 25 per cent of a 
day’s earnings. They used to distribute the donations given to the neaby mazar, and if 
ever the police caused any trouble, or anyone else caused any trouble, we used to tell 
them and they solved the problem, as Izaz, an elderly beggar told me. Majeda, a local 
NGO worker described meeting Nur Islam before he died 
I only met him a couple of times before he died, but I could see he was a good 
man. His behaviour was good. He was honest with people and had the capacity 
to manage them, that’s why he was their sardar. Whatever money people would 
give him, then he would give them that money back to them at the end. I know 
he used to have a good situation – he had four or five rickshaws – he used to 
give out loans from the samiti money and take interest  
Unlike these sardar, Anwar does not distribute goods from the mazar. Nor do people 
give him a daily cut of their earnings - why would I give the money I earn and need to 
pay for my child’s school fees to a leader? Tell me that was one response I got when 
                                                 
169 Political parties did not have a prominent presence in the context of the disabled beggars outside the 
Supreme Court. Local street businesses pay chanda to the police (the station police, traffic police and 
local unit of the police) and to local guards. Beggars did not describe having to give chanda to the 
police, however the relationship between Anwar and the police, guards or political parties remained 
unclear to me.   
170 Globally there is very little literature on savings groups among beggars. An intriguing and rare 
example comes from Mayhew’s (2012 [1861]) account of 19th century beggars in London. Mayhew 
describes a ‘society’ called the ‘Cadger’s Club’, the term cadger being roughly equivalent to scrounger. 
The Cadger Club was intended as a mutual self help society for beggars against arrest or sickness. 
Mayhew documented the account of a beggar: ‘We paid 3d. [‘d’ is an abbreviation for a penny] a week 
each—no women were members—for thirteen weeks, and then shared what was in hand, and began for 
the next thirteen, receiving new members and transacting the usual business of a club. This has been 
discontinued these five years; the landlord cut away with the funds. We get up raffles, and help one 
another in the best way we can now. At one time we had forty-five members, besides the secretary, the 




enquiring about this possibility. Another, from a young woman, was if anyone tried to 
take money from me I would kick his arse!  
Unlike previous sardar, Anwar’s activities are confined to running a samiti as a 
savings and credit group. Local people call it the cripples samiti (lengra samiti). 
Anwar is the President, while another beggar Delwar is the Secretary. Unlike the 
others samiti mentioned above, Anwar in fact gives interest of 5 per cent per year on 
the deposits members make, while he lends out at 10-20 per cent a month. As Taslim, 
who lives opposite the beggars, explained, the principle is that it is 10 taka per name. 
if you give 10 names you give 100 taka. You have to give everyday. Every year they 
run an event (onosthan) where the group’s members can collect their money and 
choose whether to re-deposit it. For each name they have they also get a portion of 
chicken palao171. The dynamics of a samiti and the activities of previous sardar are 
important to acknowledge, as there is very limited information about the social lives 
of beggars in Dhaka and more generally Bangladesh. There is some limited anecdotal 
and historical evidence to suggest a history of beggars in Bangladesh acting 
collectively and even violently. A journalist who knew these sardar personally 
recalled the strength of another beggar leader at the Supreme Court Arab Ali. Despite 
being drug addicted, he was powerful locally and when arrested in the early 2000s he 
mobilized 200 beggars to protest, which they apparently did by roaming the streets 
and biting policemen172.  
 
7.2. INEQUALITIES AND INJUSTICES 
Relationships between labour and leaders are often framed through familial labels, and 
spoken of as boro bhai, uncle, and ma. As highlighted, these figures not only provide 
access to work, security, political positioning or a samiti, but far more holistic support 
and guidance. Like family, they are seen in moral terms, judged to be good, to be fair, 
to be ethical, or otherwise. These labels then encapsulate the affection and dependency 
people have on them. They can provide sensitive support, life guidance, and protection 
like a family; and these dynamics to the relationships constitute part of the strength 
that these leaders have, and that the groups have. These relationships become all the 
more significant for people disconnected from their actual families. Part of this 
                                                 
171 An unanswered question also mentioned in the methodology regarding Anwar’s samiti is how he 
enforces repayment. Given he himself is almost entirely paralysed this presents interesting questions.  
172 Little is known about how beggars mobilise. One significant exception is the ‘fakir movement’, 
where fakir mobilised in opposition to the colonial state at the end of the 18th century (Lewis 2011: 51). 
A source from the Bangladeshi National Archives provides a further much smaller example, describing 
‘beggars’ agitation in Barisal town’: ‘During the month of May, 1943 almost all the beggar women of 
Barisal town started looting bags of rice from the leaded carts, passing through the street. On one 
occasion they assembled near the Collectorate building and took forcible possession of some bags of 
rice from a cart. On receipt of message from the Additional District Magristrate, the police hastened to 
the spot and dispersed the beggers. They went so far with their agitation that they started looting sundry 
articles from the shops and open market in the town’ (Superintendent of Police in Bakarganj, 1943a). 
Bakarganj is an Upazila in Barisal District. The letter goes on to describe the police patrols necessary 
to control the beggar looters.  
144 
 
solidarity comes from the fact that they are from the same ranks as the workers 
underneath them. Rubel and Parvez both grew up without parents at the bazar, they 
were tokai, thieves and labourers. Rimi was a sex worker. Jewel a sewage worker. 
Anwar was, and still is, a beggar.  
And yet these leaders stand above their workers. Parvez and Rubel have done well, 
moved out from the bazar and established a family life. Jewel described to me his 
house elsewhere in Dhaka, and Anwar, though begging everyday, lives in a house 
towards Old Dhaka (in the south of the city) with his wife and family. Each however 
needs to come, and often sleep in these places, in order to maintain their connection 
with the workers and fulfil their role. Saleka, an NGO worker, explained why Rimi 
sleeps outside the Prothom Alo office 
This is her choice; if she stays on the street then she can keep good 
communication with people. Like the coolie, like the traders, like the truck 
drivers, like the high class people, government staff, police and administrative 
people, everyone knows her. The high-class executives from WASA have very 
good relations with her. She maintains a good relationship with all these 
people. But if she lives in a house then it wouldn’t be possible, all these people 
won’t visit her.  
While these labour leaders have a solidarity with their workers, those who they provide 
work to, or in the case of Anwar, those who deposit in his samiti, there is a significant 
gap in status. Even by middle-class standards, these labour leaders can be wealthy.   
As an indication of Dulal sardar’s relative status, he has three children all of whom 
have graduated to masters level and he also owns a local pharmacy in Farmgate which 
his son manages. To a lesser extent Rubel and Parvez were perceived as doing very 
well from managing the contracts, collecting samiti money, and taking money for 
fighting. As Sayeed explained of Parvez leading the group into fights, he would collect 
the whole 30,000 taka and keep it all for himself. Jewel spoke of his huge TV, arms 
outstretched, and the four rooms in his home. A journalist who interviewed the old 
beggar sardar in the early 2000s described them as being very wealthy. Nur Islam for 
example reportedly owned 30-40 rickshaws, a car, kathas173 of land in kamrangichar 
bosti (to the South-west of Dhaka), and was even able to send his son abroad to be 
educated to Bachelors level. Looking at the samiti today, Anwar has been able to 
educate his family, some to university level, and sent a brother abroad to work. An 
NGO worker described intending to pay for the burial of Delwar’s (the cripples’ samiti 
secretary) wife when she suddenly died. She said: 
We thought he’s our participant so we have to help bury her, but when we went 
there [to the funeral] we saw we were of no weight… I saw that all his relatives 
                                                 
173 A katha is a common unit of land measurement in South Asia, and is 720 square feet.  
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were coming on motorcycles. Then one of his relatives told me that Delwar 
owns a 5 storey high building in Jatrabari! 
There is also the sense among some workers that these leaders are exploitative, they 
are profiting at the expense of their workers, they are “cheater”. I heard this most often 
from people outside each of these groups, those who know them intimately but are 
looking inwards. A number of beggars around the Supreme Court who were not within 
Anwar’s samiti complained about the low rate of interest and the amount of profit 
Anwar was getting. As Izaz put it delicately  
 It’s like bamboo in the arse! [goay bash] The guy who will manage the samiti, 
he will have all the profits, and he will give me only the bones [haddi] and 
sticks [dandy]. Say you establish a samiti and you have 50 members. If you 
can accumulate 50,000 taka then you can lend it to someone for profit [labe 
lagani], 10 percent per month. 120 percent per year. You are making 100 taka 
per thousand, per month so you have 5000 taka profit per month. So in 11 
months how much profit would it be? And what would they give us?  
Rather than investing the money, they charge interest, identified as immoral, as usury 
(shude lagai). As well as the sense of injustice in the distribution of benefits, samiti 
are notorious for being set-up and then the cashier running away with the capital. I 
have met people living on the pavement who had invested thousands, even tens of 
thousands of taka, in samiti, only for it to be stolen. Another beggar described to me 
having done two samiti in the past, but all the money being eaten. I asked him who ate 
it and he responded: a tiger!  
Similar sentiments are often expressed about relationships with the sardar. There is a 
common sense that labourers are not paid the real rate, that the sardar takes an unfair 
cut, being able to do so due to a labour surplus. Marium, the NGO cleaner we heard 
from previously, described to me having been part of a small team working for a 
woman selling towels next to Karwan Bazar, she said: if you have capital… then you 
have strength (jor). If she was able to sell 10 towels then she would get 10 taka, be 
fed once, and have a shower paid for. But she used to give me very little opportunity. 
She became rich, but I stayed poor. Me and the other girls used to curse her (bod doa 
– bad prayer). Commenting on Jewel’s payment to the Jubo League, Anika said  
The money Jewel gives doesn’t come from selling his ancestral land, Jewel 
makes work for 10 guys, and he takes money from them by ass fucking them... 
He takes 30 taka per person. Even if they get 200 taka, he will take 30 taka. If 
he can take this from only 10 people then it’s a huge amount.  
It is these kinds of sentiments that I encountered strongly at Karwan Bazar. Despite 
the rhetoric of the jupri group not being under Dulal sardar, they had a much more 
intimate relationship to him than they would have liked. The sense among the jupri 
labourers is that the sardar are “cheater”. Liton described arriving in Karwan Bazar 
and finding work under a sardar - I didn’t understand the system here and so went 
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with a sardar [Dulal]. But as soon as I understood, that’s when I left! The jupri group 
continued to have grievance against Dulal sardar however. At its most basic, the 
dispute concerned control over work. Within the jupri group they felt they had too 
many men for too few trucks, and looked enviously at Dulal’s supply the other side of 
jupri goli. They had previously worked under Dulal, he taught us everything, Liton 
told me174. Not only did he have a greater supply for his men, but he was also making 
advances into their territory. He was trying to take chanda, as one driver put it, trying 
to take a rent for the space, thereby taking a cut of their earnings. During one of my 
first encounters with Parvez he had told me, the sardar are thieves… if they try and 
stop us we will beat them.  
7.3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that a key way in which the kangali are included into the social 
order is through the intermediation of labour leaders. Labour leaders take diverse 
forms but are often referred to as sardar, and in the research contexts studied can be 
found among labourers, sex workers, thieves and beggars. Labour leaders play 
complex roles in the lives of those who work under them, providing access to work, 
security, savings systems, advice and support, and also a status in relation to the wider 
social order. Some groups of labourers such as the jupri group function as factions, in 
conflict with other groups for work and seeking opportunities and status in relation to 
the ruling coalition. Such groups have a clear capability for direct violence, and are 
utilised by local wings and associated bodies of political parties on this basis. The 
ability to fight is a key quality for labourers in such groups. In the urban context groups 
of labour can represent the lowest form of faction within or in opposition to a ruling 
coalition, a fact not acknowledged by literature to date. The status of a leader within 
groups of labour, and the status of the group in relation to the ruling coalition, are not 
static, but evolve and are negotiated. The following chapter substantiates these 
arguments and deepen insight into the role of labour leaders in the social order, through 
examining a dominant way in which the kangali negotiate their status and access to 






                                                 
174 It is important to realise that I am just picking up the story of these struggles and alliances mid-story. 
It appears that previously the jupri group had been directly under Dulal sardar, and the process by 
which wanted to they break away from his control was a long one, of which events described in the 
next chapter were just a small part.  
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8. DEMONSTRATING A CAPABILITY FOR VIOLENCE 
 
Do you know what Bangladeshi politics is? It’s capture, beat, cut, slash, rip, 
escape!175 
Salam, a jupri labourer at Karwan Bazar 
 
This thesis has built on the argument that social order in Bangladesh, like much of the 
world, is based on a coalition of actors maintaining a superior capability for violence 
over rivals (North et al 2009). This coalition is formed from actors at different 
hierarchical levels of society who use their capability for violence to extract resources 
from society enabling them to maintain their status (Khan 2010a). A key conceptual 
step taken in this thesis is to connect this understanding of social order to the lives of 
the poor through the notion of intermediation, and thereby explore empirically how 
the organisation of violence affects the kangali. Following the understanding of social 
order described above, it was posited that a means by which a ruling coalition obtains 
the resources they need to maintain their status is through mediating the access that 
others have to resources. This suggests a relationship between intermediation and a 
capability for violence. Previous chapters have argued that social order from the 
perspective of the kangali reflects this. These chapters have illustrated what this social 
order looks like, with arguments concerning the decline of mastan gangs, the 
significance of party political actors, the roles of labour leaders as a key intermediary 
connecting the kangali to party political factions, and the complex interdependencies 
that these relationships represent.  
An important question that has not so far been addressed but emerges from this 
framework, is how the kangali negotiate their status within the urban social order. Put 
another way, if the kangali face a range of intermediaries who control access to 
resources, then a critical question becomes how they become intermediaries, or as 
intermediaries, how they increase their control over resources. Indeed, historically 
there was a close connection between the kangali and mastan gangs, as there was also 
between the rootless people and goonda in Kolkata (Ghosh 1991); and the previous 
chapter also argued that labour leaders most often come from the same background as 
the workers they manage, suggesting that the kangali can move up hierarchically 
within the social order. The answer to these questions that emerges from the fieldwork 
and aligns with the framework developed, is that becoming an intermediary is 
premised on demonstrating a sufficient capability for violence. Establishing this 
capability is essential because the nature of intermediation is tied to how social order 
is maintained. Intermediation is a means by which a ruling coalition accrues resources, 
and attempts to gain greater control over resources in such contexts have to contend 
with the likelihood that actors within the ruling coalition either directly control or are 
                                                 
175 dhoro, maro, kato, tchero, fero, bereo jao! 
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in someway profiting from how those resources are currently distributed. Disrupting 
existing intermediary arrangements means altering the balance of power within and in 
relation to this coalition.  
This chapter explores how establishing a superior capability for violence to rivals 
requires both having this capability and also demonstrating it. Previous chapters have 
explored how this capability is associated with the ability to directly use force, as well 
as the ability to call on others who can use force. The cases explored in this chapter 
build on these understandings by illustrating how a capability for violence is 
constituted by a number of characteristics coalescing and mutually reinforcing each 
other. Together these give insight into what Khan (2010b) defined as ‘holding power’, 
the ability to engage and survive in conflict. Cases show how in the context of a 
faction, the ability to mobilise members towards violence, and call on more senior 
support, are both constituted by, and contingent on, a number of further factors 
including one’s position in relation to the ruling coalition, the control of capital and 
material incentives, and the bonds that can exist within complex interdependencies. 
Having capital and the ability to distribute benefits are essential in a faction, however 
more complex interdependencies are constituted by the personality of a leader, the 
support, the love, the confidence and trust that can exist in longer-term relationships. 
Cases suggest that a weakness in any of these areas can undermine a capability for 
violence, for example an inability to control and distribute resources, a question mark 
over one’s character or an ill thought out allegiance.  
This chapter also explores a capability for violence is a characteristic which – to serve 
its purpose - must also be demonstrated. Indeed, successfully waging violence serves 
to indicate to others that it is you who has a rightful place to control the resources 
fought over (Khan 2010b). Writing in the context of India, Berenschot (2011: 269) 
similarly argues that the ‘violence of a goonda is a performative act’ designed to instill 
a sense of authority in the wider community, and thereby show one’s legitimacy for 
wider roles such as settling disputes or running extortion rackets. To help to 
understand this argument it is useful to return to the distinction introduced in chapter 
two, regarding Lukes’ three dimensions of power. Of particular importance is the 
distinction between Lukes’ first dimension – the power to force someone to do 
something; and the third dimension – the power to control people’s references. Framed 
in terms of violence this first dimension can mean the capability to directly coerce 
people through force, while in the third dimension it refers to how a capability for 
violence enables one to influence what others perceive to be or not to be possible 
without necessarily using violence. Viewed in this way, the logic of demonstrating a 
capability for violence is to be able to develop power in the third sense. When 
sufficiently demonstrated, acts of violence instill in others a sense of one’s capability 
for violence, thereby influencing how others perceive the legitimate role of that actor 
within the context and society. The intention of demonstrating this violence is then not 
to be required to use it, as others perceive the costs or challenging it as too great; and 
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hence a greater capability for violence is associated with a lower need to use it (Tilly 
2003; Khan 2010a).  
This chapter develops this argument and explores some of the complexity in how a 
capability for violence is constituted and demonstrated. The empirical narrative of this 
chapter continues the story of the jupri group, and surrounds events in late 2014 and 
early 2015 when they attempted to take territory from Dulal sardar, and mobilised in 
support of the BNP. This took place within a climate in which opposition to the Awami 
League was being violently confronted, significantly affecting the outcome for the 
group. Emerging within this story are the unsuccessful manoeuvrings of Liton to form 
a new faction to challenge Dulal sardar, as well as Parvez, Rubel and Azad176. These 
events further reinforce many of the arguments developed in preceding chapters 
regarding the connection between intermediation, violence, party politics and labour 
leaders; and constitute part of what was conceptualised in chapter two as the ‘politics 
of intermediation’.   
8.1. FIGHTING THE RULING COALITION 
Violence is fundamental to how the jupri group pursue opportunities at Karwan Bazar. 
Rubel, Parvez and labourers within the group often framed the possibilities for 
improving their status in terms of a need to fight, whether it was in relation to the 
group gaining control over more contracts for goods coming to the bazar, or how 
people become linemen or political leaders177. I was often told, half jokingly: you’re 
with us, so you will also have to fight! The events explored in this half of the chapter 
suggest that establishing a superior capability for violence to rivals is fundamental to 
how the kangali become intermediaries and improve their status, be it as a labour 
leader or party political actor. The events illustrate the interdependency between 
different characteristics, which contribute to a capability for violence, in particular the 
relative strength of capital and labour, and most critically, the significance of one’s 




                                                 
176 It is important to acknowledge that these forms of mobilisation are high risk, and the majority of the 
kangali are not sufficiently organised or motivated to attempt such strategies. Groups of women are not, 
in my experience at least, organised in ways resembling these, and many such men do not work as 
organised labour. Given that the people studied – labourers in a bazar – are similar to much broader 
groups of the urban poor, it is likely that the dynamics described here have broader applicability, and 
indeed experiences in Karwan Bazar suggest that this is the case.  
177 I cannot of course prove that alternative routes to gaining status and becoming more powerful 
intermediaries at the bazar were not possible, but only that they were not apparent from events observed, 
nor from how the group conceptualised such processes. Furthermore, the relationship between other 
forms of labour leaders – for example the disabled beggar Anwar who runs a samiti – and a capability 
for violence is less clear.   
150 
 
8.1.1. JUPRI VS. THE SARDAR (PLUS THE POLICE AND THE CHATTRO LEAGUE) 
Bengalis are bad. If you give them a chance they will take everything, that’s what 
we’re like 
Dulal sardar 
Through immersing myself in the world of the jupri group I had heard all sorts of 
grievances against Dulal sardar – he was blocking their work, he was trying to take 
chanda, he was taking a cut of their earnings, he grabs the rights of the poor (goribder 
hoq maira kai)178. When the group discussed Dulal and what to do about him, violence 
was at the forefront of their solutions. Prior to events described here, Rakib once asked 
me rhetorically, will we really allow people to block our work? We’re the ones who 
work for our rice. We can’t sit silently. Shouldn’t I fight for my own money? Liton 
would often explain how to the group had to fight to resolve the problem179. For over 
twenty years Dulal sardar had controlled the contract to unload the carrot trucks 
coming to Karwan Bazar, but towards the end of 2014 the jupri group’s disaffection 
with him was mobilised into action.  
Though I had picked up on the increased intensity of these private remonstrations 
against Dulal sardar, I was nonetheless surprised when I arrived at Karwan Bazar on 
the 15th of December 2014, and was immediately told of events the previous night. 
The anti-sardar sentiments that had been building for months manifested into what 
was portrayed as an anti-sardar strike. By 9pm the previous night around seventy of 
the jupri group had blockaded the main entrance to the vegetable wholesale market, 
demanding that Dulal sardar be got rid of – feelings such as if we don’t get the work, 
no-one will! and it is either us or the sardar! were expressed to me. Blockading the 
bazar was an assertion of the jupri group’s identity, a ‘contentious performance’ (Tilly 
and Tarrow 2007)180. Not allowing the flow of goods even for a couple of hours could 
have serious financial consequences at the market. The group knew, Liton and others 
explained, that the market authorities and the wholesalers would either have to give in 
or fight them off, a potentially dangerous move with a group so large. In line with 
Khan’s notion of ‘holding power’ (Khan 2010b), the purpose of a strike was to 
demonstrate the potential costs that the group could impose on others using their 
capability for violence.  
Although I never discovered Dulal’s own agreement with the Awami League, his 
labourers paid the Jubo League five taka for each bag of vegetables they unloaded into 
the bazar, whereas the jupri group did not pay anything. Challenging a sardar who 
has been established for over twenty years therefore disrupts the balance of power at 
Karwan Bazar and directly affects more senior figures in changing their power base. 
                                                 
178 People call him the fake police (boa police) behind his back, and this is a way of questioning his 
authority.  
179 Though Liton advocated action against Dulal and participated in the strike, he left the group before 
the fighting, as will be discussed in more detail in section 8.2.  
180 ‘Contentious performances’ are ‘relatively familiar and standardized ways in which one set of 
political actors makes claims on some other set of political actors’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 11).  
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In line with this, local Awami League leaders from Tejgaon got involved, and there 
was reportedly even the intervention from the area’s MP. Despite the group’s BNP 
connections, the strike was ostensibly successful. Negotiations with the Awami 
League leaders led to Dulal leaving the bazar, fearing being beaten up, and it allowed 
the jupri group – led by Parvez and Rubel - to take over his contracts181. Rather than 
having access to only a few of the trucks in their lane, they took over all of them. Nazir 
explained 
The carrots used to be controlled by Dulal sardar, it was under their system. 
But now we have brought them into our system. They unloaded them for 20 
years! We didn’t say anything, they didn’t allow us to work them. Now we have 
become united, we are 150 drivers and have pressurised them. We have taken 
control. Now we work by sharing them182. 
Unlike Dulal, so the word went at the time, Rubel and Parvez would not take the cut 
that Dulal was taking, and therefore the van drivers would benefit more greatly and 
equally. Though he was not identified by most as having become a sardar, Rubel 
played a similar structural role. I remember seeing his men monitor and record the 
arrival of goods, and him take responsibility for paying not only van drivers, but also 
the coolie. As a young labourer Sayeed later described it, Rubel took the sardari 
(sardari neyechilo). Over the coming days a series of further meetings took place 
involving purano lok (old people)183 from the group who had moved on, and also local 
politicians including Tejgaon Awami League leader Maula Bhai184. There seemed to 
be an agreement that Dulal could keep the ownership of his 12 vans, and thereby still 
earn his 1200 taka rent a day, but would lose control over the contracts, thereby losing 
his cut, and his status. Dulal sardar became simply Dulal. The jupri group included 
many (but not all) of his men, recognising that they also have families and need to 
earn, as Liton put it.  
Tension however remained. A few days later when hanging out at Karwan Bazar, the 
group were subdued and reluctant to talk. Liton told me there might be a big fight. 
Someone might even get killed... It’s not safe to talk about these things… Let’s talk 
about something else. Less than a week later it became apparent that Dulal, the elderly 
and experienced sardar of decades, was not to be stopped so easily. Around 7 or 8pm 
on the 21st of December I got an innocuous seeming call from Liton, asking whether I 
was coming to the bazar that evening. Something about the tone of the conversation 
                                                 
181 Retrospectively people’s descriptions of Rubel’s interests differed slightly. Salman’s interpretation 
of Rubel’s interests for example were - Rubel wants to split the work with the sardar, for 6 months he 
will take the orders, then the other 6 months the sardar will take them. 
182 As this passage indicates, Dulal’s labourers joined Rubel, Parvez and Azad’s group rather than 
attempting to fight them off.  
183 The reference to old people from the group implied people who had previously been within the jupri 
group but that had moved on to more senior positions elsewhere.  
184 Though I was invited by the jupri group to attend these meetings with local Awami League members, 
I chose not to go as I felt my presence could have complicated the situation at the bazar and 
compromised my position, potentially posing problems for my safety in the future.   
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struck me as odd and arriving the next morning, a week after the strike, I found only 
a few of the jupri group. Shumon approached me with his usual smile but winced as I 
shook his hand; it was swollen and cut. The night before (the 21st of December) Dulal 
sardar had hired the Chattro League to come and fight off the jupri group, enabling 
him to retake control. Dulal’s inability to mobilise the labourers under his command 
did not mean that he could not demonstrate a capability for violence, which he did so 
through directly paying people within the ruling party to fight for him. Salam 
described the event to me:  
We completely beat them up. Dulal sardar paid students from the universities 
and colleges, they came at us at around 9pm in front of the bank. It lasted for 
two hours. When one of them hit Parvez that’s when we all went crazy and 
fucked them up. Azad brought his guys and smashed a hook into one guy’s 
head. He’s a chamcha. He’s in Dhaka Medical and will take six months to 
recover. They were taught the lesson of their lifetime 
Despite winning the fight, jupri were defeated however when the Chattro League 
called in the police, forcing the group to flee. The group scattered and the Chattro 
League subsequently took control of the jupri lane, posting men in the area to make 
sure they did not return. When I saw a few other member of the jupri group at the 
bazar they spoke to me in whispers, looking over my shoulder at the Chattro League 
men. Salam was optimistic however - we will get rid of this motherfucker… He has 
lots of money but we have lots of people, so we will see how long he can continue with 
his money. Pumped up by the thought of the fight Salam told me they had 500 men, 
exaggerating, and that if anyone gets near him he will take out his machine (gun) and 
bang bang, though I was quite certain he did not have a gun.  
I returned the next morning (the 23rd) and at first could not find any of the jupri group 
at all. As I was leaving I bumped into Abul, a slightly older member of the group, who 
took me to the opposite side of the bazar, up a small staircase where there was a remote 
tea stall and no-one around. Rubel was there with a few of the group looking downcast. 
Offering me tea and a cigarette, he explained the situation: 
After we took the work Dulal offered us 3.5 lakh to give it back, but we didn’t 
agree. He acted over us, spread a rumour and arranged the fighting. Because 
we didn’t take their money, they brought the “killer”185. They had 70 people. 
They brought the boys from Chattro League and paid them 2 lakh to fight, 
though they offered us 3.5 lakh. Our mistake was that we didn’t accept the 
money. 
But what can you do now? I asked. I know one person at a higher level, replied Rubel, 
but it won’t work. Taka taka taka, Dulal chipped in. The Chattro League had not only 
called in the police to push off the jupri group, but Dulal sardar had a further strategy 
to play: he launched police cases (mumla) against key jupri members at Tejgaon police 
                                                 
185 “Killer” is a common way of referring to hired muscle, and refers to the Chattro League here.  
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station. As Rubel put it – he made a charge sheet against us that we pressured him 
and took away the goods from him (a seemingly quite accurate picture of what 
happened, regardless of their grievances). The point of primary contention had been 
the unloading of the carrot trucks. Dulal sardar launched a case against the three boro 
bhai, Rubel, Parvez and Azad and eight others.186 This forced them into semi-hiding. 
They became fugitives (ferari) as Rubel put it. How can you resolve this I repeated? 
With money it can be solved… David Bhai, you don’t know anyone who can help do 
you?... I know no-one like this, I am just a student, was my formulaic but honest 
response. Before I left I heard them plan their next move. Rubel instructed: we will 
attack them again after azan. So we need to buy some “monkey tupee” (balaclava). 
Returning a few days later after celebrating Christmas, I found Rubel back outside 
WASA sitting on one of his rickshaw vans behind the parked buses. He had evidently 
found a way to resolve the situation, at least for himself, and brushed off my question 
about how he had managed it. He explained that two of those with cases against them 
were in prison (including Azad), while the rest had got bail (jamin). Though released 
they remained fugitives. Why? I asked. Because they used to do BNP. Their party 
doesn’t have any power now. Parvez does BNP as well. Rubel explained. An 
undertone to these events, but one not made explicit during them to me, were the 
group’s BNP connections. I noticed how Rubel began to soften his portrayal of his 
political affiliation. At the post fight tea stall he had been adamant in telling me that 
we aren’t BNP, we aren’t Awami, we are workers (sramik). On this occasion he told 
me that I’m both BNP and Awami. I do both, it depends on the situation. They are the 
same187.  
One of the group’s younger van drivers, Salman explained that the BNP’s people came 
to fight against the sardar, they showed their power (komota). Azad (the “fireman”) 
was most closely associated with being a BNP person and having a capability for 
violence, and it was he who almost killed a member of the Chattro League by 
smashing a hook188 into his head. It was difficult to verify an interpretation of why 
these events unfolded the way they did (given the sensitivity of the topic and me being 
unable to return to Dhaka to follow up further six months on), however a likely 
interpretation is that what began as a conflict over work became a political conflict. 
When Rubel and Parvez refused to accept Dulal’s offer of 3.5 lakh taka to return the 
work, Dulal was forced to try and call on an actor who could violently challenge the 
jupri group, enabling him to demonstrate a superior capability for violence and re-
establish dominance. These “killer” were the Chattro League189, though as it turned 
out they lost in their fight to the jupri group. Before and during the fight, the jupri 
                                                 
186 Rubel also mentioned that there were two cases launched – one from Dulal sardar regarding carrots, 
and another regarding the cabbages of a nearby vegetable wholesaler Ratul.  
187 He went on to say, both are ladies and ladies have something less than men. 
188 The long metal stick with a sharp hook at the end that coolie use for picking up bags. 
189 Though I attempted to find out, I never understood why he chose to call on the Chattro League in 
particular. It is worth noting that the Chattro League did not have a big presence within the market 
itself, though were present north of the bazar at Tejgaon, and perhaps it was too complicated to call on 
a wing of the Awami League from within the bazar.  
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group were calling on all of the people they knew to help them, and given their close 
connection with the BNP, BNP members came to fight. The fight was now explicitly 
political at a time when any support for the BNP was being violently confronted by 
the police, RAB and the Awami League. This perhaps bolstered the forcefulness of 
the police in subsequently pursuing cases against key members within the group. 
Though helping them win the fight, the BNP connections were a liability for the group, 
particularly for Parvez and also for Azad, who was still in jail (and stayed in jail for 
the remainder of my research).  
Meanwhile Dulal managed to maintain his status through payments. As Liton 
explained: Dulal sardar doesn’t have a good situation but he still has lots of money – 
so he can pay his people to come and protect him. Others told me that if Dulal sardar 
did not continue to pay the Awami League he would have to flee the market. In terms 
of work, the situation returned to how it was prior to the strike, resting on an uneasy 
peace. Dulal reclaimed his trucks, but was too cautious to return back to the bazar, 
managing everything through his men. Rubel and the jupri retained theirs, and Parvez 
continued running his samiti, turning up infrequently at the bazar, but only staying a 
short while and mostly coming during the daytime. Life seemed to settle down, only 
for it to become far more serious for Parvez and Rubel.  
8.1.2. SUPPORTING THE OPPOSITION 
All the jupri group support BNP because the current Prime Minister received 
an award from the UN that she alleviated poverty from this country, but there 
is a huge amount of poor people. She told lies and received that award. 
Sheikh Hasina has a bad character – what she says, she doesn’t do. But she 
is very educated. This government isn’t able to provide security. She’s 
especially not able to protect the poor people. Now the poor people are going 
to the police station and giving their complaints but there’s no justice for 
them. The rich people are capturing the poor people’s children. Nowadays 
we see that one kilo of rice is 50 taka, so how can people who have big 
families survive? The richest people in society are keeping the poor people 
under pressure, and that’s why the poor people don’t like the Awami 
League… This is a country of democracy, it’s not a country of kings. When a 
king dies his son comes to power. It’s not like this here. It shouldn’t be like 
those kings, so we should vote, but she’s not giving us this opportunity. She’s 
actually illegal but presenting herself as legal.   
Rubel, jupri boro bhai 
Late 2014 and early 2015, the period during which the conflict described above took 
place, was highly unsettled in Bangladesh. Khaleda Zia was put under effective house 
arrest (though in her office) and the BNP’s attempts to organise blockades (operad) 
and strikes (hartal) had very limited success. A few years previously calling a hartal 
had meant a serious threat of violence, in effect shutting down most areas of the city. 
By this period however the city was almost as busy as normal on hartal days, and the 
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ability of the opposition to mobilise labour on the streets was widely recognised as 
diminished. As a result, the opposition appeared to resort to more desperate and 
extreme measures to demonstrate their capability for violence and publically question 
the ability of the ruling Awami League to maintain order. Between January 5th and 
February 24th there were approximately 119 deaths due to political violence in the 
country (Bergman 2015), including ruling party and opposition activists, as well as 
many civilians targeted in cocktail blasts in public spaces and petrol bombs on buses. 
Understanding the role of the jupri group during this period illuminates a different 
means by which the group attempted to improve their status through violence. It also 
illustrates the street level dynamics of political violence (Atkinson-Sheppard 2015; 
BRAC 2016) and deepens our understanding of the relationship between organised 
labour and party politics.  
At the end of December I had expressed fear to Rubel about continuing to come down 
to Karwan Bazar. The 5th of January had been lined up as a showdown, the one-year 
anniversary of the 2014 general elections, which the BNP had boycotted and the 
Awami League had therefore won by a landslide. Rubel agreed, there could be 
problems. It will be everywhere. There will be fighting, shooting, bombs, stabbings. 
So maybe I shouldn’t come down? I suggested. He responded 
There won’t be any problems because you’re friends with the boys who would 
be doing it. And the main thing is that their target is the Awami League. In the 
fighting people can see from your face that you are a foreigner. But if someone 
gets inside the fight then what can be done? Otherwise we know you well, you 
can come no problem. 
My suspicions about their involvement had been sparked by his comments, but others 
in the group seemed to express genuine fear about the spate of mysterious cocktail 
blasts and fires at Karwan Bazar over the next month or so. These targeted buses, 
police and the underpass beneath Kazi Nazrul Islam Avenue. On at least one occasion 
they made national news (The Daily Star, 2015b). The report describes ‘miscreants’ 
throwing ‘at least two crude bombs’ at a bus in the north of the bazar, hurting the 
driver. By this time I had expanded my research sites southwards, and only visited 
Karwan Bazar a couple of times a week. In early February the intensity of buses and 
CNGs targeted, as well as the occasional sound of cocktail bombs going off at my new 
research location by Dhaka University, persuaded me to lay low and write for a couple 
of weeks, as well as spend time at the National Archives. 
I returned to Karwan Bazar on the 23rd of February to find the fates of Parvez and 
Rubel had changed quite radically. Around the 10th of February Parvez was – so the 
jupri group allege - suddenly taken by RAB. Akash, who saw the incident, described 
the former Sajid walking along with RAB who were dressed in white clothes (civil 
clothes). Pointing out Parvez, they allegedly grabbed him, and took him down to near 
WASA where - according to others - they tied him to Shumon’s rickshaw van and 
crushed or smashed his hands and feet before arresting him. The night before I arrived 
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(the 22nd of February), RAB had reportedly returned around 7:30pm taking Rubel, and 
he was at that point in Dhaka Central Jail. Akash, who rents one of Rubel’s vans, 
interpreted it like this: people say that those with beards are working for Shibir190, 
they placed a case against him as a suspect of Shibir. 
The charges – which all the labourers in the jupri group agreed were true – were that 
they had been doing BNP politics, orchestrating the local bombings. They had been 
paying the younger children associated with the jupri group191 (and often the nearby 
NGO centres) to torch buses, start fires and throw molatov cocktails. Mamun was 
angry that his younger brother had also been arrested, pointed out by Sajid, and 
charged with vandalising a car under BNP instructions. Golap described how they had 
forced the younger children associated with the group  
They [Rubel, Parvez, Azad] make them throw bombs. They put pressure on 
them. Like today I’ve come here to the centre, and if they ask me to clean the 
floor then I will do it, because otherwise I won’t be able to come here 
tomorrow. So, it’s like this. It’s mandatory.  
Some saw these arrests as a continuation of their conflict with the sardar, though Liton 
was adamant that this was entirely separate. In his own words 
This time it is a political problem, but that time it wasn’t political. That time 
he was taken by the police and charged. But this time he was captured by the 
RAB. And you know RAB only capture those who do big crimes192. If there is a 
case placed then the police come to get you. But RAB come with the law section 
54 that they just have doubt. They take with 54 then beat them and get 
information193. 
Liton’s adamance that the previous conflict was not a political (raznatik) problem is 
interesting given the clear involvement of the Chattro League, the BNP, and Rubel’s 
explanation of how problematic the BNP ties were at that stage. What it seemed to me 
he was indicating is that although that conflict involved political actors it concerned 
territory for work, whereas the political violence here was at the behest of the BNP 
and focused on establishing the dominance of the BNP as a political force and 
coalition. His analysis was that Parvez had been beaten and given information and that 
RAB had a long list of people they would take one by one. Rubel would be beaten, 
then another would be taken, and so on. A number of the group reflected that Rubel 
                                                 
190 Bangladesh Chattra Shibir is the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islamic party currently in 
coalition with the BNP.   
191 Some of these children were the younger siblings of labourers within the jupri group, others were 
scavengers and thieves at the market who associated with the jupri group. As mentioned in chapter five, 
the jupri group are a common entry point for young kangali children seeking work or affiliation, due to 
the shared background, with most of the group having grown up at the bazar.  
192 Liton was not here saying that RAB catch all of those who commit big crimes, but rather contrasting 
the nature of the crimes that they do address compared to the police.  
193 Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the authorities the right to arrest someone under 
suspicion of a crime.  
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would get out, but would have to pay huge amounts of money. Maybe when he gets 
out Rubel will kill the former, Nijam reflected. By this time Parvez had been released 
on bail, having paid 50,000 taka194, his hands and feet were fractured, and though he 
could walk, he could not work. He was staying with family in Tongi (in Gazipur, north 
of Dhaka), and visited the bazar occasionally by day, though his samiti had broken up 
and he therefore no longer received the daily 700 taka. As we walked slightly away 
from the bazar towards Tejgaon station, Liton told me that Parvez himself had now 
become a former. They had beaten him and convinced him, saying he would get paid. 
He’s really proud now. He thinks he’s a big person again, saying that he’s now a RAB 
person. He still has the BNP links, but they are quiet now. 
When reflecting on events with younger rickshaw van drivers who were either within 
the jupri group, or who work nearby under different sardar, I tried to steer 
conversations round to the tricky subject of Rubel and Parvez. By this point they had 
both been taken by RAB, Parvez was out and Rubel in Dhaka Central Jail. I asked 
Mamun and Salman about why – given all these problems – they did BNP politics. 
Mamun replied straight faced and bluntly 
Love. As you love your Labour Party195, they love their party… If you like Awami 
League then of course you will support them and never BNP. If you support BNP 
you will not like Awami League.  
The sense that they were motivated by love, or conviction, is also indicated in the 
passionate speech Rubel had given me quoted at the beginning of this section. Salman 
reflected differently on their involvement however, saying they get different 
opportunities from different political parties. Mamun continued on this line of thought  
You know what the latest system is? It is to think about opportunities, then you 
just do the party which has power then you will get the opportunities. They are 
opportunists [shubida badi]. I’m also an opportunist.  
Liton had a similar analysis of their involvement: they do BNP because they think 
when they get into power they will become very rich men. The motivations for Rubel, 
Parvez and Azad to mobilise the jupri group behind the BNP are difficult to discern, 
partly because of a lack of data, but also because different motivations were expressed 
to me. Rubel’s passionate speech in favour of the BNP sat alongside him purposefully 
distancing himself from them when needed, or disregarding any difference between 
them and the Awami League, and labourers within the group described the relationship 
in terms of opportunities. What seems more clear is that it is unlikely the children who 
they involved in the bombings were motivated by ideological factors, but were – as 
                                                 
194 It was unclear from who this was paid to, however. Some said it was to a lawyer while others said it 
was to RAB.  
195 I had been interrogated elsewhere about my political affiliations in the UK, and the word had 
evidently spread. Both English words, Labour and Party, have strong resonance in Bangla, and people 
had interpreted it as a positive sign about my potential involvement with the jupri group.  
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Golap’s quote implies – at least in part forced to be involved under the threat of 
violence.  
Examining both cases of violent mobilisation – the conflict between the jupri group 
and Dulal sardar, and the jupri group’s orchestration of bombings on behalf of the 
BNP – suggests different ways in which demonstrating a capability for violence can 
be a route to gaining status. It may, as in the conflict with Dulal sardar, be through a 
direct demonstration of strength, where a group publically show they have superior 
violence capabilities than those currently in power; but it may also be through 
attempting to demonstrate the weakness of others, as in the case of orchestrating 
bombings on behalf of the BNP. In the latter case, the logic was not to directly confront 
the Awami League on the streets, but to demonstrate to wider society that the Awami 
League could not contain the opposition to them, and create an atmosphere of unrest 
in which new possibilities could emerge196. In both instances, the jupri group (and 
more specifically, leaders in the jupri group) perceived that demonstrating a capability 
for violence would present new opportunities, but in the first instance it was through 
directly taking new opportunities, and in the second, it was a speculation, a risky 
calculation that the opposition could gain power and they would be rewarded for their 
support. For months one particular member of the jupri group Liton had been highly 
critical of their alignment to the BNP, not for any ideological reasons, but because he 
saw it as a futile political calculation. Indeed, he had very different plans and ideas for 
the group, as is explored in the second half of this chapter.   
8.2. THE POLITICS OF SAVINGS  
This half of the chapter continues the case of the jupri group, further exploring how 
people attempt to improve their status through establishing and demonstrating a 
capability for violence. These sections tell the story of how one member within the 
jupri group attempted to form a faction, challenge the group’s existing leadership and 
pursue opportunities through the Awami League. The means by which he began this 
endeavour offers insight into the politics of savings groups; how forming a samiti can 
be a violent statement of intent and the seed for a party political faction. This argument 
reinforces many of the arguments developed in previous chapters, particularly the link 
between intermediation and violence, and the significance of labour leaders at the 




                                                 
196 It is important to note that at this time there was speculation that the Awami League themselves were 
orchestrating some bombings in order to discredit the opposition. This was a sentiment I also 




8.2.1. BECOMING A BORO BHAI 
For these twenty boys I’ve given four years of my life. I taught these boys honestly. 
With these twenty boys I will fight! If you want you can join us… 
Liton, speaking to me, January 2015 
Coming from the struggle with the sardar and failed attempts to increase their control 
of work (though prior to the arrests of Rubel and Parvez), a further struggle for power 
emerged. One of the senior members of the jupri group Liton, a boro bhai (in terms 
of age but not in terms of structure) was unhappy. Liton had fallen from a middle class 
life around four years previously through a process he always kept guarded – it was 
either bad luck, connected to the fact his wife had died, or politics, said as if the word 
itself provides sufficient explanation. Despite living at the bazar and driving a 
rickshaw van under jupri, his education and contacts set him apart from others. He had 
a reasonable command of basic English and described having “mental problems”, 
which he explained meant he would get angry and depressed. He has a scar running 
from one side of his mouth towards his ear and was probably in his mid 40s, his hair 
and stubble greying. He would not tell me his age and always promised to tell me 
about his political background fully, but never did.  
As tension had built with the sardar he had broken away from the jupri group, finding 
work delivering goods around Dhaka, and then later finding another van owner who 
he could rent from opposite Ershad building, to the north of the bazar. To do so he had 
had to learn how to ride a rickshaw van with a chain and pedals. He had become a 
“single man” as others put it197, despite remaining within the group socially and to 
sleep. This work earned him the equivalent if not more than those at jupri, and meant 
he had not been involved in the fighting with the Chattro League, though he had been 
very active in the initial strike. It also meant independence, a freedom, an ability to 
survive without being paid by Rubel. He was explicit about this, he explained to me 
how he had seen the trouble coming, knew it was stupid for Rubel and Parvez to have 
associated themselves so closely with BNP, and that it would end badly for them. 
Moving away from the jupri was (at least in his plans) his first strategic step to 
becoming a boro bhai. As he later explained it,  
Rubel and Parvez have been working on the BNP’s side. They’ve been 
vandalising, torching, throwing bombs…. that’s why I gave up being with them 
because I knew I would be blamed and captured like them. If I stayed with them 
RAB would also capture me. But I understood a long time ago so I slowly left 
them… and I’m fine now 
He held strong grievances against both Parvez and Rubel: I am so angry with Rubel 
and Parvez. I hate them. They said they would develop everyone but they just 
                                                 
197 “Single” refers to the type of van he was driving designed for long distance, as opposed to the vans 
with two layers of support to carry heavier loads.  
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developed themselves and their families, he once told me, echoing feelings often 
expressed about other labour leaders, as seen in the previous chapter. Upon getting 
access to the new trucks in December following the strike, Rubel, rather than allowing 
anyone within the jupri group to unload them, allocated these to a select group of 
around twenty drivers. Cutting through the discourse of “jupri against the sardar”, 
Liton was very critical that though they had got rid of one sardar, they had not replaced 
him with a new system, but simply someone who would act as a new sardar, though 
called something else. Put otherwise, the grievance then was that they had claimed to 
want to change the rules of the game, but once in control had done nothing of the sort. 
During the small period where the jupri group appeared to have successfully taken 
over from Dulal sardar, Liton described the situation as such  
Most of the group are happy because they think we have got rid of the sardar, 
but we didn’t, we just changed him, but they don’t know that. Previously the 
sardar was collecting the money and distributing, and now he’s [Rubel] doing 
the same but with more authority. Now you can’t even ask or question him. He 
says this is your share and you have to take it. He already used to have an 
area, so now he has two areas… he has senior political connections at Karwan 
Bazar, he has the links and so when the protest was going on he supported us. 
Now he has more political power. 
His claim then was that Rubel – like the sardar – was taking, or going to take, an 
unfair cut from the fee given to the group for transporting the goods, as well as 
mediating access to work within the group unfairly. With his authority extended he 
had greater power over the jupri van drivers. But Rubel wasn’t just being unjust, he 
had a bad character 
Rubel is no good. He has his beard to show people he is pious but actually he 
isn’t. Inside he is evil. Do you know how he is? Just one year ago he used to 
sleep on the top of the water tank at WASA with a prostitute. How could he 
manage to sleep at night with a prostitute like this? He has his wife, son and 
daughter 
His grievance also extended to Parvez, particularly because of his samiti - he’s 
dangerous, he is a trouble for everyone, he’s not thinking in the right way, not for the 
development of everyone. He just thinks about himself. In practice Liton claimed that 
Parvez had been taking the 700 taka a day collected from the samiti, and sitting down 
most of the time, not bothering to drive his van. He had taken a total of around 70,000 
taka of their money, gone home and eaten well. Similarly, Rubel had apparently also 
previously run a samiti and he had only given back a small portion of the amount 
people had deposited. The primary grievance is then that Parvez and Rubel have been 
given a responsibility, a power, a role, by the group, which they had misused. 
Liton considered himself above the others, older, more experienced politically, and 
better educated. Parvez was however established in the area and he had trusted him. 
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How could I have become a leader four years ago? No-one knew me, no-one could 
trust me. Parvez and Rubel have grown up here, they know everyone. But Parvez has 
only been doing politics for six months, I’ve been doing it since birth, is he really that 
senior to me? Rubel treats me like he’s my senior. He sometimes orders me around. 
But I’m his senior, that’s why I’m doing this. Parvez had aligned the group with bad 
people – by which he meant the BNP - prominent among whom was Azad who had 
led the fighting with the chattro league. These contacts were now make obstacles for 
their work rather than making it easier, and if anyone says anything to them they will 
get stabbed or shot.  
Faced with this situation, Liton had a vision for what he wanted to achieve, one that 
either impressed others, provoked ridicule or anger. He wanted to build a new group, 
a faction, still within jupri, but taking thirty of the labourer to contest the power of the 
sardar, Rubel and Parvez. His steps to achieve this would be first, to start a new samiti; 
second, to register with the krishok league, and third, to contest again the role of Dulal 
sardar. Finally, being a samiti for life as he described it, it would eventually become 
a “limited company”, buy land and have their own office with a karam board and 
TV198. Members would also have their own “visiting card”. Later on this “limited 
company” was framed as an NGO, suggesting I could be the “chairman”. People can 
be impressed by his knowledge. He helps people fill in forms and chat to women on 
the Facebook app on mobiles. They carry assumptions and ideas, stories and rumours 
about what the outside world can offer them (such as loans, tenders), and they see the 
benefits of extortion rackets and bribes. The importance here is not whether any of this 
happened (it had not by the time I left Bangladesh), but rather the logic by which he 
envisioned extending his power.  
Using Shumon, his most trusted friend, he began signing people up for the samiti in 
early January 2015, carrying a small notebook to record transactions and keeping the 
funds in Shumon’s locked wooden box next to WASA building. Rather than having a 
samiti where people gave money and eventually it would be shared later, he wanted to 
create a fund that would be for life, as he described it. People therefore deposited daily 
(30 taka day, or more if they could give it), and from the collective fund it was planned 
that people would eventually be able to borrow (rather than be given) money, without 
paying interest. Within the next two or three months he thought he could help between 
two and five of the members. Within one year he would have one or two lakh taka. 
What can people do with it? I asked. With this money you can buy your own van, you 
can buy goods in the evening and sell them in the morning, give me back the capital 
and walk away with the profits. People can change their clothes, change how they are 
perceived. People can borrow without interest. Do you see my idea? He asked me 
once.  
The purpose of the samiti was that it bound people together around interdependencies 
weighted in favour of Liton. It creates real material opportunities which people could 
                                                 
198 Liton discussed these plans with me in depth for a couple of weeks before actively starting the samiti.  
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take advantage of and therefore a solid base on which Liton as their leader, the samiti 
cashier, can lead them and provide for them. Selling the samiti to a potential member 
Mamun, he invoked his contacts 
I know the metropolitan Jubo league chairperson, Nikil bhai, Siddique the 
organisational secretary, they are my friends. He has lots of power. He does 
north city politics. He manages the whole north side of the city and I’m with 
him. Do you know what this means? If he makes a call to Ahmed [Tejgaon 
Awami League leader] or anyone else here so that people don’t put a place a 
case at the police station, or even if he calls the police station – even if they 
have committed murder – it’s no problem for him. Don’t you understand? 
Their party is ruling now. So if the police don’t listen to him who will they 
listen to? They are my friends from my childhood, I can call them and there 
won’t be a problem any time. 
The difference then is between Parvez’s BNP links and his Awami ones. Parvez’s 
links have become a liability for the group, while signing with the Awami League 
provides security and opportunities. It is interesting to note that, in one of the few 
glimpses I got into Liton’s past, he had claimed to be a BNP Hawkers Dal leader 
elsewhere, but insisted that in Karwan Bazar it did not matter because he did not have 
a BNP “signpost”199. What will your relationship with the Krishok League be like? I 
asked. Liton replied: I won’t need to give them money, they will give me money. If I 
take money then they will use me. Nothing else is required – they need manpower and 
we have people. With this group then Liton imagined having his bodyguard, evoking 
the images of previous godfather. He would keep five people around him at all times, 
register with the Krishok league and then challenge the sardar in the way Rubel failed.  
First I will register then I will fight Dulal sardar. Maybe I will take an AK47. 
I will solve the situation. He has money, he has many goonda, mastan, he can 
make all of them come. No problem we can also call many mastan, we have 
many mastan. He is senior so he has had his turn but now we want to do 
it…200 
This is of course a risk. But, as Liton said, I have to take a big risk, because I need to 
get married again. I have to take care of my son, so won’t I take the risk now? Liton 
had come to the point where he felt confident enough that he knew people, knew how 
things worked, that he had built up sufficient respect as a potential leader to take the 
risk. And at the same time he also felt he had wasted so many years, he was getting 
older, the work was getting physically harder and he needed to move on with his life, 
and become something more. People however questioned and even ridiculed him. The 
                                                 
199 From snippets into his past gathered in the year I knew him he also described having been an interior 
decorator, having worked in technology, and having had to provide a large gang with twenty thousand 
taka worth of phensedyl everyday. He also showed me what he claimed were the scars from having 
been shot nearby Karwan Bazar many years previously.  
200 The term mastan is used here in the same way as goonda or “killer” to indicate a for hire fighter. 
Liton previously spoke of the jupri group itself as a goonda.   
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key issue was trust. From the perspective of the choto bhai they wanted to know 
whether Liton could be trusted with their loyalty, their labour. Shumon (half jokingly) 
called him their guru while others outside the samiti called him the educated crazy 
man (shikhito pagol). They described him as sometimes doing things that can’t be 
said. People question his family situation and ability to care – he doesn’t go to see his 
son often, does he really care for him? a young potential recruit to the samiti asked 
me201. They question his ability to show respect, love (bhalobasha) and “adore” his 
choto bhai. Salam explained his perspective on Liton’s samiti: 
If he doesn’t give importance to the people who will make him leader then how 
will he become a leader one day? If you take 10 people and want to become a 
leader but don’t “adore” them, then how will you become a leader? Will 
people love you? He has 30 people. He wants to take 20 people to do politics 
and manage the area with 10 people. He wants to be a big person, do politics, 
keep a pistol with him and get a big name. 
Liton’s ambitions were then to control the contracts under Dulal like a labour leader, 
however also control a side of the bazar as a political leader. But, he lays his hand on 
us [hits, slaps], gets angry, how can we make him our leader? Rakib asked me 
rhetorically. People do not trust him with their money, they fear that he will run away 
once the samiti is large enough. Not everyone was therefore won over. Salam reflected 
on Liton’s samiti 
It’s bad, in Bangladesh no-one believes anyone, a brother doesn’t believe a 
brother, so how can I trust him to give him my money? If I gave him my money 
now when the situation of the bazar is so unstable, what will happen to it? 
Liton’s samiti was a very public demonstration to the wider group of who he wanted 
to be at the bazar, and his actions directly challenged Parvez and Rubel’s leadership 
during a fractitious period in which they were also under threat from the police. To 
side with Liton was clearly to side against Rubel and Parvez. The labourers most 
solidly under Rubel (who rented his vans for example) were not part of his samiti. 
Some, like Salam, made fun of him too much for him to be his leader, publically 
voicing a disrespect for his aspiration and claim to be a potential leader. Tension built. 
We need to throw Liton out, Rakib told me once. As Shakib, another van driver, put it 
- I will make Liton leave this place, this guy isn’t good, he wants to become a leader 
but won’t be able to. I will throw him out. I will throw everyone who is educated out.  
By the time I left Dhaka in April 2015, Liton’s samiti had collapsed. People did not 
trust him enough for it to work, some reflected, and members had received their 
deposits back. Shumon, his once trusted friend and follower, had aligned himself with 
a low level political leader who was using him, as Liton put it. He described Shumon 
as not thinking in the right way, as being stupid. Liton was renting a van from a young 
                                                 
201 Liton would react angrily to people’s suggestion that he did care for his family sufficiently, because 
he knew – so it seemed to me – that it compromised the viability of his attempt to be a leader. 
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guy who owned five or so of them opposite Ershad building. He seemed to be 
integrating himself with that group, though I could see he was frustrated being ordered 
around by someone a good couple of decades younger than him. I had planned to 
return six months later, but Dhaka’s political situation declined sufficiently for me to 
be warned off. Liton had remained hopeful before I left however, maybe when you 
come back I will be a leader. You will see.  
8.2.2. SAVINGS, VIOLENCE AND MOBILISATION 
This section reflects further on the significance of a samiti in Liton’s plans, in relation 
to wider literature from Bangladesh. Samiti feature in academic research from 
Bangladesh primarily through the study of NGOs and microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). Early in Bangladesh’s history, NGOs formed samiti as a way of organising 
the rural poor into class based solidarity groups (Devine 1999), forming part of a rights 
based and political approach to development (Lewis 2017). Samiti were important 
structures within high profile NGOs such as Proshika, Samata (Devine 2006), and 
continue to be so in rare cases such as Nijera Kori (Kabeer 2003). With the growth of 
microfinance in Bangladesh, and the movement of NGOs through the 1990s towards 
service delivery models of development (Lewis 2017), samiti within MFIs became 
essentially a means of organising clients to facilitate financial transaction, by reducing 
transaction costs and better ensuring loan repayments202. While the model of social 
mobilisation may have largely died out in Bangladesh, elsewhere the significance of 
savings groups for social mobilisation has received significant attention within 
development practice and academia (Appadurai 2002; Archer 2012; d’Cruz and 
Mudimu 2012; d’Cruz 2014). Under the umbrella of the Slum/Shack Dwellers 
International (SDI) network, for example, savings groups have been promoted as a 
means by which groups of relatively powerless people can mobilise together to 
promote their collective interests. A founding example of this is the Mahila Milan 
(‘women together’) association, a group of pavement dwellers in Mumbai mobilised 
on the basis of regular and collective savings to advocate for the right to settlement 
and access to services. For this group saving money has been a key ‘tool for 
mobilization’ (Appadurai 2002: 33), and this model has been applied across the world. 
The change enabled by such groups has been framed in terms of claiming rights, and 
gaining better access to government services (Appadurai 2002; Archer 2012; d’Cruz 
and Mudimu 2012; d’Cruz 2014). 
Savings groups outside the context of NGOs and Microfinance Institutions are rarely 
studied in Bangladesh, despite being extremely common (Rutherford 1997; Khan 
2000; Al Asad Bin Hoque and Baqui Khalily 2002). As Khan (2000: 80) wrote from 
his research in a Dhaka bosti ‘it was almost impossible to find anyone who was not 
involved with a ROSCA’; and yet very little research has been conducted on their 
prevalence, forms and dynamics (Al Asad Bin Hoque and Baqui Khalily 2002). 
                                                 
202 This point reflects the assessment of a key informant who was previously head of microfinance for 
one of the country’s largest NGOs.  
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Savings groups have been most systematically examined in Rutherford’s (1997) work 
on ‘informal financial services in Dhaka’s slums’. Rutherford found variations of 
informal samiti operating between neighbours in slums or lower class 
neighbourhoods, and among occupational groups such as garments workers and 
rickshaw drivers. Elsewhere, he also refers to the presence of saving groups among 
staff within MFIs (Rutherford 2009). In chapter seven it was argued that in the lives 
of the kangali, samiti are typically organised through labour leaders, and this was the 
case for market labourers, drain workers and beggars. Historical work on labour 
leaders discussed in chapter three suggests that group savings may be a long 
established feature of these relationships (Bates and Carter 2016). The presence of 
samiti within occupational groups in Bangladesh has also been noted historically 
(McGregor 1989)203.  
The case of Liton’s attempts to organise labourers at Karwan Bazar suggests seeing 
samiti as – in certain contexts – serving as vehicles for mobilisation, however 
embodying different values to those usually acknowledged within development. This 
argument resonates with the role samiti played within the NGO Samata (Devine 1999, 
2002, 2006). Devine’s (Ibid) ethnography of Samata in rural Bangladesh demonstrates 
how the ends to which these samiti can be mobilised can be highly confrontational and 
violent, and the principles through which these are mobilised, and resources 
distributed, clientelistic. The role of samiti in the lives of the kangali, and particularly 
the case of Liton, suggest that samiti must be understood in relation to the role of 
labour leaders in the context of a social order where intermediation is dominated by 
actors within the ruling coalition on the basis of their capability for violence. Viewed 
in this way, samiti can be conceptualised as a means by which potential leaders 
demonstrate a capability for violence, and thereby attempt to advance their claim to 
control of resources.   
Within the model of competitive clientelism, factions at different levels of society 
compete for inclusion within the ruling coalition through demonstrating their superior 
capability for violence to rivals. In the lives of the kangali it has been argued labour 
leaders are a critical way in which political factions can form, mobilising the labourers 
under party political banners to gain greater control over resources. Viewed from the 
perspective of a labour leader, status is is contingent on, among other factors, being of 
political value to those above you, while ensuring that labourers are incentivised to 
remain with you. Establishing a samiti can enable a potential leader to achieve both of 
these aims. As seen in the case of Liton, a samiti solidified a group of people around 
him who were committed to his political vision, and incentivised their loyalty through 
the longer-term prospects of the group as well as immediate benefits such as money 
for business ventures. Rosen (2010: 3) writes of building authority 
                                                 
203 Though in the example cited by McGregor (1989) the samiti had roots in the cooperative structures 
introduced by the British in the early 20th century, suggesting multiple origins for the samiti we see in 
Bangladesh today.   
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Figures of authority, then, must build up their constellations of indebtedness 
in order for people to begin to attribute to them the qualities of someone who 
will share benefits with his dependents and not (in the local idiom) “eat” 
everything himself. 
While at first Liton was required to promote his samiti to others, describing his vision 
and the benefits they would receive, the longer-term outcome from his perspective was 
that the web of interdependencies created would solidify his position as the group’s 
leader. As Liton attempted to build this role for himself he also began acting like a 
leader, appearing strong, wise and reliable. This sense of role-playing is examined 
further in the next chapter but is an extremely important part of this process. Liton 
began openly carrying a notebook, which he kept in the breast pocket of his shirt and 
in which he detailed who was in the group, the deposits made and the total samiti fund. 
This symbolic indicator of status was particularly impressive for those of the group 
who could not read and write. Similarly he would open his wallet204 to demonstrate 
the “visiting card” of local politicians, as if proving his connections to establish the 
veracity of the claims he made205.  
The symbolism of forming this samiti was very clear at Karwan Bazar, and represented 
a threat to the existing leadership of the jupri group, and the place of Dulal. Liton 
would sell the samiti to potential members invoking his political contacts to 
demonstrate his capability to offer opportunities and protect the group, however at the 
same time the samiti was fundamental to the value he could offer to his political 
contacts. As described, he framed this relationship simply in terms of giving the 
support of his group to a political leader in exchange for money. From the perspective 
of others the presence of a strong and functioning samiti with Liton at the head was a 
declaration of intentions. In a similar way to the performative violence of a goonda 
(Berenschot 2011), the creation of a samiti is a performance, and serves as a threat to 
rivals. Understood in relation to Lukes’ faces of power, it symbolizes power in the 
first dimension, an ability to coerce others, but also makes movements towards the 
third, opening up possibilities about the agenda for change possible at the bazar. It 
demonstrates to others that he Liton, was the clear leader of 30 men who were bound 
to him, have a capability for violence, and are committed to his leadership. Viewed 
from the perspective of members within Liton’s samiti, a commitment to save money 
with him was a commitment to an inherently violent vision of what they could ahieve. 
                                                 
204 Even having a wallet indicated his seniority over others who would carry rolled up bundles of money 
in their lungi or pockets.  
205 More generally it is very common for low-level or aspiring leaders to keep small piles of slightly 
frayed cards in their wallets. These are proudly brought out and paraded and then delicately replaced as 
one would a valuable document in a safe. I found street corner party affiliated leaders with not only 
local political leaders cards, but even MPs and ministers. Whether they had been directly given them, 
passed them from above or somehow traded for them, I do not know. 
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For this reason, depositing money within Liton’s samiti by labourers can therefore be 
seen as a symbolically violent act206.  
8.3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has asked how the kangali attempt to improve their status and become 
intermediaries. It has argued that a fundamental means by which this occurs is through 
demonstrating a superior capability for violence than rivals. The events explored in 
the lives of the jupri group illustrate some of the complex ways in which this capability 
is constituted, and how it is demonstrated. Events suggest that because intermediation 
is intertwined with how a ruling coalition accrues resources, and therefore how social 
order is maintained, such conflict inherently involves the ruling coalition. Even where 
one has a superior direct capability for violence to rivals, if one is not appropriately 
situated in relation to the ruling coalition, attempts to become an intermediary can be 
high risk in that rivals can more easily drawn upon the strength of the ruling party and 
apparatus of the state. People also demonstrate a capability for violence in diverse 
ways. Most obviously it can mean fights, strikes or bombings, but more subtly it can 
mean building allegiance and interdependencies through, for example, a savings 
group, or by showing the contacts one can draw upon. All of the events described 
illuminate how fragile a capability for violence is. A powerful labour leader one 
moment can be publically beaten the next, a budding leader starting a samiti can be 
undermined by rumours or question marks over character. The account offered here 
should be seen as offering only a glimpse into how the kangali demonstrate a 
capability for violence, and in practice its dynamics are far more complex than what 
has been documented here. Furthermore, as the following chapter argues, even if 
violence is fundamental to how the kangali improve their status within the social order, 
people have diverse interests, which they pursue in a variety of ways beyond violence.   
 
9. THE TOOLS AND STRATEGIES OF THE WEAK 
 
Negotiation… a power of weakness 
Rosen (1984: 182) 
This thesis has explored the ways in which the kangali have complex dependencies on 
intermediaries, or in others words, how they ‘live in the shade of others’. It was argued 
                                                 
206 This understanding of samiti has some resonance with examples of much larger samiti in Dhaka’s 
history. In the early 20th century the ‘Dacca Anushilan Samity’ had the purpose of ‘bringing about a 
revolution by force of arms and depriving the King of the sovereignty of British India’ according to the 
prosecution team against the samiti’s ring leader and followers (High Court of Bengal, Calcutta 1912). 
The case describes the samiti’s involvement in murder and dacoity, noting that the commitment of 
members to the samiti were formalised in a vow, and regulations were learnt by heart. Furthermore, the 
group agreed to follow the principle that ‘money obtained is to be the common property of the members’ 
(Ibid: 4). This reference to common property may have been organised as savings, suggesting that the 
connection between savings, samiti and violence, may have deep historical roots.   
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in chapters six and seven that a term of these relationships is often the necessity for 
the kangali – particularly men - to participate politically, and this can be violent. In 
the previous chapter it was further argued that a fundamental means by which the 
kangali negotiate their status within the social order and become intermediaries, is 
through demonstrating a capability for violence. This capability is of such importance 
because social order itself rests on a dispersed capability for violence, and access to 
resources is often controlled on this basis. This chapter provides an important 
counterweight to these arguments. It argues that despite the significance of the 
phenomenon described, in fact the majority of the kangali do not pursue their 
livelihoods and interests through violence. Rather, they negotiate around the violence 
capabilities of others, seeking and creating opportunities through more surreptitious 
and common strategies and tactics. The focus of this chapter is therefore how people 
negotiate the urban environment in ways that enable them to avoid or negotiate the 
obligations and risks associated with intermediation.  
The first half of this chapter examines the limitations to the control that actors within 
the ruling coalition at the lowest levels of urban society has on resources. It is argued 
that a prevalent way in which people improve their livelihoods in the contexts studied, 
is through exploiting resources that are not controlled by others by virtue of being 
considered defiled. This includes living in the open, collecting recyclable goods and 
begging. Cities such as Dhaka have the potential for what are conceptualised here as 
‘defiled surpluses’, resources that can be productively exploited but at the cost of an 
association with the defiled (Jackman 2016) 207 . The second half of this chapter 
examines dynamics to how people negotiate the urban environment in ways that 
support the defiled surpluses proposition, but also apply more widely. Role-playing, 
lying and maintaining weak ties are explored as examples of non-violent ways in 
which the kangali navigate life, pursuing their livelihoods and interests208. In line with 
chapter two, rather than ‘weapons’ (Scott 1985) these are conceptualised as ‘tools’. 
The key argument developed is that the kangali should be conceptualised as dynamic 
actors actively crafting their futures through the means they have at their disposal. 
9.1. EXPLOITING ‘DEFILED SURPLUSES’ 
It’s better to have small fishes everyday than one big fish for one day 
Neymar, a moyla worker at Osmani Uddyan park 
9.1.1. ‘DEFILED SURPLUSES’  
It is well established that for the urban poor in Bangladesh, access to resources such 
as housing, services, employment and the right to do business, are closely mediated 
                                                 
207 Arguments developed in the first half of this chapter has been published in Jackman (2016).  
208  It should be made clear that the latter examples given – role-playing, lying and creatively 
maintaining weak ties – can all of course be applied to anyone and not just the ‘weak’, as seen in the 
case of Liton for example. The argument however is that for people who cannot demonstrate their 
capability for violence, or appeal to people who can, these tools take on an even greater significance, 
hence the focus given to them here.   
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by third parties (Khan 2000; Wood 2003; Banks 2008, Hackenbroch 2013; Banks 
2016). Previous chapters have explored how access to employment, opportunities, the 
right to do business and security are often controlled on this basis in the lives of the 
kangali. Using the LAO framework this thesis has framed the ways in which such 
access is mediated in relation to the need to control organised violence (North et al 
2009). Preceding chapters have examined in detail how intermediation and violence 
intertwine within the lives of the kangali. In particular, the right to do business and 
work in value chains such as those that manage waste or supply vegetables have been 
argued to be intimately connected to the ruling coalition that weaves its way down to 
the lowest levels of urban life through the wings and associated bodies of the Awami 
League. People require and utilise relationships with political leaders to seek 
opportunities, and these political leaders look to the kangali as a source of revenue for 
their factions, and as labour for violence. The experiences of the jupri group at Karwan 
Bazar illustrate the complex nature of these relationships, and the obligations, 
opportunities and risks they entail.   
Alongside these relationships it is also important to understand where the ruling 
coalition’s grasp on resources is not so firm, and the implications this has for the 
livelihoods of the kangali. Critical to understanding this in the contexts examined is 
the proposition that resources that are considered socially ‘defiled’ are less exploited 
by those with the power to do so. The term defiled is used here to indicate that which 
is considered dirty or impure, physically and also symbolically. In contrast to many 
groups of urban poor – particularly those living in Dhaka’s large bosti – it is often 
more difficult and less profitable to extract economic benefits from the kangali. Part 
of the reason why this is the case is that unlike in large bosti, there are not collectively 
provided services in places such as pavements, parks and to a lesser extent bazars and 
transport terminals. Dhaka’s large bosti, as elsewhere in Bangladesh and across the 
world, are densely populated and people are reliant on basic services such as gas, 
electricity, water and sanitation that are provided by a limited number of actors. 
Mediating access to these very often represents a source of income and leverage for 
those in the ruling coalition. For the most part, this is not possible in the lives of the 
kangali as there are no such services209. Rather, in these contexts people make do as 
they can through piecemeal solutions and using nearby services controlled by a 
shopkeeper or landlord. They cook on the street between pavement cracks, use private 
toilet/shower for a small fee, charge their phones in local shops and use NGO services.  
Also unlike the large bosti, it is relatively uncommon for people living in the open or 
in potho-bosti to have to pay to live in these spaces. Though people more often than 
not live regularly in the same space, because they have a greater degree of mobility, it 
is far more difficult to leverage living in the open as a source of regular income. This 
is not however to say that it does not happen – I encountered, for example, infrequent 
examples of people living in these spaces being forced to make small payments under 
threat of locally powerful political chamcha. As noted in chapter six, at Karwan Bazar 
                                                 
209 An exception to this are NGO run toilets and health services operated across the city. 
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Ansar began charging people on the veranda to the south of the bazar 10 taka a night 
to sleep there, and during DCC evictions, it is common for police to extort people for 
the right to return back to their patch of pavement. In terms of payment size and 
regularity, these are however nowhere near the magnitude of Dhaka’s large bosti. 
Similarly, access to work in sectors where labour and supply of work is not organised, 
is far less closely mediated by the ruling coalition. There is therefore a broad contrast 
between the kangali who work in sectors where labour is organised (examples include 
market labourers, drain workers and sex workers) with forms of work, which are less 
organised. Two very common examples of this latter form in the research contexts 
were scavenging and begging. In the vast majority of cases scavengers operating in 
public spaces do not have to pay anyone for the right to collect waste bottles, paper or 
other materials. Similarly, in the contexts studied beggars do not need to pay a beggar 
leader, political leader or the police for the right and ability to beg. I did however 
encounter exceptions to this, particularly outside of my research sites. In certain 
neighbourhoods (particularly wealth ones such as Gulshan and Banani) some of the 
popular spots for begging are controlled by small groups who exclude others. The 
connection organised beggars and the sardar of a previous generation outside the 
Supreme Court was also discussed in chapter seven. In the case of scavenging some 
child scavengers live together in recyclable goods shops (bhangari dokan), and have 
close – and often exploitative – relationships to the owners. By and large however 
access to these forms of work are not mediated in the same way as that focused on in 
this thesis.  
Collectively, the elements pointed to here – the ability to sleep in the open or in potho-
bosti, the ability to beg and the ability to scavenge – can be conceptualised as ‘defiled 
surpluses’. This is the idea that cities have the potential for creating surplus resources 
that are socially constructed as “defiled”, but that can be productively exploited. The 
idea of a surplus – as in excess, or resources beyond what are needed – comes from 
the fact that third parties do not control or utilise them. The majority of poor urban 
people do not actively exploit these defiled surpluses. A shop worker paying to live in 
a large bosti may be able to save money and invest elsewhere, for example, but is not 
necessarily exploiting any defiled surpluses. But drawing on this surplus represents 
the dominant way in which people living in the very worst conditions benefit in the 
urban context.  
In Dhaka, scavengers survive through collecting waste paper, bottles and vegetables, 
which they then sell on, as people do across the world. Sicular (1991) writes of 
scavengers as “those who treat waste essentially as an ore: a source from which 
valuable materials can be extracted”. The basic principle behind this is the productive 
appropriation of something that has been conceptualized as both dirty and not needed. 
Similarly, the act of begging itself can be seen as an appropriation of a defiled surplus, 
but in a different form. It is taking on a subservient, socially demeaning status, in order 
to extract surplus wealth from other urban dwellers. Most significant of all is the 
appropriation of unused space in a productive way. In Dhaka this includes footpaths, 
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parks, sides of rail lines, nooks and crannies within markets and between buildings, 
mazar (shrine) grounds, stadium car parks and transport terminal floors. These spaces 
are often concrete, solid, sometimes sheltered, in some ways comparatively clean 
physically, and yet considered defiled and in much of the 24- hour cycle unused. 
Together these spaces, materials and statuses are all perceived as defiled and as 
impure, and yet together can represent surplus resources that can be exploited.  
That scavenging and begging can in instances be profitable, or that living in the open 
can be a means of reducing costs, has been observed across the world, indicating that 
defiled surpluses are not unique to any particular context. Sicular’s (1991: 144) study 
of scavengers in Indonesia records how for the uneducated and unconnected, certain 
forms of scavenging could offer higher incomes than working in agriculture or 
garment factories, “often high enough to allow them to save small amounts to remit to 
their villages”. Recent research from Ghana has found that scavengers in Accra “earn 
far better than the daily minimum wage” (Rockson et al 2013: 152). Similarly, 
scavengers in Nuevo Laredo, a city in the north-east of Mexico, have been found to 
“make in one day what minimum-wage factors workers/employees make in 1 week” 
(Medina 2005: 391). As will be established, evidence here suggests that some 
scavengers can even earn more than low-level professionals.  
There is no reason to suggest that the possibility for defiled surpluses is uniquely 
urban; however, characteristics particular to the urban environment give reason to 
believe that defiled surpluses are more probable in these contexts. The possibility for 
defiled surpluses is, most importantly, contingent on significant inequality. As Sicular 
(1991) argues, scavenging is dependent on high levels of consumption producing 
recyclable waste. Similarly, the opportunity for begging is dependent on there being 
surplus wealth, and the appropriation of open spaces is also reliant on high levels of 
public investment in infrastructure (pavements for example). There is greater potential 
for all of these in areas with concentrations of wealth. Given that urban areas across 
the world – and certainly in Bangladesh – are often wealthier than rural ones, this leads 
to the conclusion that defiled surpluses are more likely in urban centres. Indeed, 
historically, scavenging for example has concentrated in urban centres, though it is not 
unique to them (Downs and Medina 2000). There is also some historical evidence that 
suggests a long-standing potential for defiled surpluses. Mayhew (2012: 528) 
describes with some surprise the high income of sewer scavengers in 19th-century 
London. These scavengers were known as “shore-men”, “shore workers” or “toshers”, 
the last name coming from the items, or “tosh”, that they found. They would illegally 
enter the city’s labyrinth of sewers, searching for lost and washed- away goods, usually 
working in small groups to protect themselves from swarms of rats. Mayhew also 
notes the high incomes of particularly entrepreneurial beggars in the city.  
Though emphasizing the potential for defiled surpluses, it is clear that not all urban 
contexts offer such opportunities, and that not everyone experiences these 
opportunities equally. Thus, research elsewhere has documented that, contrary to 
arguments here, these occupations offer low incomes (Tevera 1994; Wilson et al 2006) 
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that are only enough for subsistence (Birkbeck 1978; Huysman 1994). A recent study 
from India, for example, argues more generally that those living in poor- quality 
settlements “merely survive” (Krishna et al 2014). The authors argue that “the kinds 
of settlements that currently serve as home in Bangalore to new migrants from 
distressed villages hardly serve as locations for building a better life” (Ibid: 583). 
Similarly, studies of people living in the open have elsewhere noted high inequalities 
in people’s incomes (Jagannathan 1988). Critically, therefore, defiled surpluses should 
be understood as resources only when there is the convergence of different factors, 
including particular structural socioeconomic and political conditions, as well as 
certain personal characteristics. An extremely wide range of factors can be pointed to 
as significant, including economic factors (for example, relating to the price of 
recyclable goods, or the availability of surplus wealth to be distributed in alms), as 
well as the regulation of urban spaces (whether people are able to sleep in the open or 
beg at all, for example). While structural factors create general conditions for defiled 
surpluses, they can only be exploited through the convergence with individual 
characteristics. The next section examines these defiled surpluses in Dhaka.  
9.1.2. EXPLOITING THE CITY  
Contrary to public perceptions, the majority of people who live in the open or the most 
basic slums in Dhaka earn far more than the thresholds used to categorize “the poor” 
and “extreme poor”. That this is the case points in part to serious weaknesses in 
poverty lines as tools for measuring poverty210. However, in general I found that such 
people could earn not only beyond poverty thresholds, but often even more than low-
level university educated professionals. This finding is born from long-term and 
systematic observations, as well as triangulation through conversations with labour 
leaders, recycled goods shop owners and NGO staff. Strikingly, NGO fieldworkers 
openly acknowledged that some project “beneficiaries” living on pavements earned 
more on a monthly basis than they did. They explained that they had learnt this from 
years working in the context as well as conducting internal monitoring activities. This 
finding is not confined to those working in sectors with organised labour. Hassan, an 
experienced scavenger of almost three decades who sleeps outside a University of 
Dhaka hall, explained the situation as he saw it:  
There’s lots of money in doing tokai. If you work well, you can make at least 
500 taka a day… If the market is very bad, if you can’t even collect the smallest 
amount, you would still make 300-400 per day. And if someone goes to a “spot 
dustbin”, “moyla top”… Like this morning I couldn’t find any goods, I went 
early in the morning, I couldn’t find anything, nothing, nothing, I only had 
                                                 
210 It is well established that income and expenditure measures fail to account for the diverse aspects of 
poverty (Green and Hulme 2005; Boonyabancha et al 2015) and the cost of urban living. It has also 
been argued that the “cost of basic needs approach” used fails to consider the heavier reliance of urban 
households on cash income to survive, being unable to live from homestead or agricultural land 
(Rahman 2011), or the price differentials between urban and rural areas for food and basic non-food 
items (Banks et al 2011). 
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3KG of recyclable goods in my bag, some boards, this and that, the goods will 
be worth around 100 taka, maybe only 70 or 80. And then I was coming back 
and I found 10 KG in one spot… 1KG is worth about 25 taka. That was this 
morning.  
Put another way, on a monthly basis some scavengers can earn significantly more than 
the official salary of a traffic police constable211. The earnings of rickshaw van drivers 
at Karwan Bazar fluctuated from a minimum 300 taka (this is rare, and when I 
observed was due to the blockades and strikes preventing goods enter into Dhaka), to 
around 1000 or even more a night. Nazir once said to me where else in the whole of 
Bangladesh would you get paid 100 taka to move these goods from the truck to just 
round the corner? Nowhere! Similarly, income in pocket was described by street-
based sex workers as about 400– 600 taka a night for older or less attractive women 
(as they explained it), and for the lighter-skinned, younger, more beautiful women 
around 1,000–2,000 taka. The beggars without disabilities I knew typically earned 
between 300 and 600 taka a day, and those with disabilities earned more, even up to 
1,000 taka a day. Some disabled beggars living on pavements have young assistants 
to whom they pay 10,000-taka monthly salaries. Rina, a single woman who was 
thrown out of her village by her husband a couple of years ago, came to Dhaka by boat 
and started to live in the Supreme Court area. She described her experiences:  
I used to beg, walking around, I went to Chawk Bazar, Shabagh... I earnt about 
500, 600, 700 taka a day... If the police caught us, they would take all our 
money, but they couldn’t. Whenever we saw a police van, then we ran away 
from them. 
These illustrations should be qualified. Though they are born from systematic 
observation and questioning over a long period with many people, I have not used any 
statistical methods. The areas in which I have researched are busy, economically 
dynamic areas where higher incomes would be more expected. Furthermore, the 
livelihoods of Rina, Hassan and others like them all represent significant risks and 
vulnerabilities, they are subject to seasonal fluctuations, and households have differing 
dependency ratios. The health risks associated with scavenging, for example, have 
been well documented (Wilson et al 2006; Tevera 1994). Research from India 
indicates the significance of police harassment to children (Patel 1990) and adults 
(Huysman 1994) living in the open, and the significance of health shocks and life 
events more generally for the urban poor can seriously threaten any gains made 
(Krishna et al 2014). Studies from Bangladesh have noted the experiences of violence 
and poor health amongst people living in the open (Koehlmoos et al 2009). This is also 
not to negate that the underlying reasons for people to live in such contexts are most 
often related to such hardships as environmental degradation, indebtedness, lack of 
                                                 
211 Of course the ‘official salary’ of a police constable is rarely their true salary due to chanda and 
bribes.   
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employment and family breakdown.  
The basic point however is that occupying what are perceived as the lowest-status 
forms of work and poorest-quality of spaces for living in Dhaka City can reduce 
expenses and thereby increase incomes. A proposition then emerges: some such 
people could in fact afford to live in the more established and serviced bosti. It is often 
assumed that people live in these seemingly desperate places because they cannot live 
elsewhere. But one way in which the situation is often understood by those living there 
is in terms of having lower or no costs. A primary reason why people choose to live 
in these spaces is that it avoids certain forms of mediated access to housing. As an 
NGO fieldworker put it to me once of a potho-bosti – almost everyone here could 
actually live in the bosti if they wanted to. Choton, who lives in a potho-bosti opposite 
the headquarters of a major international bank and works as a scavenger, explained:  
You see the people in this area? They earn three or four hundred taka in a day, 
some earn five hundred daily. In one day they work hard to earn that. But they 
keep that money, many don’t spend it. Saving little by little they make it a large 
amount, and then they take it back to the village. Then they invest it in some 
work, maybe for land or building a house, and then they come back here again. 
This way they become a little bit settled and later we see they’ve been able to 
give their children a better life.  
The basic dynamic described in this passage was a common one. Through sacrificing 
a degree of immediate security, people working as beggars, labourers, scavengers, 
maids and sex workers are able to channel resources elsewhere. The intended uses of 
these savings differ – some migrate to save up for a daughter’s dowry, others to buy 
land, others to invest in business, others simply to feed their families. In Dhaka’s 
bazars people pass through for a week working as a coolie by day, later sleeping on 
the market floor or on the footpath, lying curved in their baskets. People travel to the 
city to beg, perhaps for a week, sometimes even daily, and most noticeably around 
religious festivals. Some stay for months, others only return once a year. The amounts 
of time spent in either location clearly differ but the basic logic is similar. Nijam, for 
example, was by his own estimate in his 50s and when I met him and had been living 
outside the office of an international business at Karwan Bazar for two years. He is 
from Jamalpur in the north of the country, where he has four daughters. He described 
having only a small plot of land and needing to save for their dowries. He begged 
around central Dhaka by day, focusing particularly on the five-star Sonargaon hotel. 
From this he earned around 500 taka daily, of which he spent about 120 taka buying 
food from street restaurants, and was able to save around 300 taka a day. Every couple 
of days or once a week he sent this back to his village via bKash, the mobile-based 
money transfer service. Nijam planned to spend a couple more years like this in Dhaka. 
Similarly the vast majority of labourers within the jupri group sent money to family 
in a home village or bosti, as did all of the beggars outside the Supreme Court that I 
met, and most of the drain labourers at Osmani Uddayan park.   
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Parveen, a woman living in Pantho Kunjo pavement nearby Karwan Bazar, reflected 
on the situation on her pavement: some people here have two storied buildings back 
in the village... She then counted the names of six or seven local people on her fingers. 
They have a good situation but come here and sleep on the street. Many (but not all) 
of the rickshaw van drivers at Karwan Bazar within the jupri group, and the waste 
workers in Osmani Uddyan, and the beggars outside the Supreme Court, have families 
and homes elsewhere, where they channel the money they earn. Other have saved up, 
but not yet invested. A notable example was Nijam, a 15-year-old labourer who had 
grown up in NGO centres from the age of around five, when he described coming to 
Dhaka alone on a train. Working unloading vegetables at Karwan Bazar, where he also 
lived, he had diligently saved up two lakh taka (over US$ 2,500), deposited safely in 
a Dutch- Bangla Bank account. This dynamics resonate with the descriptions heard in 
chapter three of the low-caste and class groups in 19th century Dhaka, though not 
necessarily relating to people living in the open. This suggests that the people living 
in the open or in the most basic slums on public land are at one extreme of the much 
broader spectrum of people who migrate for low-status work. This reinforces an 
argument made by other authors that living in the open can be a temporary strategy of 
“supplementation” to livelihoods elsewhere (Speak 2004), and can also form part of 
“traditional, long-standing livelihood strategies” (Tipple and Speak 2009)212.  
Critically however, the potential for these defiled surpluses is contingent on both 
people’s personal characteristics – such as whether they have the wider connections 
which represent somewhere to channel money, and the ability and temperament to 
work and live in these spaces – but also wider structural factors. It is the convergence 
of these factors, which enables these defiled surpluses to in fact be resources. These 
factors connect deeply to the nature of social order. As has already been argued, a 
large part of what makes these defiled surpluses resources is that they are largely 
beyond the grip of the ruling coalition. A further important factor is the radical decline 
in crime and violence seen in Dhaka over the past decade or so with what has been 
termed the ‘party politicization of criminality’ and the decline of gangsters, as 
explored in chapter six. This has led to far less risks associated with living on the 
pavements, far less violence and robberies. Connected to the risks that do undoubtedly 
remain when living in these spaces, is the important role that new technology such as 
digital money transfer services now plays.  
As seen in the case of Nijam, the utility of defiled surpluses has been enabled through 
the growth of mobile-based money transfer services such as bKash. This and similar 
services allow people to quickly and cheaply transfer money across the country 
through a vast network of registered agents, who are often based on streets and in 
                                                 
212 It also supports the point that people are strategic about where they live in the urban context. Writing 
of Kolkata, Furedy (1984: 130) argues that scavengers ‘will position themselves as close as possible to 
the wastes they covet’, which tend to be central business areas near hotels and offices. Analysing 
pavement dwellers in Bombay, Patel (1990: 11) similarly argues that some ‘chose the location because 
of its proximity to their place of work’. 
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shops. Across Dhaka people spoke very highly of this service, and explained that it 
has radically improved their ability to benefit from such spaces by improving security. 
Anwar explained: Ah, bKash! Through bKash you can send money from here to 
England!... It’s good, the thieves can’t steal it. The creation of bKash has made things 
very convenient for us. Others described being far less reliant on both informal 
networks back to the village as well as on local shopkeepers, and therefore less 
vulnerable to theft and exploitative relationships either in Dhaka or in their village. 
Abul, a market labourer who grew up in Karwan Bazar, explained:  
There used to be lots and lots of robberies here. People always had their money 
stolen. But nowadays it’s different, people don’t carry lots of money anymore. 
If we have 500 taka we can send it through bKash. Before when we used to go 
home, then the local groups [in the village] also used to rob us, but now we 
have bKash so they can’t. It’s been going for about 5 years. Nowadays it’s very 
easy you can stay inside your room and get the money.  
This section has argued that not all valuable resources in the urban context are 
controlled and exploited by those in the ruling coalition. Defiled surpluses can be 
exploited in ways that facilitate improvements in people’s livelihoods, albeit by 
accepting a status and association, which for most in society is marginalizing and 
demeaning. Not everyone however is able to exploit these, and recognizing this gives 
insight into the nature of the stark destitution that does exist among the kangali. For 
people without wider connections, the opportunity to invest and support others does 
not necessarily exist. For people with wider connections but not functioning 
relationships, these opportunities similarly cannot be exploited. The costs of 
associating with the defiled are furthermore not equally distributed, and single women 
without a male “guardian” are particularly worse off. For such women an association 
with the streets and that which is defiled leads them to becoming considered nosto 
(broken, spoiled), and closes down the future ability to exist within wider society. A 
key message however from this section has been that people are actively and creatively 
pursuing their interests.  
It is also important to acknowledge that although the concept of ‘defiled surpluses’ 
has been presented as a counterpoint to the proposition of ‘living in the shade of others’ 
- representing how people avoid certain forms of intermediation and pointing to the 
limits of the control that intermediaries have – in practice, these phenomenon interact 
and co-exist within people’s lives. Many of the labourers in the jupri group for 
example have built or re-established relationships with family in the villages (either 
their own or their partner’s family). Though enmeshed in complex and risky 
dependencies, they also reduce expenditure through sleeping on their rickshaw vans 
behind the buses and are thus able to send more money to family elsewhere. 
Furthermore, as argued in chapter six, these dependencies are not experienced equally 
by all of the kangali, and while we can point to trends and probabilies in likely 
dynamics, these relationships may be experienced positively, and therefore 
177 
 
complement the defiled surpluses proposition. Hence many of the people living on 
Pantho Kunjo pavement described their relationship with the reformed mastan 
Jahangir positively, and as protecting them when needed thereby helping them in their 
efforts to save money, support family and build livelihoods elsewhere. The second 
half of this chapter builds on these arguments by examining the subtle ways in which 
people try to gain, improve and maintain access to resources.  
9.2. NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES AND TIES 
9.2.1. BUILDING TIES AND ROLE-PLAYING 
It looks like a bosti but it isn’t, it’s a “business centre” 
Liton and Abdul pointing to Dhaka’s largest drug market 
 
Everyday, subtle, and strategic ways in which the urban poor gain and maintain access 
to resources, thereby pursuing their livelihoods and interests, are through role-playing 
and lying. This is an important part of people’s experience exploiting defiled 
surpluses, but also a much wider dynamic to social life. That people approach social 
interaction with particular intentions can be taken as a basic characteristic of social 
life, one that is as true of ‘the poor’ as it is for ‘the rich’ and ‘elites’ (Goffman 1956; 
Rosen 1984). People’s intentions to social interaction in everyday life vary. They may 
be to please, to impress, to compliment, to ‘defraud, get rid of, confuse, mislead, 
antagonize, or insult’ others for example (Goffman 1956: 2). A further basic 
characteristic of social life is that people try to place or categorise others in meaningful 
ways on the basis of the social and cultural categories to which they have access and 
in which they operate. Rosen (1984: 57) argues that 
A person’s origins, ethnicity, family, occupation and other social 
identifications contribute to that person’s assessment by others. In a world of 
uncertain personal relationships – a world in which the threat of potential chaos 
is met, on the level of interpersonal ties, by the elaborate placement of another 
in his social contexts – the focus is at once on the typological features of an 
individual and the unique summation of these qualities in an individual 
personality.  
Placing these two characteristics of social life together opens up a way of examining 
how people negotiate an environment in which personal relationships and ties are 
paramount to gaining and negotiating access to resources. Accepting then that people 
approach social interaction with particular intentions, it can also be accepted that 
people are interested in how to ‘control the conduct of others, especially their 
responsive treatment’ (Goffman 1956: 2). If social interaction is purposeful, then 
influencing people’s responses is part of this. One way in which this is done – so 
Goffman argues – is by presenting oneself in such a way that gives others the desired 
impressions and evokes certain responses. People wish to ‘project a definition of a 
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situation’ (Ibid: 3) through their behaviour which they hope others will buy into.  
People may or may not be conscious that they are doing this, sometimes acting out of 
tradition and custom, while sometimes very conscious of this intended projection. 
There is then a sense in which people are ‘performers’, who have a ‘front’ that they 
face to the world (Ibid: 13).  
People attempt to manage others’ perceptions in a variety of ways, for example 
through their appearance, by controlling knowledge or by lying. We can reflect on 
such strategies in our own lives, how people purposefully try and appear in a way that 
gives others certain impressions about them, impressions which may in fact not 
correspond with that person’s life or how they feel but which are in some way 
instrumental to something else. Hence people try and dress to impress, they comport 
themselves in manners so as to fit into socially valuable categories, budding academics 
wish to appear intelligent, professionals competent. The proposition here is that this 
notion of role-playing can equally be applied to the lives of the kangali. This has 
already been briefly discussed in relation to Liton’s attempts at becoming a new boro 
bhai within the jupri group at Karwan Bazar. These ‘arts of impression management’ 
(Ibid: 132) are tools of the weak, powerful and pervasive tactics that the poor use to 
survive and advance their access arrangements through intermediaries.  
Some of the kangali often try to create, maintain or improve access to resources on the 
basis of their status as kangali, which is to say, as being poor. This is therefore 
intimately connected to how people exploit defiled surpluses. Goffman (1956) argues 
that every society is based on principles about the moral rights people with particular 
characteristics have. The argument here is that people’s projections of themselves 
often try and adhere to culturally defined notions of deserved poor, and thereby make 
moral claims on wider society. Wood (2003) understands this in terms of ‘moral 
proximity’ and the attempts by those worse off to draw people of status into their 
‘moral universe’, thereby developing obligations and longer-term ties. We can think 
for example of a beggar who attempts to build relationships with ‘patrons’ with the 
hope of a longer-term dependency (Ibid). The starting point by which people try and 
draw people into their ‘moral universe’ is by having their projection of reality 
accepted, thus being acknowledged as poor. By asserting their subservient and 
desperate status some people hope to invoke people’s sense of moral responsibility.  
The kangali recognise this disconnect in their own contexts. In discussing the rail line 
bosti adjacent to Karwan Bazar with Abdul and Liton, for example, they were both 
adamant that it should not be called a bosti but rather a “business centre”. This was 
on account of it being one of Dhaka’s centres for the supply of drugs, with many 
people living there moving from the village and earning very significant amounts of 
money. Akash, a younger van driver, reflected: 
You see the bosti it looks poor from the outside, but inside they sometimes keep 
two or three crores taka of goods in the room, they have a fridge and tv in their 
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room, they purchase land in their villages. But one blow [dakiy] can make 
them lose everything. RAB could catch them.  
The point Abdul emphasised was that people have to look like a kangali to live and 
work there, but they actually have a very good situation. As Liton put it: 
Look at me, I wear these dirty clothes but actually I have a good income. In 
the same way, maybe someone looks like a rich man, he wears nice clothes and 
sunglasses, but he is actually poor, he actually has nothing. 213 
What this suggests is that identifying as a kangali can be of instrumental value, and 
that people purposefully and actively identify with it in order to pursue their interests. 
On a number of occasions, for example, local people in research contexts would make 
off the cuff comments to me in the vein of – you think these people are poor? You 
don’t understand their situation and during a short piece of field work in Kolkata, this 
was even clearer. I recall a conversation with a fakir/Baul214 follower at Gulistan 
mazar. He was angry that so many people who live there are not in fact true pagol 
(true mad people), as he put it, but are just pretending. Pointing to others nearby he 
said that 90% of the people who live at the mazar are just acting as if they are pagol, 
but are not really. They know that if they dress like this and live at these places, people 
will give them money to say prayers, and that people will feed them. His claim is then 
that people seek advantage by fitting into a socially valued and recognised category of 
deserving alms or deserving money for prayers.  
Similarly beggars have to craft an image that fits into a socially acceptable category 
of a “deserved” poor person, someone who has a right to ask for alms. Beggars have 
to look poor and helpless, and their tone of voice (using imploring language) and body 
language (often hunched, head lowered) are often intended to conform to this image, 
denigrating themselves in front of others. In many cases this is not difficult – where 
someone is disabled for example. However it is common – in Dhaka at least - for 
people to publically parade their disability, or the disability of others. For example, 
Anwar the samiti cashier we heard of in chapter seven is by all accounts wealthy within 
the context, far more so than field level NGO staff for example. And yet every morning 
he comes outside the Dhaka Press Club where he lies in the floor shaking his legs and 
rolling on the floor reciting religious texts as one person who lives outside the 
Supreme Court put it. The point is not to judge him, but to highlight that to beg people 
have to play roles – in this case from a powerful samiti leader to a helpless disabled 
man. A further example is that of a woman called Reka at pantha kunjo pavement. I 
learnt from NGO staff and people living on the pavement that for years she had been 
pretending to be deaf, and used to beg on that basis around the area, making sounds as 
if she were deaf. I similarly knew beggars who adopted overtly religious clothes for a 
                                                 
213 Similarly, I remember meeting a man who works as a drug dealer at Kamalapur explaining that he 
is actually wealthy but just has to wear clothes that appear poor to fit in at Kamalapur when he comes.   
214 Bauls are a religious sect in Bangladesh and West Bengal that combine elements of Sufi Islamic and 
Hindu teachings and are famous for their songs and oral traditions.  
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days work, constantly invoking religious texts, before changing into regular non-
religious clothes at the end of the day. Clearly children have learnt the strategies and 
images they need to portray, even from a strikingly young age, and it is hard to avoid 
demands in English for “one hundred taka!” from young children215.  
An example of role-playing at its most theatrical is the distribution of blankets in 
winter to the kangali. During the winter 2014/2015 I witnessed this at both Kamalapur 
station and on a number of occasions outside the Supreme Court. In these instances, a 
car or rickshaw van approached and crowds quickly formed, blankets were passed, 
grabbed, thrown to the crowds, with the inevitable scuffles and shouts. Indeed, yearly 
during winter people migrate to the streets of Dhaka from the villages explicitly to 
collect as many blankets as they can, often selling them or taking them back to the 
villages. Those I knew at the Supreme Court complained that the true kangali were 
not able to get blankets because gangs of blanket stealers descended on the area216. I 
similarly kept track of a group of beggars over a couple of weeks at Tejgaon station 
who came into the city by train regularly to beg, before heading back to their villages. 
They had begun depositing savings with the Sajida Foundation, because, so NGO staff 
suggested, they knew the NGO were planning on distributing blankets. Once they were 
distributed, they withdrew their deposits, and stopped speaking to them217. This is not 
to judge these people or to claim that they are not deserved of help, but simply to point 
to the constructed way in which people have to make claims.   
As a foreign researcher it was common for me to be in the receiving end of people’s 
attempt to bring me into their ‘moral universe’. I experienced it most starkly with a 
young woman called Monwara, a case that illustrates the significance of role-playing 
even where people do closely conform to the image they wish to portray. Following 
the death of her husband Monwara had been unable to pay rent at Kamrangichar bosti 
so joined her mother and sister at pantha kunjo pavement. She was however excluded 
from the main pavement, kept further afield under plastic sheeting with her three 
young children218. Living there I observed how she continuously had to publically 
assert her status, would often face questions from nearby office workers on a break, 
and she would emphasise to anyone in earshot how her husband had died (not left her 
or divorced, she would make clear). Despite her situation she would very often insist 
on buying me tea and a banana. I interpreted this on one level as generosity. An 
indication of respect, all conditioned by Bangladeshi-Islamic-South Asian norms 
                                                 
215 Interestingly with foreigners some can be much more demanding in a way they would not dare to be 
with Bangladeshis, the strategy must have been honed to fit the audience.  
216 Meanwhile the young men distributing blankets were insistent on groups posing with them for a 
photo, saying in English “facebook smiles”. 
217 In a similar vein, NGO staff even told me about beggars at the Supreme Court demanding money in 
return for information to put them on beneficiary lists. 
218 She explained not being allowed to sleep on the main footpath because of the local park mullah, who 
did not like a single woman being on the street. Others identified a particularly established and 
disagreeable couple living on the footpath who did not want her encroaching on their space. 




about welcoming guests. On another level I interpreted these ‘gifts’ as an attempt to 
create an obligation, which she foresaw leveraging somehow to her own advantage. A 
gift, or just communication in itself, can all affect what Rosen (1984) termed the 
‘balance of obligations’219.  
Over the days, weeks and months, our conversations naturally came round to the role 
I could play in Monwara’s life, as it did with many others. I have no security... I just 
need a job. You don’t even have to pay me. Just shelter and food, she told me. Later 
on she would try and persuade me to shelter her youngest baby, if I give it to you for 
ten months before you leave, she will get fat like other babies and I can be free to 
work. Despite the acute vulnerability and needs, a striking feature of Monwara’s 
attempts to bring me into her moral universe was that they were also in a sense 
performed. On a number of occasions Monwara’s narratives about the role I could 
play would be in tears, imploring me to action. But just as quickly as tears appeared, 
they would stop. Being interrupted by her sister because one of the children had wet 
themselves, or being met with a comment she disagreed with, she would snap out of 
her submissive status and resolve the situation, before returning again to me. The point 
is that even when people’s situations do fit into socially valued categories, they may 
utilise generic tactics to enact or play out their role.  
A further tool people use to negotiate access, is controlling knowledge or lying. 
Similar to the ways researchers have to be strategic with the truth in order to maintain 
access to research contexts in a sustainable and manageable way, so to do the kangali. 
There is a widespread perception among NGO staff I knew, as well as the wider public, 
that the kangali lie. They are liars, they won’t tell you the truth, they are chalak 
(shrewd, cunning), I often heard220. Rather than seeing these as either incorrect crude 
stereotypes, or as evidence of immorality, they could be seen as evidence of people 
trying to negotiate opportunities using one of the few tools at their disposal. Lies or 
controlling knowledge can take many forms – it can be flagrant or more subtle, for 
example an omission or purposeful ambiguity. Lies can also be instrumental to many 
ends, for example being defensive or opportunistic. I often directly encountered or 
heard about the constructive use of lying in the research contexts studied. Anwar, the 
cripples samiti leader continuously denied the existence of a samiti to me, being 
lambasted by others nearby on the pavement as chalak for his denials. As he said to 
me  
If someone wants to make a new samiti, they need a well-educated person. But 
disabled people like us can’t do that. Someone who has only lost one of his 
hands, he might be able to write. They have to go up stairs two or three stories. 
                                                 
219 I similarly recall the attempts by young rickshaw van drivers to buy local political leaders tea as they 
passed through Karwan Bazar – boro bhai, come, drink tea. This everyday behaviour can be understood 
as part of tactics to negotiate access. We can think about how a deferential greeting, for example, is 
anticipated by its giver, measured in its tone and calculated in its intended effect. 




We need an educated person like him who has at least one hand. If we want to 
form something, we need an educated person. 
More generally, it was common to hear stories of samiti cashier encouraging beliefs 
about the benefits of the samiti meanwhile planning to run away with the money. In 
the case of rickshaw van drivers I directly heard some describe how they would have 
to pretend to the sardar that they did not steal the missing bag of carrots, though they 
secretly did. In the case of some potential NGO beneficiaries there was a very clear 
sense that they would astutely judge the NGO staff, constructing certain stories and 
images about themselves in order to adhere to what they perceived to be the categories 
which NGOs value. Women, for example, saying they are unmarried and that they 
have no land in their village, when both are in fact false. People saying they only earn 
200 taka a day, but being shouted at by their boro bhai for lying to me. Children 
pretending they are from different districts, wary of what consequences the knowledge 
in other hands could lead to. Role-playing and lying may be a means of covering subtle 
tactics for shifting the balance of resources within a relationship. In terms of work for 
example, this could mean slacking or it could be hiding theft, appropriating a greater 
share of resources than agreed upon. Hence I heard examples of helpers to beggars 
reportedly siphoning off small amounts of the money from that which they collect on 
behalf of the disabled beggars.221 Understood in relation to intermediation and the 
negotiation of access to resources, role playing or lying constitute everyday and subtle 
tools by which the kangali pursue their livelihoods and interests.  
9.2.2. MAINTAINING WEAK TIES 
There’s no advantage to bringing enemies into my life 
Sayeed, teenage rickshaw van driver at Karwan Bazar 
 
Where people cannot or do not wish to demonstrate a capability for violence, and 
where people are able to maintain access to resources without significant dependencies 
on the powerful actors examined in this thesis, then the possibility of such relationship 
can pose a threat. Relationships with party political actors and labour leaders may 
bring opportunities, but they also bring risks and obligations, as explored through 
chapters six to eight. An important dynamic to the way in which the kangali negotiate 
                                                 
221 Some of these descriptions resonate with the notion of ‘hustling’. Though the term has connotations 
of sex work in a US context, in its broader use it conjures up well a sense of fluidity and dynamism, the 
almost entrepreneurial image of people trying to make the most ‘by hook or by crook’. In its cultural 
origins in lower class neighbourhoods in the US, the notion of hustling has strong connotations of 
criminality and deception. As Wacquant (1998: 3) writes, it refers to ‘the ability to manipulate others, 
to inveigle and deceive them, if need be by joining violence to chicanery and charm’. As such, it ‘stands 
in structural opposition to that of wage labor in which, at least in theory, everything is legal, recognized, 
regular and regulated, recorded and approved by the law’ (Ibid: 3). In some African contexts where 
American popular culture has influence however, the term hustling can have broader connotations. 
Thieme (2013: 400) describes the notion of hustling as it is used by waste workers living in slums in 
Nairobi: ‘Hustling was the attempt, the ‘‘trying’’ to defy the odds and traps of poverty’. An approximate 
concept could be how people ‘wangle’ something, or ‘wrangle’ something out of someone. 
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their environment is strategically maintaining weak ties with powerful people, or 
avoiding making ties at all. That people choose to live in certain spaces and in certain 
ways in order to avoid relationships is an essential part of the defiled surpluses 
proposition. In practice however maintaining weak ties and living in the shade of 
others are not mutually exclusive, but intertwine in complex ways222.  
The notion of maintaining weak ties is partly captured in English through the 
expressions ‘keeping your head down’. The logic of such behaviour is uniform – not 
interacting seems the best strategy to avoid a situation that creates obligations, 
expectations and demands that would in some way decrease, threaten or destroy the 
quality of access experienced. By doing so they maintain a set of access arrangements, 
be it related to space, work, security or whatever else. This tool or strategy can be seen 
in very ordinary and everyday occurrences. It should not be imagined as a getaway car 
or jumping out the window, but more as a glance not taken, or a dark alleyway avoided. 
I found this strategy all over – from young rickshaw van drivers moving into the world 
of adulthood, to adult labourers, to single and vulnerable women, and even NGOs.  
As described in previous chapters, teenagers and men at Karwan Bazar are often called 
to participate in party political meetings, as they are elsewhere in Dhaka. The events 
themselves may be uneventful. Attending a meeting, sitting in a chair, chanting the 
name of a leader. They may even get some money or perhaps biryani. The fact of 
going in itself may however be far more significant. Noyon, one of the young van 
drivers, described not liking politics at all, involvement would lead one person to call 
him, then another, and would create an adulteration (bhezal), as one would describe 
polluted food, meaning a complex or corrupt situation. Sayeed described how the 
whole country is becoming political now (ekon deshta choltese razniti upore), bringing 
obligations to be involved closer and closer to daily life in the bazar. He knows the 
boro bhai (referring to the local Awami League leaders), but he pretends not to. 
Sayeed and a number of his friends were called by Parvez and others during the fight 
with the Chattro League. Sayeed described it: 
I saw them fighting, and they started calling us to join. I was going to but I saw 
the fighting was so “heavy”. I realised something terrible might happen and it 
could be bad fortune (kopal) for us to go there. If I had joined them and 
something happened like the police caught me, it would have been a tough time 
for my family. We aren’t rich. We spend what we earn, so it would have been 
very difficult for us. It would take time for the news to come to the [Aparajeyo] 
centre, and during this time I will be in detention and the police will ask me 
many things… I have no-one to support me… so that’s why I didn’t join the 
fighting. The leaders have money, so they can arrange this sort of fighting, and 
                                                 
222 Though the term ‘weak ties’ is used, I am not intending to build on Granovetter’s (1973) work on 
‘the strength of weak ties’. Similar to Granovetter I am arguing for the significance of weak ties to 
enabling opportunities, but in the argument here the ties described are more likely to work against the 
opportunity than for it, as in Granovetter’s model.  
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they can hire “killer” [Chattro League], but we are children from poor 
families.  
But what did Parvez say after you didn’t go? I asked.  
At the moment I don’t see him, I don’t take care about him. If I see him he’ll 
say “hey, don’t you know me? Did you forget me? After this fight you don’t 
come to me. I called you to come to the programme and you don’t come. Go 
away!” I don’t want to listen to that and don’t need to go to him. I will be 
blamed, maybe he will say that he should beat me up, so why do I need that? 
When I see him sitting there, I take my van the other way around. 
Reflecting back on the days he and others used to steal vegetables, Sayeed similarly 
explained how even though there was a local boro bhai who did Awami League 
politics, they would not go to him, even though he could solve problems and lend them 
money when they needed it. Why? I asked. Sayeed described how he could create more 
problems, he would involve them in fighting, he would take money, and when they 
really needed him, he would not be there. They would take the blame and not him. 
Alongside the links that Jewel’s moyla workers have to maintain with the local wings 
of the Jubo League, as individuals the labourers have diverse interests. Some were 
described to me as thieves involved in all sorts of risky violence and closely conneted 
to Awami League actors, while others were far more cautious in their political 
involvement. I asked a small group if they had any connection to the local Sramik 
League. Neymar replied 
No! We don’t have any relationship with them. If we go there we will have to 
go to meetings, processions, and get into fights. We don’t need this. We aren’t 
within politics we are within belly–tics! (amra razneti bitorey na. Amra 
petnetir bitorey!) We work, we eat and sleep. If I can’t get work today, my 
brother here will give me the money, not the party people. If I can’t get food 
today, I can take 10 taka from Jewel bhai to eat. Tomorrow if I can’t find any 
work then I can borrow money from someone else. But if I do party work they 
won’t feed me… maybe he will have 5000 million taka, but at the end he will 
get 3.5 yards of land like me223.  
Involvement in politics is seen here as a fruitless choice. To some it may hold hope of 
large rewards, but others see this as a veneer. The conversation with the moyla workers 
continued. I was told it’s better to have small fishes everyday than one big fish for one 
day… if I go to the procession for 200 taka and a bomb blasts I could die, so why 
would I go? Similar to the stories of men avoiding being used as fodder for political 
interests, I also heard stories of women avoiding the interests of political leaders and 
chamcha. Anika described Antara’s story to me. Antara arrived recently at Osmani 
Uddyan not knowing anyone so stayed at the park for a couple of nights. She was 
                                                 
223 Neymar is expressing a futility about doing politics here, emphasizing how the risks involved are so 
great that even if you earn lots now, in the end you will end up with very little.  
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brought to the attention of the local Jubo League leaders, Ratan bhai and Masum bhai 
who took her into their hold (as in, took control over her) and said “come with us”. 
She tricked them, saying “Brother, not now, later. This is my number. Call me at 
night”. She then came straight to the Amrao Manush centre where she broke her sim 
straight away… Now she doesn’t go back.  
Not only do the kangali purposefully avoid involvement with these party neta and 
boro bhai, but so to do NGOs. Across Dhaka NGO field staff explained similar 
situations in relation to local political leaders. In chapter six I made the argument that 
these NGOs are largely powerless in directly confronting these leaders’ interests. To 
build on this argument, it is important to recognise that NGOs often avoid contact with 
party political leaders and followers altogether. A number of centre managers 
described how they need to keep a little or minimal relationship with them, but beyond 
this, they do not want a relationship with them, while others described not even 
wanting to speak to them. Relationships were perceived as bringing obligations and 
threats, or more accurately, opening up avenues for these actors to leverage any 
perceived weaknesses or needs that the NGO had, to their own – often financial – 
advantage.  Staff and managers described how were they to begin a relationship then 
these leaders would start coming to the centres, creating problems for their work, such 
as asking for chanda. Maintaining weak ties can thus be seen as a tool of the weak, a 
means by which certain forms of mediated access are avoided, and a way of not 
entering into dependencies that represent risk.  
9.3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has offered an important counterweight to key arguments developed in 
this thesis. Despite the fact that the ruling coalition weaves its way down to the lowest 
hierarchical levels of urban life, and that powerful intermediaries are common in the 
lives of the kangali, it has been argued that the grasp these actors have on resources is 
not total, and that the kangali actively exploit these gaps. Access to the open space in 
which people often live in Dhaka, to money gained through begging, or to recyclable 
goods laying strewn around the city, are not for the most part mediated by others. 
Exploiting these can be a means of reducing expenditure and help avoid the risks 
associated with intermediaries, such as the necessity to participate in political 
violence. These have been conceptualised here as ‘defiled surpluses’, resources that 
can be productively exploited but at the cost of an association with the defiled. These 
can be seen as materialising through the convergence of a range of factors, including 
having relationships elsewhere, and the ability to bear the costs of an association with 
the defiled, which is not felt equally (Jackman 2016).  
Exploiting these gaps helps avoid the complex and often high-risk dependencies that 
intermediation can necessitate. Furthermore, even when people do depend on an 
intermediary, the risks these relationships pose are negotiated. People creatively try 
and maintain weak ties, gaining access to resources, but avoiding some of the 
obligations that these opportunities can represent. These strategies are supported 
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through tools such as lying and role-playing, which people utilise in everyday life to 
help pursue their interests, negotiate access and its terms. The majority of the kangali 
thus pursue opportunities to improve their lives without demonstrating a capability for 
violence, but creatively negotiating around the violence capabilities of others. These 
strategies thus sit alongside the attempts people make to work their way up the social 
order as described in the preceding chapter. In practice, these dynamics intertwine in 
people’s lives in complex ways. Hence some of the kangali, for example, are heavily 
dependent on labour leaders, or required to participate politically and give chanda to 
political leaders, while also reducing expenditure by living in the open, enabling them 
to invest elsewhere.  
10. CONCLUSION 
 
It isn’t possible for everyone to be good. It also isn’t possible for everyone to be bad. 
The world is mixed between good and bad 
Marium, formerly of pantha kunjo pavement-slum and now an NGO centre cleaner 
This thesis has examined how the kangali live in the shade of others, and how these 
relationships are conditioned by the nature of social order in Bangladesh. The 
dynamics studied are diverse, from the descriptions of Golap’s life as a vegetable thief 
seeking protection from a drug dealer, or as a bus driver under the shelter of a Sramik 
League leader; to the accounts of chanda, labour leaders, political factions and violent 
political mobilisation. Examining the lives of the kangali in a range of contexts 
including a bazar, some pavements and a park have offered insight into how order is 
constituted in microcosm, and how this can account for some of the complexity of this 
shade. The overarching question posed in this thesis regarding how the kangali relate 
to the social order has been responded to through conceptualising intermediation in 
relation to the capability for violence, the ruling coalition and social order.  
This chapter revisits the three sub-questions posed in the methodology, consolidates 
the core arguments of this thesis and reflects on their wider significance. The first half 
of this chapter responds to questions regarding the forms of intermediation 
experienced by the kangali and how these are negotiated. It re-articulates the core 
concept of the politics of intermediation in light of the empirical findings, and 
examines what insights this offers us in the lives of the kangali. The second half of 
this chapter asks what the research tells us about the nature of social order in 
Bangladesh. This section consolidates arguments concerning how the capability for 
violence is organised in Bangladesh, and reflects longer term on Bangladesh’s future, 






10.1. THE POLITICS OF INTERMEDIATION 
1.1.1. THE CORE ARGUMENT  
The politics of intermediation (Devine 1999) was introduced in chapter two as a way 
of conceptualizing the negotiation of access to resources in a society characterized by 
violent intermediaries. This section retraces this theoretical argument, and reflects on 
this concept in light of the empirical arguments made. A premise of this thesis has 
been to understand social order in Bangladesh as stemming from how a dispersed set 
of actors with a capability for violence form a coalition (North et al 2009). A further 
premise has been to see this coalition as formed from actors at different levels of 
society (Khan 2010b, 2013), and hence Bangladesh’s political settlement involves 
societal elites, but also networks which weave down throughout society to the 
grassroots. This framework draws attention to the structural significance of ‘violence 
specialists’ (Tilly 2003). According to this model, social order stems from actors 
within the coalition extracting resources from society, and controlling the access that 
others have to resources. This process enables order by incentivising actors with a 
capability for violence not to be violent, and by these actors dominating potential rivals 
outside of the coalition. Logically, the structures and processes by which a capability 
for violence is constituted, and by which resources are extracted, are fundamental to 
how social order is maintained.  
A concept employed in this thesis and fundamental to the model of social order above, 
is that of a ‘ruling coalition’. How actors within this coalition are identified in any 
given context has not been explored empirically in microcosm before. This thesis has 
demonstrated how a capability for violence is dispersed through a wide set of actors. 
Though the kangali commonly identify key ruling party leaders and their followers in 
Awami League organisations as the dominant actors with a capability for violence, 
these actors also rely on others to maintain this capability. Groups of labourers 
organized under a sardar or boro bhai often participate politically, and compete for 
status through party political connections. The degree of party political affiliation 
differs, while some have registration with particular bodies within the Awami League, 
some operate as freer agents, and some align with the opposition. There are layers of 
political affiliation, such that political affiliation can be a tangle (patch), as the boro 
bhai Rubel described it in the jupri group. These findings problematize the notion of 
a ruling coalition if it is seen as drawing a sharp distinction between actors being ‘in’ 
and ‘out’. Though political affiliation and identity is clear cut for some, for many it is 
more ambiguous, and a question of degree, aspect and context.   
The focus of thesis has been to think through the significance of this model of social 
order for the kangali, a sub-group of the urban poor often considered to be the most 
poor and marginalized. The key conceptual step taken was to argue that social order 
manifests itself in the lives of the kangali through the notion of intermediation. 
Intermediation is the need for personalistic dependencies on more powerful actors to 
gain access to resources needed to pursue one’s livelihood and interests. When social 
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order is premised on the dominance of a ruling coalition, actors within this coalition 
need and very often wish to accrue resources. This thesis has argued that mediating 
the access others have to resources is a key means by which this is achieved. As such 
intermediation is intertwined with how violence is organised, and hence central to how 
social order is maintained. This argument thereby recasts a long history of work on 
brokerage and intermediation around the organization of violence 224 . Empirical 
findings substantiate this posited relationship, but also point to its limits. The control 
of a ruling coalition over resources is not total. Some actors who are explicitly 
associated with the opposition maintain control over resources and operate as 
intermediaries. The opportunities of BNP affiliated labour leaders for example may be 
limited under Awami League rule, but they are not totally excluded from controlling 
resources, as in the case of the jupri group. Indeed, there were limited examples of 
BNP leaders still collecting chanda at Osmani Uddyan park. Actors without a direct 
capability for violence such as the NGOs, while significantly limited in their ability to 
confront the interests of party political leaders, can meaningfully mediate the access 
that people have to security (through night shelters for example). A counterpoint to 
that of intermediation is the phenomenon of ‘defiled surpluses’, where people 
creatively avoid intermediation; suggesting that intermediation and its boundaries can 
be seen as a negotiated phenomenon.  
The politics of intermediation is then the negotiation of access to resources, and is 
characterised by the capability for violence of intermediaries. This politics concerns 
both how people negotiate their lives within these hierarchies, but also around the 
violence capabilities of others. The violence capabilities actors have relate to their 
status within or in relation to the ruling coalition. Most fundamentally, actors can have 
a personal capability for direct force, but a greater capability for violence is associated 
with being able to rely on the capabilities of others, be it a faction or – more threatening 
still – the apparatus of the state. This latter ability moves the nature of power away 
from Lukes’ first dimension towards the third, where the implicit or explicit threat of 
violence influences others’ actions. This is a key advantage that actors within the 
ruling party have over opposition. These capabilities are thus demonstrated in diverse 
ways, through a show of force in a strike, a fight or a bombing for example; but also 
through the demonstration of an ability to mobilise others. A samiti can express a 
unity, and visiting cards or proclamations of affiliation can indicate an ability to call 
on more powerful actors. These arguments place significant emphasis on the necessity 
of violence for mobilisation, suggesting that violent mobilisation is a critical means 
by which groups of poor people can improve their status. People however also 
creatively negotiate their status around the violence capabilities of others, through 
associating with defiled surpluses or purposefully maintaining weak ties.  
                                                 
224 To be clear, this is not to argue that all forms of intermediation in Bangladeshi society are necessarily 
characterized by violence in the way examined, but rather that the dominant forms of intermediation in 
the lives of the kangali were, and that the framework of LAO suggests that this is prominent 
characteristic to wider society.  
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The connection between a capability for violence and intermediation conditions the 
terms of these relationships. It means that violence, either direct, threatened or latent, 
can be used to enforce the interests of these intermediaries. This suggests that the 
interplay between violence and intermediation should be a central characteristic to 
how patron-clientelism is conceptualised. That the relationships on which the kangali 
depend are often violent and exploitative is not coincidental, but a function of how 
social order is maintained. They are also however socially embedded. As such they 
are emotionally complex, and their depth cannot be captured by the exchanges 
described here, however important these may be. What this means in practice is that 
the significance of these dependencies in people’s lives are always partly a function 
of the vagaries of people’s personalities, hence accounts of particularly abusive and 
exploitative political leaders can be contrasted with those of helpful, protective and 
supportive ones. A dependency on a local political leader inspired to protect the poor 
by a new-age movement, compared to that of a leader known for raping vulnerable 
women, is extremely significant. Furthermore, seemingly contrasting characteristics 
can also exist simultaneously. The metaphor of ‘living in the shade of others’, adapted 
from Golap’s description of relationships at Karwan Bazar, is a protective image, but 
one that also has resonances of shadow. The sense then is of care being balanced with 
that which is dark and dangerous, capturing some of the complexity described here.  
1.1.2. CONCEPTUALISING THE KANGALI  
Examining the kangali through the politics of intermediation helps to better 
conceptualise this sub-group of the urban poor, and confront some of the prevalent 
ways in which these people are characterised in public discourse in Bangladesh. The 
kangali are by definition the destitute, those perceived as living the most degraded life 
in the urban context, without dignity and without hope. Associated with the worst 
forms of shelter or none at all, they are portrayed as floating (bashoman) and rootless 
(chinomul), disconnected from the social-moral base that a home village (bari) 
represents in Bangladeshi society. They are perceived as lacking the relationships and 
resources to improve their lives, and as debasing themselves by living in the public, 
open space, without even a modicum of privacy. These characterizations are not 
entirely inaccurate, and do in certain ways reflect the lives of the kangali. People 
behave in ways that contravene moral norms in Bangladeshi society, for example by 
taking drugs or having sex outside of marriage; some also are disconnected from their 
bari, driven out by family breakdown, abuse or abandonment; some are truly destitute 
without work or people to rely on; and finally, some (particularly adult males) do move 
from place to place, following networks of mazar (Islamic shrines), and living – atleast 
ostensibly - more aesthetic and religiously inspired lives.  
The dominant narrative emerging from this thesis is however one that radically 
confronts these characterisations by showing how the kangali are intimately connected 
to the social order. Relationships of intermediation permeate down to the street level, 
such as in the lives of market labourers, disabled beggars living on a pavement, waste 
workers living in a park, young thieves in a bazar, or the women sitting in the ground 
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selling scavenged vegetables. The terms of dependencies on labour leaders, linemen 
or political leaders - particularly around the areas of work, business and security - are 
structured by the dynamics to how social order is maintained. The kangali are used for 
political activities, and are a source of chanda; and as such, often support and reaffirm 
the violence capabilities of actors within the ruling coalition. The historical 
connections between the kangali and mastan gangs, or the rootless people and goonda 
in Kolkata, continue in a different form. That these relationships penetrate to the 
lowest hierarchical levels of urban life indicates how deeply rooted and 
comprehensive the dynamics maintaining social order are.  
Furthermore, although outside of their bari, many of the kangali are still very much 
connected to their roots. For some, the potho-bosti (street-slums) in which they live 
are formed through village connections. Many more still retain clear links to their bari, 
and fund rural lives with urban money. This was the case for all of the disabled beggars 
I met outside the Supreme Court, for example. Though there are elements of freedom 
to living in such spaces, in that certain social norms are not so clearly enforced, 
exploiting defiled surpluses represents an intense discipline and sacrifice. It is a 
constructive act in that it can help enable improvements, and opportunities, in lives 
elsewhere. When viewed historically in relation to the significance of caste in historic 
Dhaka, the defiled surpluses proposition suggests an interesting historical 
development. It was argued that an association with that which is considered defiled, 
often inhibited people’s potential to participate in society and structured inequalities. 
The account of the kangali developed in chapter nine suggested dynamics that turn 
this association on its head: an association with that which is considered defiled can 
in fact represent a means by which people improve their livelihoods.  
Through adopting the contentious term kangali, there is inevitably a tension between 
speaking across a group of people, while recognising and exploring heterogeneity 
within the group described. My constant use of ‘the kangali’ should be acknowledged 
as simplistic, and we need to be reminded of the scavenger Masud who emphasised to 
me how people aren’t all the same! This thesis has offered many ways of conceptually 
delineating the kangali through the framework of intermediation. Perhaps most 
fundamentally is the ways and degree to which people live in the shade of others, 
which is to say their distance from some of the intermediaries described. The 
phenomenon of living in the shade of others is however complex, and people can exist 
concurrently at a proximity and distance in different regards. Furthermore, as 
empirical chapters have suggested, there is no simple relationship between this 
intermediation and outcomes in the lives of the kangali. Proximity and distance both 
pose risk and opportunities, and these materialise in people’s lives in different ways, 





10.2. SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY BANGLADESH 
1.1.3. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF VIOLENCE  
Bangladesh was recently conceptualised as a ‘vulnerable semi-mature LAO’ (Khan 
2013). Even in the short period between Khan’s analysis, the research for this thesis, 
and writing this now, much seems to have changed. This section reflects on 
Bangladesh’s recent political transition through events described in this thesis, but 
does so through understanding it in relation to previous changes in the country’s 
political settlement from the late 1980s. Through these periods a thread can be 
discerned: the ever-closer association between violence, the ruling coalition and party 
politics. 
The backdrop to this research is a transition in the structure of the ruling coalition 
during the late 1980s under President Ershad. Khan (2010a) describes the need for 
Ershad to appeal to wider groups within society to consolidate and maintain his 
dominant capability for violence. The lack of research and sources from this period 
necessitates a degree of conjecture, however at Karwan Bazar this period is associated 
with increased political participation at the grassroots and also large gangs, dominated 
by powerful and infamous leaders. With the return to parliamentary democracy in 
1991 and the fierce conflict for power that ensued, both political parties and these 
gangsters grew in strength. Gangsters were associated in public imagination through 
a host of terms both old and new to Bangladesh, including mastan, shontrash, goonda, 
“top terror”, “mafia” and “godfather”. These gangsters operated as powerful 
intermediaries, particularly in the lives of the poor. They began to be mentioned in 
academic work through the 1990s, were often discussed in the media, and almost 
mythologized in public imagination, as seen in films from that period. Though 
politically sheltered, many gangsters retained a degree of independence from party 
politics, and could shift with the political currents; and hence the same figure could 
function under different regimes such as the Jatiyo Dal, BNP or Awami League.  
Alongside political relationships, these gangsters had complex relationships to the 
state, and were often pursued and arrested by the police. Picchi Hannan for example 
rose to power through meeting Sweden Aslam in prison, and later had to move from 
safe house to safe house to evade capture, while his gang ruled his territory. These 
gangsters had a significant capability for violence, for which they were feared and 
infamous, however many were unable to draw significantly upon the support of the 
police or apparatus of the state. They could not truly develop power in Lukes’ third 
dimension and as such other groups could always form to challenge their capability 
for violence, which is why the period was associated with significant violence as gangs 
openly fought for dominance. 
From the early 2000s, Dhaka however saw significant change. With Operation Clean 
Heart and later the formation of RAB, the state violently pursued these gangsters, first 
killing Picchi Hannan and then many more in “crossfire”. Most infamous gangsters 
were either killed, imprisoned, fled to India, or managed to move into politics or 
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business. In Dhaka some gangs do still exist, but only in a diminished form. The 
destruction of these gangs did not however result in a discontinuation of many of the 
roles associated with them, such as collecting chanda, running illegal businesses or 
mobilising people towards political violence. Indeed, the formation of RAB and 
increased capability for violence of the state, enabled bodies within or associated with 
political parties, to take over these roles. These bodies thus have a greater capability 
for violence than mastan gangs in that they are able to draw upon the strength of the 
state, threaten arrest, police cases and imprisonment. Political parties have what was 
often described by the kangali and key informants as an agreement with the police. 
Chanda is funnelled through linemen into the police and the police can be relied upon 
to protect the ruling party, utilising the wider systems of law enforcement such as the 
courts where and when necessary. These politically affiliated actors thus have a far 
greater capability for violence, which increases their power in Lukes’ third dimension, 
the ability to influence preferences. The consolidation of power in the hands of the 
ruling political party has increased an underlying latent or implicit violence within 
society that conditions what is or is not possible. This may offer one explanation for 
why the levels of physical violence have decreased so markedly in the lives of the 
kangali and the wider research contexts. Although Dhaka city experiences far fewer 
incidents of physical violence, order is premised on a profound underlying violence.  
The uneasy peace that this consolidation of violence capabilities has created, has 
enabled a degree of political stability, which has been further consolidated after the 
landslide election victory in January 2014 (landslide only because the BNP refused to 
participate). During the research, the BNP’s status as a serious opposition party 
became more and more precarious, such that by the time research had finished, they 
were unable to mount a serious presence on the streets to demonstrate their strength. 
Attempts to do so – like those I observed in Dhaka in 2014-2015 – were quickly 
overwhelmed by the Awami League and clamped down on by the police. On days the 
BNP or Jamaat-e-Islami did call hartal during this period, key intersections and areas 
in Dhaka were busy with political activists, but those of the Awami League. The 
attempts of the jupri group to mobilise initially alongside BNP muscle, and then in 
support of the BNP through bombings, illustrate in microcosm the consequences of 
overtly supporting the opposition party. Parvez had his hands and feet smashed by 
RAB while tied down to a rickshaw van, and Azad and Rubel were still, when I left 
fieldwork, in Dhaka Central Jail. If the story at Karwan Bazar resembles elsewhere, 
then the ability of the BNP to even organise a simple bombing has also been largely 
controlled.  
The story from Dhaka over recent decades is then the consolidation of a capability for 
violence within party political structures, on the back of the state, and now more 
recently the consolidation of violence capabilities in one particular party, the Awami 
League. This all seems to indicate the re-emergence of the authoritarianism of 
Bangladeshi politics prior to 1991 (Khan 2010a). Understood within the LAO 
framework, the significance of this for Bangladesh’s future are ambiguous. A key 
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‘doorstep condition’, necessary for a transition to an OAO, is the consolidated control 
of the military. Applied to Bangladesh where a capability for violence is maintained 
by a wider set of actors than the army and police (for example political parties, labour 
factions, and historically gangsters), the transition described seems to represent the 
consolidation of violence capabilities within a particular institution, namely political 
parties, however still dispersed throughout society. In other words, though the 
organisational forms through which violence can be organised are more limited, these 
are still controlled at different levels of society and have not been consolidated by a 
central state. This analysis of recent decades of political transition sets the stage for 
further reflection on Bangladesh, its future, and further research.  
1.1.4. FUTURE RESEARCH AND CHANGE IN BANGLADESH 
A premise of the model of social order on which this thesis has reflected and built, is 
that there is no teleology moving societies through different stages of development 
(North et al 2009). Whether the changes observed in the research contexts and 
described above in terms of the institutionalization of violence, represent a movement 
towards the OAO model is debatable. Furthermore, there are no guarantees of where 
Bangladeshi society will move from here. Bangladesh could move into a period of 
political stability under a one-party state bolstered by strong economic growth, 
fracture into forms of organised violence both familiar and unknown, or move in ways 
yet unclear. It is on this basis that we can consider how this model of social order 
informs our understanding of Bangladesh’s future, and the areas for further research 
that emerge from this.  
The central problematic emerging from this thesis concerns how the capability for 
violence is organised, and the significance of this for maintaining social order. In light 
of the transitions described above a fundamental question for understanding 
Bangladesh’s future is the dynamics of social order that this authoritarianism gives 
birth to, and whether the current government will be able to maintain their grip on 
power under these conditions. The concentration of a capability for violence within 
the ruling party is often flagrantly exhibited; for example through brandishing 
weapons at protests, public humiliations, targeted beatings and killings. The abuse and 
violence that ruling party actors can mete out on others can however relatively easily 
become the focus of significant domestic (and even international) media attention. 
This is particularly so given the widespread use of social media, and the ability for 
videos and photos to ‘go viral’. These events can seriously undermine the perceived 
legitimacy of the ruling party by the public. Whether a serious public backlash could 
form against a loss of the government’s moral standing is unknown, however events 
such as Shahbagh 225  do suggest a degree of unpredictability in the forms of 
mobilisation possible in Bangladesh. It is perhaps in light of this unknown that when 
particular incidents of abuse have garnered significant media attention, these have 
                                                 
225  The 2013 protests at Shahbagh junction north of Dhaka University against a verdict of life 
imprisonment for a war criminal in the 1971 war of independence, and in favour of the death penalty.  
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usually been met with direct comment and action from either the Prime Minister 
herself, or at a Ministerial level. The Prime Minister has made very public declarations 
that Awami League bodies will be held accountable for their crimes, and the courts 
have – in highly visible instances – followed through these actions, even when it has 
meant imprisoning relatively senior political leaders. This raises the difficult question 
of how the apparent ‘excesses’ of political leaders can be controlled, when these 
‘excesses’ can represent the process of maintaining power, and accruing resources, on 
which social order rests.  
Under ‘authoritarian clientelism’ swathes of political operators at different levels of 
society have been cut from the resources that they would have expected to control 
since early 2014. Though violence specialists by training the extent to which they can 
mobilise significant forces on the streets is clearly highly limited. What has become 
and will become of these violence specialists remains to be studied and seen. One 
possibility is that they calculate that their political careers are over, at least for now, 
and focus on non-political activities. Another option is that some use their capability 
for violence but mobilise in new or different ways. Questions have been raised about 
the extent to which Islamic extremists will benefit from this, although there is not 
convincing evidence of this connection. A further possibility is that they become 
incorporated in some capacity within the dominant coalition. Indeed, this was the 
experience of Parvez at Karwan Bazar, the BNP activist orchestrating bombings who 
became a RAB informer. Placating the violence capabilities of political organisers and 
factions across society is premised on having the resources to do so. This raises a 
second critical area for Bangladesh’s future, whether the resource base on which social 
order is maintained will remain sufficient. Economic growth has been strong despite 
political upheaval and terrorist attacks, but whether it will remain so cannot be 
predicted. This balance will furthermore remain vulnerable to yet unknown external 
factors be they environmental, geopolitical or economic.  
The sense of unpredictability in Bangladesh’s political settlement reflects the non-
teleological nature of social order, the rapidly changing political landscape, but also 
our lack of understanding about how social order is constituted and maintained. The 
recent wave of micro political economy analyses has given insight into the 
environment in which the urban poor live, and this thesis has further demonstrated 
how much more there is to understand. If our analytical concern is to understand how 
order is constituted, then empirically we must focus attention on how violence is 
organised. In the urban context this requires engaging in new ways with key actors, 
both familiar and new. There is, for example, little institutional analysis of the political 
parties, of the police, or other security forces and Dhaka city corporation. There is 
little sense of the complexity within these institutions, for example the webs former, 
linemen and chamcha, of the negotiations and balance between and within them. 
Further research within this field is therefore critical and can take many forms.  
Moving beyond the contextualised case study of Picchi Hannan, further investigation 
into the political economy of the transition argued for could help nuance the argument 
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made, demonstrating how these gangsters have fallen, where they have evolved, and 
the comparative impact that direct dominance by the political parties has had. 
Institutional analyses of the Awami League or police, and the relationships between 
them, could be approached in a multitude of ways. It could, for example, be through 
understanding a particular sector, further ethnographic research in a particular area but 
with greater focus on these institutions, or be more actor-oriented, understanding how 
individuals navigate and pursue their careers within these. It could also take a 
particular case, for example the interesting conflict between elected officials, Dhaka 
North and South City mayors, and hawkers and transport workers, which has played 
over the past couple of years. As the ruling party’s authoritarian control is 
consolidated, there may even be a new emerging power balance between the apparatus 
of the state (the police and RAB for example) and the ruling party, as the government 
calculates how it can most efficiently maintain power and social order.   
A final and pressing question, to return to the focus of this thesis, is the fate of the 
poor. What will this authoritarianism bring for the kangali in their attempts to improve 
their lives? How these macro shifts in the structure and form of a ruling coalition will 
be felt at the grassroots, remains an open question. The last transition described from 
mastan gangs to closer party political control led to a significant decline in physical 
violence, such that the kangali describe their security as far improved today. How a 
decline in party political competition will change the dynamics of intermediation is 
likely to be complex. Shifting time horizons and incentives may influence the bonds 
created and necessitated, posing new opportunities, risks and challenges. Factional or 
the re-emergence of party political conflict will likely further call on the kangali as a 
source of chanda and violence capabilities. The potential for defiled surpluses may 
decline if intermediation imposes itself, economic growth slows or violence erupts. 
What is clear is that negotiating the shade of others will remain central to the lives of 
the kangali, and the dynamics to this must be further understood as Bangladesh moves 
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